[Editorial] Verification in stages is needed to solve N. Korean nuclear issue

Posted on : 2008-08-13 13:21 KST Modified on : 2008-08-13 13:21 KST

The removal of North Korea from America’s list of state sponsors of terrorism could have taken effect on August 11, but now that will be postponed. The nuclear discussions between the North and the United States in Singapore in April saw the negotiations going well, but now the parties are hanging back. All the nations involved in the six-party process need to work to make sure this latest development does not hurt the momentum of the talks as a whole.

The U.S. State Department says it “needs” a “strong verification regime.” In other words, it might not lift Pyongyang off the terror sponsor list until there is an agreement on verification. The problem is that the verification regime is supposed to cover uranium-based nuclear programs and proliferation issues, not just plutonium. At the U.S.-North Korea talks in Singapore, which dealt with how Pyongyang will declare its nuclear past and present, the United States focused on the “present issue” of plutonium and left the questions about uranium -- a vague issue to begin with -- and past proliferation for another day. Since then, the U.S. administration has been facing criticism for that on the home front, and so now wants a verification program that is more comprehensive.

Pyongyang considers its removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism a test of whether its “hostile policy” towards the North is changing. That means removing it from the list could contribute to increased confidence between Pyongyang and Washington and play a key role in bringing the process to the next stage, in which the North abandons its nuclear programs. Now, however, the situation has Pyongyang wondering whether the United States is trying to put together reasons not to remove it from the list. But as seen in the inspection of nuclear facilities in Iraq, the North could put all its nuclear sites on display, and it would still be hard to prove it has never had a uranium program or attempted some proliferation.

A proposal by Gary Samore of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations is of note as a potential breakthrough on the situation. His idea would be to separate verification for plutonium from the other areas, as was done with the declaration. The United States would remove Pyongyang from the state terrorism list as soon as there was an agreement on plutonium verification, and then the other questions would be saved for later. This is a realistic proposal, one that maintains the “action for action” principle while substantially advancing the verification negotiations.

There absolutely must be a verification regime, but there is no way to resolve all the suspicions at once, which is why there should be verification in stages and commensurate measures taken in response. The United States and North Korea need to sit across from each other again. The experience so far of having substantial negotiations overcome impasses in the past should be a big help in the current situation. Our South Korean government, for its part, needs to wake up from its lazy stance right now and play a substantial role in the process.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]

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