hankyoreh

During his visit to the U.S., President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a package agreement on the North Korean nuclear issue. He has basically expressed his concept of nuclear diplomacy in step with the beginnings of a move towards dialogue aimed at a resolution on the nuclear issue. How effective this proposal will be is in doubt, however, as it shows no basic reflection on problems within his existing North Korea policy.

The core of President Lee’s proposal is a package agreement in which North Korea is asked to abandon core parts of its nuclear program through the six-party talks in exchange for a definite security guarantee and an earnest commitment on international assistance. This proposal both represents a substantial advance after North Korea's initial steps towards total denuclearization, and also declares an intention to provide more incentives. One can glimpse signs of some consideration on how to present a specific proposal prior to the start of nuclear discussions. It also conveys the sense of encouraging the U.S. not to accede too easily in its upcoming dialogue with North Korea.

The current proposal remains in line with President Lee’s Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness plan, in which large-scale assistance is promised to North Korea on the condition that it first abandons its nuclear program. The proposal therefore inherits all of that policy’s problem areas, which have already been revealed all too clearly. First and foremost, the section on “abandoning core parts of the North Korean nuclear program” is something that can only be accomplished after considerable progress is made in negotiations, yet there is nothing about the process leading up to it. In this regard, this proposal can be seen as a retreat when compared to President Lee’s Independence Day celebratory address, where he said, “If North Korea makes the determination to abandon its nuclear program, I will push forward with a new vision of peace.” Realistically, the U.S. and North Korea are the ones leading nuclear discussions. It will be impossible to gain the cooperation of the countries involved if the South Korean government merely calls for prior denuclearization without securing any leverage for negotiations. It is also inappropriate for it to be seen continuing to fixate on five-party discussions, a transformed version of the five-party talks framework.

Another major problem with the proposal is how it conveys that inter-Korean relations are subordinate to the nuclear issue. President Lee said, “Even if we cooperate with and hold dialogue with North Korea in the future, resolution on the nuclear issue will serve as one of the main items on the agenda.” It is in itself contradictory to declare an intention of discussing the nuclear issue with North Korea without making any basic efforts to thaw inter-Korean relations that could be effected by resuming tourism efforts at Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong or by providing humanitarian assistance. Such an approach will prevent the formation of the “virtuous circle of inter-Korean relations and resolution to the nuclear issue” that the government has been emphasizing.

The problems with a policy of demanding prior denuclearization are not that apparent in a situation where pressure is being applied on North Korea, but they can easily turn into hindrances to negotiations. Unless the South Korean government enhances our right to speak with the countries involved, including North Korea and China, by changing its “denuclearization and openness” policy and making headway in inter-Korean relations, packet agreement plans like the current one will remain unrealistic.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]