hankyoreh

By Lee Byeong-cheol, Senior Researcher at Institute of Peace and Cooperation

Several cold fronts are forming: one between North and South Korea over rice, and one between North Korea and the United States over the issue of Pyongyang's money in Macao's Banco Delta Asia. Nothing has happened in the way of implementation of the February 13 agreement since it was signed by South Korea and the other countries participating in the six-party talks. The situation has continued already for more than four months.

It is the United States that is the most caught off guard by this. It is no longer a secret that the U.S. state and treasury departments are arm-wrestling over what to do with North Korea's money in Macao. Currently, it is highly likely the treasury is going to "win by decision." Subsequently, the time it will take for North Korea to get its money back because of domestic U.S. law is going to be longer than what the state department expected, which will naturally mean it takes longer for North Korea to carry out its first-phase obligations pursuant to the February 13 agreement.

Assistant state secretary Christopher Hill, chief six-party negotiator for the U.S., recently compared the situation to a video game. The farther you get, the harder it gets. The harder you pull on a rope, the tighter the knot becomes. The North Korean nuclear situation could stretch out over the long term unless there is a dramatic breakthrough. You hear reports that the Bush administration is nearing the end of its patience.

North Korea is also taking an unyielding stance. On June 1, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong Nam called on the U.S. to make the first move, saying it is "up to the U.S. to remove the last obstacle to closing the nuclear facility at Yongbyon." Kim Myong Kil, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, has also said Pyongyang needs to get its money before it can take the initial steps in freezing its nuclear program. North Korea, too, then, intends to tighten the knot instead of loosening it.

At the recently held 21st round of cabinet-level talks between North and South Korea, the North Korean delegation strongly demanded that the South quickly give it aid in the form of rice. However, the South Korean government had repeatedly said it would not start rice shipments unless Pyongyang got started on the February 13 agreement. There was essentially a breakdown in the talks, since they ended without so much as being able to decide on a specific date for the next round.

The case the Bush administration made so tenaciously was "strategically" right on the mark - that the focus has to be on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. It is also simply fact that rice aid and the money in Macao are connected, as public opinion in South Korea would not be favorable towards a ship heading North with rice before the North's nuclear issue - now tied to the money - is resolved. It has become very likely that relations between Seoul and Pyongyang are going to go nowhere for a while because of this, despite having felt so good recently because of developments like the historic opening of railway links across the DMZ.

The problem becomes one of whether the U.S. is going to be patient and wait. North Korea needs to be watching how the Bush administration goes about negotiations regarding enriched uranium in Iran. Moderates in the administration find themselves with increasingly less to work with these days, and gradually more members of Congress are criticizing the administration for its North Korea policy.

Pyongyang would actually do itself good right now to take this opportunity to win the confidence of the international community by exerting its own so-called "big politics" which it has been proud of - namely, a flexible, less rigid version. One would like to see North Korea show that it can loosen the knot before it comes to extreme methods like taking a knife to cut a rope that has become extremely taut. It is Pyongyang that provided the cause for the current stalemate, and it should actively show that it wants to resolve the nuclear issue. If that were to happen, South Korean rice could pass into North Korea sooner than expected, and it seems clear that it would also help lead to the normalization of ties between Pyongyang and Washington.

If North Korea has any ability to read the "sincerity" shared by South Korea and the United States, it could reap a much bigger harvest than it thinks. It could make resolving the ever so complicated nuclear issue so much easier if it starts taking action where it can.