hankyoreh

By Park Hyeong-joong, Senior Researcher, Korea Institution of National Unification(KINU)

This year it looks like Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” is overcoming its isolation and getting another chance both internationally and in Korea. Meanwhile, the United States’ policy on North Korea has changed, and the main opposition Grand National Party is working to change its official position. Therefore, the position being proposed might as well be called a “conservative Sunshine Policy.” This is good news to Sunshine’s supporters. But there is something we need to bear in mind - it is a very changed world.

For its first three years, the Sunshine Policy of the administration of Kim Dae-jung was pursued with the support of the United States and Japan. North Korea, in turn, needed Seoul’s help in improving relations with those two countries and joining the international community. China was a friendly spectator.

Things suddenly changed in 2001 when the Bush administration launched its hostile policy toward North Korea. However, now, in 2007, things have suddenly changed again. Since testing a nuclear device, North Korea has succeeded in getting the bilateral talks it so wanted with Washington. However, the U.S. ability to negotiate with Pyongyang is weaker than it used to be. The nuclear materials and weapons North Korea might have are not being talked about yet. The United States is diplomatically weak because of problems in the Middle East and political division on the domestic front. In addition, Washington is not getting cooperation from Japan on its policy towards North Korea.

It would be hard to say that America’s emotional and strategic identification with South Korea is a strong one. Though most of the policy differences between the United States and South Korea have been resolved, there are still emotional leftovers and strong suspicions about South Korea in Washington because of the strong anti-American sentiment in South Korea over the past six years and because Seoul has pursued an independent foreign policy. South Korea, in turn, tends to express the same kind of resentment and suspicion towards the Americans. During the course of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States called on China to play a major role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. China then used the issue to solidify its position in relation to the Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, one would not be able to say that Seoul has good relations with Tokyo, and it is not as if Seoul can trust Beijing, either.

In short, if you compare things to how they were during the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung, Seoul’s position has been weakened and Pyongyang’s has been strengthened. During President Kim’s term, Pyongyang needed Seoul, but Pyongyang does not currently feel the same need to place importance on relations with Seoul. This is because Pyongyang has determined that it can deal directly with the United States, and Seoul has no important role to play in improving relations with Tokyo. The United States, meanwhile, views China’s role in dealing with North Korea more effective than that of South Korea. Furthermore, criticism of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is far more severe in China than it is in South Korea. When it comes to the denuclearization of North Korea, it is possible that the United States has more confidence in Beijing than it does in Seoul. Also, the United States is concerned that Seoul might insist on trying to play an independent and leading role in the matter. If that is what happens, the United States could conclude that Seoul might neglect American interests in its negotiations with Pyongyang. If an isolated Seoul persistently approaches Pyongyang, North Korea will have a wider range of choices in its policy towards the South.

This means two things. For starters, it is highly likely that North Korea will demand more conditions in military and political affairs and in the talks with South Korea. Pyongyang will be in a position to control the overall pace of progress in negotiations, and that could create a situation in which it gets another country to pressure Seoul. In addition, other countries could feel a decreased sense of obligation to cooperate with Seoul or defend its interests in the various negotiations going on in relation to the six-party talks, since if Seoul is going to take its own approach so will other countries, and if Seoul is powerless there is no need to go to any trouble on its behalf.

This is not good news. Whether “progressive” or “conservative,” whoever leads the next government needs to be able to answer how they will respond to the new challenges of the Sunshine Policy.