hankyoreh

The outcome of the June 2 regional elections has summoned winds of change greater than some general elections in terms of major policies, the power structure and institutions of democracy.

Directly speaking, core policies of the Lee Myung-bak administration such as the Sejong City Development Plan revisions and the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project are now the subject of debate. Also noteworthy, however, is the collapse of the “national security politics” framework uncritically rehashed time and time again over the past several decades.

The words “No North Korea effect was observed” do not fully capture the extent of the change.

Many voters not only avoided allowing themselves to be swayed by the “Cheonan storm” the administration tried to foment, they actively rejected it. The attitude among voters was as unprecedented as the tragedy that befell the Cheonan.

The message sent by the voters of South Korea was twofold. On one hand, it reflected a careful determination regarding claims about the North Korea threat. Even if North Korea did attack the Cheonan, it does not change the reality of the already enormous difference in national might between North Korea and South Korea. Indeed, North Korea has long shown itself to be concerned primarily with maintaining its regime.

During an Asian national security meeting in Singapore a few days ago, President Lee said there was “absolutely no possibility of a full-scale war between North Korea and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula.” The statement was intended to stabilize the economy, but it was also the truth, in that North Korea simply does not have the capacity for an all-out war.

The other message was a strong check on the attempt to increase the threat further. North Korea may not be a full-scale threat, but it is a potential and realistic one. The intentions of the North Korean administration play some part in this, but the external environment also has a large effect. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and beefing up of its capacity for unconventional or special warfare represent a struggle to say alive with limited resources. It is more an expression of weakness than, as it claims, a step toward achieving the goal of a strong and prosperous nation. However, a trapped mouse will sometimes bite the cat.

This time around, a majority of South Koreans did not support the ultra-hardline measures against North Korea promulgated by the Lee administration. The reason for this is that they know all too well how such measures are ineffective and only succeed in increasing the threat.

Lurking behind the national security politics is the specter of redbaiting. Redbaiting may be an anachronistic bit of Cold War ideology, but it is one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of those currently in power. The affixation of the label of “leftist administrations” on the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun was a strategy by conservatives to gain power, but also an expression of their intent to make active use of redbaiting once they were in office. This certainly did turn out to be the case.

After reporting on problems with the importation of U.S. beef, MBC was classified as a stronghold of “leftist reporters” and made a target for “occupation,” while members of the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union (KTU, Jeon Gyo Jo) have been viewed as “Communist teachers” and subjected to constant crackdowns.

The Cheonan situation has been scarcely different. Those expressing views out of step with those of the Lee administration have been branded as pro-North Korea, and there has even been a string of announcements about questionable espionage cases. The Lee administration and ruling Grand National Party (GNP) believed in the effectiveness of this up until the day of the election, but the result was the sinking of national security politics and redbaiting.

The more authoritarian an administration is, the more it comes to depend on rule that creates an “internal enemy” to attack in order to cover up its own contradictions. As a result, the political structure and policy become ever more distorted.

To be blunt, if the current administration had acknowledged even half the achievements the Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung administrations made with the North Korea policy, if it had merely gone through the motions of fulfilling the terms of the October 4 Summit Declaration and June 15 Joint Statement, things would not have arrived at their current state.

The Lee administration should look upon the sinking of national security politics as a blessing in disguise. This is the only way to increase its range of policy options. A first step in this would be to acknowledge that the sinking of the Cheonan provided a clear-cut illustration of the failure of the last two or so years of national security policy. Merely emphasizing North Korea’s “wicked designs” will not permit a proper resolution of the Cheonan situation or the North Korean nuclear issue, let alone contribute to the mutual benefits and common prosperity of North Korea and South Korea.

The foundation of the U.S.’s national security policy is making every effort to prevent the national territory from becoming a battlefield. This is impossible for South Korea, who shares a border with North Korea. Even the slightest change in the national security situation is immediately reflected in the economy and society, and the people in power are tempted to exploit this for political ends. For this reason, the warning sent by the people of South Korea, that national security politics and peace cannot move together, is all the more valuable.