hankyoreh

Lee Jong-won, Rikkyo University professor of International Affairs

Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao came Japan in mid April. It was the first visit by top Chinese leadership in six years, when his predecessor Zhu Rongji came in October 2000. Chinese leaders have refused to visit Japan, in protest of Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi's trips to worship at Yasukuni Jinja. You can see in the reciprocal visits that began when current Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe visited Beijing shortly after his inauguration in October a deliberate attempt to demonstrate that relations are recovering from the situation that began because of the Yasukuni issue.

China's proactive approach is particularly noticeable. Wen said that Abe's visit to Beijing was an "ice-breaking" visit, while his trip to Tokyo would "melt that ice." Wen's speech before the Japanese Diet was broadcast live in both countries. That was quite unusual. Having him speak at the Diet was a gesture of the Japanese government, but it was also the result of strong requests by the Chinese. It gave you a peak at a desire to make it clear relations with Japan were being improved, something meant for domestic Chinese opinion. While before the Diet Wen said he has "taken positive note of repeated expressions of introspection and apology by the Japanese government and Japanese leaders," and that he has "not forgotten Japan's assistance in Chinese reform, openness, and modernization." During his short three-day, two-night visit they produced visible accomplishments like the establishment of a "strategic and mutually beneficial relationship," building formal channels for high-level economic dialogue, and cooperation on energy conservation and the environment. While in Tokyo Wen went jogging, visited cultural sites, and did a little baseball with a university baseball team in some "publicity diplomacy" intended to influence public opinion in Japan. Later, at an international academic symposium, Chinese scholars affiliated with state-sponsored institutions there could hardly conceal their excitement at Wen's "big success." You sensed you were looking at a lot of interest on the side of the Chinese.

The biggest factor in China's approaching Japan is the desire for economic cooperation, particularly support for China's efforts in the area of the environment and technological cooperation. Continued Japanese investment is essential if China wants to maintain its energetic economy. Some observers say it is a strategy to, over the long run, strengthen relations with Japan so as to embrace it as a regional partner and use that to confront the relationship between Japan and the United States. It is the idea of strategic relations with Japan that has been discussed in China since the mid-nineties. What you are seeing is the unveiling of pragmatic diplomacy that on the one hand pursues military modernization so as to be able to stand up to the U.S.-Japan alliance and seek the creation of a "Urasian alternative alliance" that includes Russia and Central Asia, all while simultaneously working on relations and doing your best to avoid a conflict with the U.S. and Japan.

Naturally, Japan has complex motives, too. It is simultaneously going to respond in kind to Chinese "smile diplomacy" and try to legalize its "right to collective self-defense" and, based on that, move on to the next level when in the integration of its military with that of the U.S. The uniquely dynamism of international politics in the global era is swirling around the Korean peninsula, and the dynamic is one where strategy and pragmatism intersect and conflict and cooperation coexist.

Compared to Sino-Japanese relations, relations between Korea and Japan continue to be at a stalemate. When the Korean and Japanese foreign ministers met ahead of Wen's visit to Tokyo, they met way south in Jeju, instead of in Seoul. One issue on the agenda was a visit to Japan by president Roh Moo-hyun, but that was not even discussed, and reportedly the mood was a chilly one because of issues of history. Observers said the reason might have been the Abe cabinet's approach, which is to avoid bringing up history issues with Korea and wait for the next Korean election. That is something in sharp contrast to what it has done in the way of diplomacy with China. There is a lot of skepticism in the air about the soon-to-be-announced formation of a joint Korea-Japan history research project. Setting relations right with a Japan that is turning to the political right is not going to be easy. We are at a point where again we need strategic thinking and effort when it comes to reestablishing Korean-Japanese relations, just as during the early stages of the Participatory Government of Roh Moo-hyun and while pursuing the realization of a peace regime for the Korean peninsula.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]