[Editorial] Accountability for the Cheong Wa Dae in assessing the Cheonan response

Posted on : 2010-05-03 12:57 KST Modified on : 2010-05-03 12:57 KST

The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) is launching a performance inspection today in connection with the response to the sinking of the Cheonan, setting as target institutions for inspection the Ministry of National Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval Operation Command and related units. This is the result of an effort to address concerns about the efficiency and regular operations of the military command reporting system during the response, the circumstances surrounding the delay in rescue efforts, and allegations about the concealment of important data to those aspects of performance subject to a BAI inspection. However, such a method is unlikely to bring to light the essential problem areas with the Cheonan incident. This is because it leaves out entirely the issue of the responsibility of President Lee Myung-bak and the Cheong Wa Dae (the presidential office in South Korea or Blue House), who performed the function of overall mediation from the earliest stages of the incident.

Starting on the very evening the incident took place, President Lee directly presided over four meetings of national security ministers over a period of three days. This was intended to indicate that the president had directly arranged a rescue operation and security response posture in the early stages after the incident, and the situation certainly warranted this. But rescue equipment and personnel were not dispatched to the site swiftly, and some rescue workers even lost their lives amid the chaos. Despite this, President Lee said on the third day after the accident, “We were able to avoid greater damages thanks to the competent early response from the Navy.” This showed a wild interpretation of the reality.

A number of national security experts are also baffled about the nearby patrol ship Sokcho’s concentrated firing of naval guns toward a block of birds immediately after the accident. Given that this action could easily have been a significant national security anxiety-producing incident in and of itself, the particulars of the circumstantial judgment should be sufficiently brought to light. Other factors such as the constantly changing officially designated time of the incident and gaps in the transmission and reporting of the situation should not be limited to the military level. The problem involved a collapse of the government’s overall crisis response system, and thus the Cheong Wa Dae’s duties cannot be omitted from the overall assessment of the response.

There is a clear limitation to a BAI inspection as a sole means of precisely clarifying the circumstances of the Cheonan’s sinking and establishing response measures. There is also a limitation to a National Assembly’s special fact-finding committee, since it is not comprised of experts. An investigation of the accident’s cause by a joint civilian-military fact-finding team will also be unlikely to gain credence if it is simply led by the government, as it is now. In light of this, it would be worth of consideration to actively examine the idea of a suprapartisan experts’ committee, a so-called “Cheonan committee,” as proposed by Lawmaker Song Min-soon of the Democratic Party (DP). His suggestion is to improve the objectivity and credibility of the investigation by establishing a committee of prominent figures recommended by ruling and opposition parties, and allowing this committee to participate with the existing investigative body. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), a committee comprised of five experts each recommended by the Republican and Democratic Parties, also worked in a similar fashion to gain the trust of the people.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]
 
 

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