hankyoreh

If the government decides to quietly and secretly push an issue until it comes to fruition one day, does that finalize the issue? It cannot and must not be the path to a final policy decision. This is because in this case, wartime operational control (OPCON) as an issue of military sovereignty is a core aspect of national sovereignty. A public debate, centered on the National Assembly and civic society, must be convened urgently and the relevant issues fully verified and debated.

The Lee Myung-bak government and conservative newspapers have claimed that wartime operational control has nothing to do with military sovereignty, but this is a falsehood. They have stated that wartime operational control is exercised in accordance with agreed upon guidelines from the South Korean and U.S. presidents within the framework of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and Military Commission (MC). This, however, is merely a formality. It is self-evident that the commander of Combined Forces Command (CFC), who is also the commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), will follow the directions of the U.S. president in an emergency. It is a reality that OPLAN 5027, which is a plan of action for a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, is being planned by United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The fact that the United States would push a security response in an emergency on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with their own strategic judgment is also a source of instability resulting from the deferment of military sovereignty.

To begin, we must establish the true reason for the delay in the transfer. The Defense Ministry said two days ago that the South Korean military has sufficient capacity to lead an allied defense. The Cheong Wa Dae (the presidential office in South Korea or Blue House) has, on one hand, claimed that South Korea lacks preparation in areas such as intelligence gathering. On the other hand, it has spoken of the psychology of insecurity. This means they have placed a top priority on the movement led by some retired soldiers to oppose the transfer of wartime operational control. It is not a proper approach, however, to prioritize political logic in security decisions rather than objective and military reasoning.

In particular, it is necessary to make public the entirety of the negotiating process and what was discussed, if only to reduce suspicions of a political exchange through major South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) concessions. The Lee administration has merely stated that Kim Tae-hyo, presidential secretary for national security strategy, began discussing a delay in the transfer of wartime operational control in early February. Despite the fact that the United States likely requested something in return from South Korea when the country first requested the delay in wartime operational control transfer, there has been no explanation. There has also been no explanation about the progress of the KORUS FTA negotiations.

The Lee administration’s decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational control is a measure that confines South Korea’s military sovereignty for an additional three years and seven months. Strict verification and debate in the National Assembly and civic society is naturally necessary. The opposition party raised the need yesterday for a parliamentary investigation and ratification. We hope the National Assembly quickly prepares a way to concretely publicize the debate. If the ruling party is honorable, it should not avoid discussion and come forward with a proactive attitude toward debate on this issue.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]