hankyoreh

It is now a crucial time for bringing to light the cause of the Cheonan disaster and the problems with response readiness, and for putting measures in place so that this kind of tragedy does not happen again. Doing so will require, more than anything else, the maintenance of objectivity and a cool-headed stance. But there has been a worrisome string of attempts from one corner of the military to use early conjectures to send the situation in one particular direction.


During the funeral ceremony two days ago for the victims of the Cheonan disaster, Navy Chief of Staff Kim Sung-chan said, “We will not sit idly by when forces bring great pain to our people, no matter who those forces are.” He also said, “We will not rest until we find those responsible and make them pay a greater price.” He did not specify any particular party, but his wording smacked strongly of a vow of retaliation targeting North Korea. However, at present we still have yet to clearly determined the cause of the sinking. Sufficient grounds have not been presented for the possibility of a “non-contact underwater explosion” presented by the joint civilian-military fact-finding team either. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to fathom who is supposed to be made to pay the price and how.


Moreover, Navy Chief of Staff Kim is in a position where he has to exercise self-restraint with regard to the disaster. Whatever the cause may have been, the navy could not prevent the tragedy, nor was it able to efficiently muster rescue equipment or personnel after it occurred. Fundamentally, the military, by failing even to protect itself, raised the question of whether it is actually capable of protecting the lives and homes of the South Korean people. As such, Kim, as the individual with supreme responsibility in the navy, could become a target of a reprimand depending on the results of the investigation. It is highly inappropriate for such a person to be directing criticism outside without engaging any self-reflection. One even gets the sense that he is determined to dilute a growing number of calls to hold him accountable.

Since the tragedy, the military has been broaching the topic of revising its existing plan for beefing up military strength. Since coastal and offshore waters were left exposed in the process of maximizing the size of equipment as with the Aegis destroyer, the argument goes, we must change course to center on traditional weaponry suited to the situation. But what came to light with this tragedy was not a problem with equipment, but an even more serious weakness in management capabilities, including military discipline, training and operational control. One clear example of this is the fact that the report on the tragedy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not come until 49 minutes after the accident, something that cannot be blamed on communications equipment. One cannot help sensing an underlying motive in the decision to ignore this fact and mention equipment instead.

The Defense Ministry is now talking about various other prescriptions, including clearly stating the concept of the “main enemy” and education programs on increasing psychological strength. All of this is rash and inappropriate at the present time. These moves, devoid of objectivity and caught up in conjecture, are not the way to respond to the tragic loss of life among the sailors of the Cheonan.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]