hankyoreh

Statements by the Unification Ministry on Tuesday hint that inter-Korean relations, which have enjoyed steady advances in recent years, are going to stall or take steps backwards. There has been a major loss of continuity and originality in policy towards North Korea, and the ministry’s report on its activities is a list of vague themes that are out of touch with reality. The tone of policy has been tailored to fit President Lee Myung-bak’s ideology, and it is in no small way possible it will lead to renewed conflict between the two Koreas.

The new North Korea policy’s emphasis is negating the accomplishments of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. A brief example would be how there is no single mention of the October 4 Summit Declaration and the June 15 Joint Statement, which should be a most basic part of inter-Korean relations. The summit declaration talks about policy goals like a “West Sea Peace Cooperation Zone,” a “Haeju Special Zone,” a shipbuilding yard, a two-stage development plan for Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and repairs on roads and railways, but all of these are missing from the ministry’s report, and now there’s no knowing when there might be prime ministers’ talks or a meeting of the economic cooperation committee. After listening to the ministry’s presentation of its report, President Lee Myung-bak instead spoke with special emphasis about the importance of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed during the Roh Tae-woo presidency in 1991. In other words, he wants to negate the continuity in North Korea policy and turn back the clock on relations by about a decade.

Lee’s government is also making unification policy something that is dependent on the North Korean nuclear issue. Where the report says that the “speed, range and method of pursuing further development” will be adjusted “while watching the advancing situation of the nuclear issue,” it might as well be declaring that no effort is going to be made in relations with the North until the nuclear issue is resolved. This is self-restricting in that it limits the ability to exercise relative originality in inter-Korean relations. Nowhere do you see any sign that Lee’s administration has given thought to how to restart dialogue with the North, which has been essentially suspended since the change of administration. This kind of approach will not help build a foundation for reunification, nor will it help strengthen Seoul’s voice in dealing with Pyongyang; instead, it will likely hurt the South’s presence in issues facing the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear issue.

What the new administration is offering in the way of top-priority North Korea policy goals are the ‘Nadeul Island’ project and the repatriation of South Korean soldiers from the Korean War and South Koreans kidnapped and taken northward since the war ended, all things that require the emergence of favorable conditions and political decisions on both sides. So Lee’s administration is essentially taking issues that need a far more mature level of relations with Pyongyang to even talk about seriously, then skipping everything that would build up to that, and talking only about the final destination. One can see how this is an unrealistic attitude for not taking one’s negotiating counterpart into consideration, given how almost none of the North Korea policy goals Seoul announced before the nineties ever saw fruition.

If there is one area of long-term national policy that should not be flipped around according to the tastes of changing governments, it’s unification policy. That would be why the majority of South Koreans opposed Lee’s attempt to do away with the Unification Ministry. His administration should stop its retrogression into the past and think again about the kind of unification policy the South Korean public really wants.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]