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Ryu Jae Hoon, Washinton Correspondent

The bigger the expectation the bigger the disappointment. There are sure signs of a storm brewing in Washington now that the sixty-day deadline for implementing the first stage of the February 13 agreement, the one that came out of the last round of six party talks, has come and gone without Pyongyang doing its part. It is not a tornado yet, but you cannot be sure it will not become one.

U.S. assistant state secretary Christopher Hill, who had negotiated so ambitiously while testing the limits of his authority, has been hard to get a glimpse of since returning on April 16 from a visit to Korea, China, and Japan. Hill tends to be media-friendly, so this is evidence that he finds himself in a corner.

As recently as early January Hill would repeatedly say that the U.S. Treasury Department's investigation into Macao's Banco Delta Asia was a "law enforcement issue" that was not a matter for the State Department. It was he who, after the talks in Berlin, achieved a huge turnaround when he got president George W. Bush to make a tough political decision and get the Treasury Department to cooperate when it did not want to lift its freeze on North Korea's money in Macao. Until the very end, the Treasury Department insisted it would only release funds that were legal. Hill convinced everyone that Pyongyang would carry through with the agreement if the U.S. let go of all the money, even the illegal funds that were going to be a problem. At this point, however, his argument has gone flat. People in the State Department who believe in negotiating with North Korea say they find themselves embarrassed.

Hill appears to have believed North Korean deputy foreign minister Kim Kye-gwan when he said things would change when the Pyongyang had its money in hand. North Korea says the promise it received at the Berlin talks about getting its frozen funds back was an assurance that financial sanctions were lifted. People who have been part of the six party talks say at first the North demanded just what was legal about the US$25 million, then its demands grew to include all of it. Now it wants more than just being able to do international wire transfers; it wants an end to all financial sanctions, including international financial transactions.

The question of North Korea's money in Banco Delta Asia used to be a technical and procedural one, but since has become a most fundamental issue, a precondition for moving ahead on the six parties' principle of "action for action." The Northerners are essentially telling the U.S. to be responsible even for things like its international credit. They are effectively demanding that the U.S. say uncle by saying it was wrong for investigating and doing something about what it said was the North's illegal activity, and do back to how things were before the money was even an issue. Pyongyang needs to realize that it cannot entirely blame the U.S. for the fact the Bank of China refused being involved in the transfer of its cash.

Those who were critical of Hill's approach to the negotiations saw their chance. They're saying that Pyongyang "keeps moving the goal posts" and that it was a mistake to have unleashed all the funds in Macao. There are even calls for the February 13 agreement to be scrapped. At an April 24 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, Robert Joseph, who resigned as the State Department's senior arms control official before he resigned last month because of the recent change in America's approach to North Korea, said pressure was the best way to control a North Korea that is currently the biggest proliferation threat.

The upcoming U.S.-Japan summit is going to reinforce the current mood. Michael Green, the former Asia specialist on the White House National Security Council who is widely recognized for his knowledge of Japan, says that Bush will follow along when Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe tries to persuade him to put the pressure on Pyongyang again. Japan has been left out of the action at the six party talks, but North Korea's delay in implementing its part of the February 13 agreement is going to be what revives cooperation on Pyongyang between the U.S. and Japan.

That, in turn, will mean Hill and others in favor of a negotiated approach are going to have less room to maneuver in. One source told me that "things are gonna get really difficult if the North Koreans don't get moving in a week or two." Lately Pyongyang's attitude looks like all it wants to do is delay the six party process and crush its toughest opponent. It is helping the hardliners in Washington.

April in Washington D.C. brings snow and hail and strong winds only to turn warm enough for short sleeves. Times that are as hard to adjust to as spring in Washington continue when it comes to North Korea.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]