hankyoreh

By Lee Jong-won, professor of International Affairs at Rikkyo University, Japan

The six party talks get underway again in Beijing on February 8. There are a lot of expectations for some tangible "progress." In the meantime, it’s a little hard to side with this optimism, especially when you consider how expectations have repeatedly led to disappointment in the three years since the first round in August 2003.

Last week, the United States and North Korea held working-level talks in Beijing to discuss U.S. financial measures, which Pyongyang says have to be resolved in order to talk nukes at the six-party talks. Pyongyang hasn’t said anything official in response to that meeting. However, on February 5, the Choson Sinbo, the official publication of the pro-Pyongyang Chongryeon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, had this to say: "If it is determined that the American side has settled on the right kind of direction and has established a breakthrough for discussing the nuclear issue, [North] Korea will respond proactively." It went on to say that the "issue of financial measures must not be emphasized as an obstacle" if the six-party talks "are going to move forward smoothly." What you notice is that this stance seems quite different from the North’s prior one, which called the removal of financial sanctions a "precondition" for progress at the six-party talks. The choice of phrasing sounds much more flexible.

The Choson Sinbo also said that the North had expressed to the U.S. its willingness to accept the closure of the nuclear facility at Yongbyon and the inspections that would come with that. This all hints at the likelihood the North is going to have a constructive attitude at the six-party talks.

For starters, it is fortunate that the North Korea nuclear crisis, which once had parties headed for collision, is now becoming more about negotiation. Most encouraging is that the Bush administration has had a change of attitude. The neocons have lost much of their standing because of the failure of the Iraq war, and you notice that the Bush administration has "yielded" toward the North since its nuclear test. It had long refused to negotiate directly with Pyongyang, but recently there have has been bilateral contact on more than one occasion. It is not yet known what the two sides have been talking about, but it appears that in addition to overall ways to improve relations, there is also something of a return to the oft-maligned gradual approach favored by the Clinton administration. The appearance being given is that the U.S. is trying to "accomplish a minimum" of something with a North Korea that, by lowering its demands, is looking more "composed" than usual.

You even get the feeling that the two sides are reversing roles compared to how things were between the financial measures began in September 2005 and the missile launch in July of last year. During that time, Pyongyang was all but openly begging to talk with the U.S. about the financial measures. During the unofficial six-party talks in Tokyo in April of last year, North Korean deputy foreign minister Kim Kye-gwan even waited at the Chinese embassy without an appointment of any kind in the hopes that top U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill would come to talk. The North was making a rare display of weakness, and U.S. hard-liners congratulated themselves at the effectiveness of those measures and sought to gain even more of a stranglehold. It was in this context that Pyongyang launched some missiles and tested a nuclear device. Maybe it would be too wild a conspiracy theory to assume the North deliberately exhibited its weak spot to induce the U.S. to take a hard-line position to in turn allow it to justify the missile and bomb tests. But on the stage of international politics you regularly see hard-line policies bring about the same on the other side.

I'd like to believe that the more conciliatory approach on both sides is going to lead to real negotiations. However, both Pyongyang and Washington still have hard-line factions in their midst. From their perspective, looking like you are ready to negotiate might be a tool for going hard-line again, or it might be a way to buy time. While it is a fact the neocons have a weaker position right now, conditions continue to exist that would allow the negotiations to become prolonged while upping the pressure on Pyongyang and causing the negotiations to break down into serious tensions. The Choson Sinbo also noted that "wasting time checking each other out could lead to a drawn-out situation that might upset the possibility of, and the framework for, resolving the issues." It said both sides need to "make big steps without delay."

This mood conducive to negotiation did not come easily, and should be taken advantage of. It is time for the kind of diplomacy that could bring the post-Cold War framework for the Korean peninsula to a higher level.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]