hankyoreh

The once uniform hardline response to the Cheonan sinking has begun to show signals of change.

First and foremost, there has been a change in approach from the U.S., which abruptly postponed large-scale joint exercises with South Korea that would have taken place in the West Sea on Tuesday. The explanation given was that the exercise would be postponed until the end of the month for preparation reasons, but the tone of an awe-inspiring show of force against North Korea has already begun to dissipate.

Since the exercises were planned to be led by the South Korean military with support from the U.S. forces, the U.S. appears to have taken a full step back. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates indicated that the U.S. would first wait to see results from the U.N. and consider follow-up measures afterward. He also mentioned of “additional measures” against North Korea, but stated nothing concrete about what the measures would entail. The change in intensity of the initial decisive response is evident.

This situation was in some sense a foregone conclusion. As Gates stated, a military response on the Korean Peninsula must be ruled out, but there are unlikely to be any other effective sanctions against North Korea. The countries involved also share the understanding that it would be inadvisable to drive North Korea into a corner with extreme sanctions and generate additional provocations.

The U.S. remains forced to concern itself with the possibility of tensions with China as a result of this situation. China, with its emphasis on the peninsula’s stability, and the U.S., with its emphasis on a nuclear-free world, are both more interested in getting the six-party talks going again as soon as possible than in having tensions stretch out into the long term. The limitations of Seoul’s approach, centering on pressure on North Korea and an antagonistic posture, were always apparent.

The Lee Myung-bak administration should not try to deny this reality. At present, it does not appear that U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea will go through as the administration had hoped. Even if it attempts to push for an ordinary resolution or a U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement rather than a new sanctions resolution, it does not appear likely to establish conclusively that the Cheonan’s sinking was North Korea’s doing. This likely stems from the fact that its efforts to persuade the international community to accept its investigation results on the Cheonan did not go as originally planed.

Under such circumstances, it is unwise for the Lee administration to focus solely on a hardline approach. In a worst-case scenario, doing so could result in South Korea being dragged around passively in the six-party talks, as inter-Korean relations remain severed.

The Lee administration should immediately set about reexamining its uniformly pressure and antagonism-centered North Korea policy. It should not shy away from a joint international investigation of the Cheonan incident if necessary. Most of all, it should stop with self-defeating sanctions against North Korea such as limits on toll processing fee remittances to North Korea by commissioned processing and trade firms. This policy will succeed only in strangling South Korean businesses. Now is not the time for consoling themselves with such empty hardline rhetoric.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]