hankyoreh

Jang Jung-soo, Editorial writer

Until returning to Korea recently, I spent the past year at a think tank in Washington, D.C., where I had a lot of opportunities to talk with American experts in Korean and Northeast Asian affairs. Their main interest was the North Korean nuclear issue. After the mood turned toward negotiation in the wake of the February 13 agreement, however, they showed interest in South Korea’s upcoming presidential election as well. With few exceptions, everyone I met would ask about the election. They wanted to know if the Grand National Party was going to win the presidency and who would be Uri Party’s candidate.

“If the election were held tomorrow, the GNP would win,” I would always answer. “However, there is still a lot of time before the vote slated for December this year and so you never know if they will really do it or not.” Most of those who remembered how Roh Moo-hyun the candidate won at the last moment in the 2002 presidential election seemed to agree.

Most Korean affairs experts in Washington were predicting that the GNP would win. In the meantime there were also those expecting a dramatic turnaround on the part of the liberal candidate, or who thought it was possible a third candidate could suddenly appear center stage. They recognize that Korean politics is very dynamic.

However, many American experts think that even if a GNP candidate wins there are not going to be major changes in Seoul’s policy towards North Korea. Comments made by former GNP chairwoman Park Geun-hye when she visited the United States had no small influence in this. When she met with American leaders while in Washington two years ago Park stressed the need for U.S. support for Seoul’s policy of engagement. Members of the Bush Administration who had been talking about North Korea in a way quite different from South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun’s “peace and prosperity” policy were reportedly left in considerable shock by the things Park said. I was told that as a result, American experts on Korean affairs came to realize that the engagement policy was a national consensus among the Korean public and more than something about which there was partisan interest. I also came to understand that the view that there would be no fundamental change in Seoul’s basic tone towards Pyongyang began to spread in Washington.

The fact there is no particular preference for a particular Korean party or candidate by observers in Washington watching the presidential campaign seems to be because there is wide understanding about this. Policymakers who, when it comes to policy on the Korean peninsula, place the highest priority on a fundamental resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue seem to be not overly concerned with who might win the election, so long as the election does not disrupt the process of negotiating an end to the nuclear situation.

The subtle discord between Seoul and Washington on a potential North-South summit meeting originates from a difference of opinion on how to resolve the nuclear issue. The United States is concerned that a summit held before Pyongyang gets rid of its nuclear program could delay the United States’ timetable for disabling that program, while South Korea is actively pursuing a summit because it believes holding one would give Seoul more leadership in the course of the negotiations as they continue. Maybe the reason Washington is opposed to an inter-Korean summit is because of political considerations on the part of American conservatives who perhaps think that a summit, if held this year, might work to the advantage of a liberal presidential candidate in South Korea. Conservative elements in South Korea have been accusing the United States of betrayal because of the February 13 agreement, and have been doing all they can towards American conservatives, saying that an inter-Korean summit would hurt their chances of winning the election. Currently the Bush Administration does not look favourably on the idea of a summit, but if there is rapid progress in talks on disabling North Korea’s nuclear capabilities it is highly likely it could allow itself to watch a summit happen. This being the case, whether or not an inter-Korean summit is held will be determined by South Korea’s diplomatic capabilities and the choices made by Pyongyang.