[Column] Abe’s neo-Cold War diplomacy and Korea-Japan relations

Posted on : 2013-03-20 13:39 KST Modified on : 2013-03-20 13:39 KST
Park’s newly formed government must follow through with active diplomacy to establish peace in Northeast Asia

By Lee Jong-won, professor at Waseda University Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies

At long last, the Park Geun-hye administration is starting to take shape. Considering the urgent situation on the Korean peninsula, it is hard not to feel frustrated about all the delays.

Park has decided to visit the US in early May, after her diplomatic team is set. It is at this time that she must hasten to implement the ambitious North Korea and China policies that she promised during her election campaign.

At the end of May 2013, a summit will be held in Seoul for the heads of government from South Korea, China, and Japan. Along with this, attention is focusing on in what manner Park will pursue summit diplomacy with important states in Northeast Asia such as China, Japan, and Russia. This is a situation that calls for Korea to take the lead in active diplomacy, even if only to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from deteriorating further.

The government of Abe Shinzo in Japan, which has a slight head start on Park, is showing itself to be a surprisingly nimble diplomatic player so far. Of course, until the election of the Diet’s House of Councilors in Jul. 2013, Abe is advocating “Abenomics,” concentrating on domestic economic issues. Indeed, his fundamental approach so far has been a cautious one, putting off diplomatic and ideological objectives until later.

However, when it comes to diplomatic relations, Abe has slowly but surely laying the groundwork for neo-Cold War diplomacy with the aim of containing China while avoiding any direct confrontations. Immediately after his inauguration, he had hoped that the US or South Korea might be the first country he would visit, but when this proved too problematic, he set his sights on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) instead. He didn’t even bother to conceal the fact that countering China was the main objective.

Abe visited Vietnam, which is involved in a dispute with China over maritime territory, as well as Thailand and Indonesia. In Indonesia, he prepared a speech advocating five diplomatic principles for ASEAN, though he was not able to actually deliver it because of the eruption of the Algerian hostage crisis. These actions made abundantly clear Abe’s intention to make a strategic link with ASEAN, which is clashing with China over land and sea territory. The idea is to espouse the principle of a maritime order based not on strength, but on law.

It can be inferred that Abe’s next diplomatic objective was using containment of China as a launching board to visit Washington and show off a complete revival of the US-Japan alliance. When the Chinese aimed a target radar on a vessel that was part of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) shortly before this at the end of Jan. 2013, Abe opted to make the incident public as a way to put pressure on China rather than pursuing a diplomatic compromise. Through this action, we can see Abe focusing not so much on restoring China-Japan relations as on seeking success in the Japan-US summit.

During an interview with the Washington Post on Feb. 21 just before the summit, Abe strongly criticized the threat posed by China. Once again, during his meeting with US President Barack Obama, Abe is reported to have repeatedly asked for permission to strengthen Japan’s defensive capacity, for the right to collective action, for the US-Japan alliance to be bolstered, and for US support in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), all while repeatedly emphasizing the danger of an increasingly powerful China

But contrary to expectations, the American reaction was very cold. The formal dinner and the event showing off the closeness between the heads of government were both omitted, and even the official document that was released as a joint statement was extremely simple, only containing three paragraphs dealing with the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

In diplomatic terms, this was an unusually poor reception. This suggests an effort on the part of the Obama government to keep its distance from Abe’s neo-Cold War diplomacy and to put the brakes on the conflict between China and Japan, which Abe’s diplomacy has been aggravating. There is nothing simplistic about US policy toward China.

In terms of policy toward North Korea and China, the plans that Park revealed in her campaign pledges show more of a post-Cold War than a new-Cold War orientation. This is because, considering South Korea’s national interest, strengthening relations with China is essential not only for the economy but also for finding a solution to the problem of North Korea.

In relations between Japan and Korea, even aside from historical disagreements and the Dokdo issue, there is also the potential for conflict over how to frame regional order in Northeast Asia. It won’t be an easy task, but the situation presents a challenge, along with an opportunity for creative diplomacy that can bring together the US, Japan, China, and Russia.

 

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

button that move to original korean article (클릭시 원문으로 이동하는 버튼)