hankyoreh

By Kim Ji-seok, editorial writer

When it comes to the North Korean nuclear issue, the biggest question is whether Pyongyang has decided or will decide to make the "strategic decision" to give up its nuclear weapons or not. Those who think the main reason it developed nuclear weapons was for the political and military goal of preserving its government tend to think it won’t make this decision, and those who think it developed its program as leverage in negotiations with the United States tend to think it will. Those working on the six-party talks refrain from making any judgment about what Pyongyang has decided at the moment, but believe that it will ultimately give up its nuclear program if negotiations go well, making them positive about what will happen regarding certain current conditions.

North Korea continues to fail to live up to its pledge to implement the first stage of action on closing its nuclear facility as outlined in the agreement that came out of the six-party talks on February 13. Its stated reason is that there hasn’t been resolution to the issue of its money previously frozen at Banco Delta Asia. What more has North Korea gotten from obsessing with that money since the U.S. and the North arrived at an agreement on the issue on March 19? All it got was an April 10 announcement from the U.S. Treasury Department saying the freeze was being lifted. The international finance industry, however, still doesn’t want to touch Pyongyang’s money. Surely the North has acutely felt how the treatment it gets in the international community changes depending on how it behaves, and not on the Americans.

North Korea is losing a lot. Distrust of Pyongyang is growing again. Those who are carefully positive about it making the right choice hold that the condition for being positive about the future depends on gradual, give-and-take progress based on the agreement arrived at the six-party talks. The talks are a process that is supposed to begin with small steps and gradually build confidence that leads to the North giving up its nuclear program and the establishment of a peace regime for the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Thus, if the North does not build a basis for confidence in this, the first phase of all, it could upset the whole framework of the six-party process. Pyongyang’s money at Banco Delta Asia is a relatively small issue, but confidence in North Korea is so important that everything about the talks depends on it. It has to stop "obsessing with minor things while losing over the bigger things" (sotam daesil).

The U.S. appears to be thinking of going as far as normalizing relations between Pyongyang and Washington by next year, when the Bush administration comes to an end. Just as it suddenly sought diplomatic relations with China to get out of the deadlock it found itself in half a century ago, it is looking for a new approach on the Korean peninsula. The change would be politically justified because it would be consistent with the direction of reestablishing peace, as desired by most nations in Northeast Asia, including North and South Korea. However, this is not something that can be entirely welcomed when it comes to method, since once the U.S. decides on a framework, other countries have to follow along, despite any dislike of the unilateralism unique to that superpower.

That kind of attitude could create unnecessary obstacles and influence the whole situation. When it comes to the question of Pyongyang’s money, the U.S. made the mistake of thinking matters would be resolved once it decided to lift its hold on the funds, thereby wasting a lot of time in implementing the February 13 agreement. The U.S. stumbled on a little rock because it was looking only at the big picture. It "tripped while going after something big" (daetam siljok).

Thinking about what kind of decision Pyongyang will make forces one to look at the most basic character of the six-party talks differently. Unlike those who think the talks are useful and that therefore they will lead somewhere, those who think Pyongyang will not decide to give up its program think it is agreeing to the talks only for strategic motives, to momentarily avoid international pressure. The moment of truth will arrive when the February 13 agreement is implemented, and then we will know who was right. The biggest variable influencing what the truth will be is confidence, and the depth of that confidence is going to be determined by self-fulfilling thinking and action. Confidence becomes more firm when you trust your counterpart and act in good faith on your part of an agreement. The nations participating in the six-party talks need to stop paying too much attention to minor issues and those that are too far off in the distance, and instead follow a path of "no loss, all gain" (musil yuik) that builds upon substantial accomplishments. This is particularly important for North Korea.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]