hankyoreh

A normal country must have the authority to command its own military. There is nothing so dangerous as turning over the direction of one’s armed forces to the commander of another country’s military. During the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the U.S. examined war scenarios that included bombing North Korea. In his later days, then-President Kim Young-sam recalled narrowly averting a war by having an “all-out battle with U.S. President Bill Clinton” after enormous damages were predicted. The reason the South Korean President had to fight with a foreign president was because the country has no operation control. Reclaiming peacetime command in December of that year, Kim said, “We have solidified a framework for autonomous national defense.” The 2007 South Korea-U.S. agreement to wartime operational control transfer to South Korea in 2012 was belated but entirely reasonable.

However, President Lee Myung-bak will reportedly soon meet with U.S. President Barack Obama to bring up the issue of once again postponing wartime command transfer. Some have reported that an agreement has effectively been reached to defer the time of the return at South Korea’s request. It is staggering that the government would be doing what amounts to abandoning military sovereignty, and carrying out its efforts in secrecy at that, without engaging in the process of public debate. As recently as the time when certain discharged generals and politicians were clamoring their opposition to the transfer of wartime command, one had the feeling that they were in the grip of a terribly outdated mode of thinking. The fact that the Lee Myung-bak administration has gone this far defies comprehension.

First and foremost, there has been no change in situation between South Korea and the United States that warrants putting off the 2012 date for transferring wartime operational command. South Korea’s armed forces have long since secured the capability to deter and repulse North Korea, with the twenty-old years of military reinforcement that have taken place since the 1980s. Both South Korea and the United States concluded in 2007 that the South Korean military had the capacity to take a leading role in directing operations, albeit with the cooperation of the U.S. military.

Some have brought up a deteriorating national security environment resulting from the sinking of the Cheonan. However, even if that incident was North Korea’s doing, it has nothing to do with the issue of accepting responsibility for operational command. A clear-cut example of this is the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who maintains responsibility for peacetime operations, received his report on the incident late, and was negligent in his follow-up measures due to intoxication. It is also an evasion of responsibility to create this issue related to operational command with another country. The sinking of the Cheonan requires the reexamination of the entire alert, command and response systems of the South Korean armed forces. It seems that according to this line of reasoning, we should also hand peacetime operational command back to the United States.

There is also the concern that South Korea may pay a tremendous price if the transfer of wartime operational command is postponed. If the South Korean government pleads for a postponement, the United States will feign being compelled to respond, while extending its own list of demands, including an increased financial burden for South Korea in its share of U.S. Forces Korea defense expenses and the cost of expanding the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, as well as increased deployment of South Korean forces to Afghanistan and South Korean participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system. With talks taking place in secret, an even greater concern is that inappropriate transactions will be conducted.

Military sovereignty is a supreme value in and of itself. Our military must accept wartime operational command in order to retain a range of options and maintain security in the event that an incident leads to major changes in the political situation on the Korean Peninsula. Wartime operational command also needs to be transferred to South Korea so that our country can increase its standing as a party to future negotiations toward a Korean Peninsula peace agreement. A number of national security policies backslid back since the Lee administration took office, but the wartime operational command is exceptionally serious in that it is directly related to military sovereignty. We hope the administration will immediately abandon this outdated thinking that lacks both justification and practical benefit.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]