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President Park Geun-hye greets US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at a dinner held at the Smithsonian Institution to honor the 60th year of the US-South Korea alliance

Among the various remarks made during the summit between South Korean President Park Geun-hye and US President Barack Obama, there are a few important points that were brushed through without sufficient clarification. These are the issues of South Korean participation in the US-led missile defense network, the relationship between Park’s plan for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia (the so-called Seoul Process) and Obama’s policy of the pivot to Asia, the nuclear power agreement between South Korea and the US, the KORUS Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the transfer of wartime operation control.

Summit meetings customarily involve only the affirmation of principles and do not generally delve into the specifics. Nevertheless, the issues mentioned above are far too critical to pass by without some detailed explanation. As these are issues that are inextricably connected with the future not only of South Korea, but of all of Northeast Asia, it is imperative that Park address them in detail sooner or later.

First of all, the two countries showed a difference of temperament on the issue of missile defense.

The official statement that was released to commemorate the 60 years of the alliance between the US and South Korea stated that the two countries are “resolved to continue to defend our citizens against North Korea’s provocations by strengthening our comprehensive, interoperable, and combined defense capabilities, to include shared efforts to counter the missile threat posed by North Korea and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.”

Obama expanded on this during the press conference that followed the meeting. “We’re investing in the shared capabilities and technologies and missile defenses that allow our forces to operate and succeed together,” he said.

Park, however, did not make any remarks about this. It is unclear whether or not she accepted the US’s proposal to participate in its missile defense network. The issue of whether or not to take part in the US-led missile defense system is very sensitive and requires consideration of how effective it would be, how much it would cost, and how it might affect relations with China.

Second, in explaining the US’s support for her peace initiative for Northeast Asia, the so-called “Seoul process”, at the press conference, Park said that “there would be synergy between President’s Obama’s policy of rebalancing to Asia and my initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia as we pursue peace and development in the region.”

Obama’s pivot to Asia policy is concentrated on using military and economic means to surround and counter China. Park’s logic leaves open the possibility of mistakenly assuming that the Seoul process is a sub-policy means of supporting the larger goal of containing China.

Third, a clear explanation must be made about the transfer of wartime operational control, the KORUS FTA, and the US-ROK nuclear power agreement, all of which are directly linked with the national security and the economy of South Korea.

Based solely on the remarks made during the summit meeting, it is impossible to know whether or not wartime operational control will be transferred to South Korea according to plan. With the US-ROK nuclear power agreement, Park has stepped forward to take charge, but it is uncertain what results she achieved. One also cannot help but wondering whether the pledge to “faithfully implement” the KORUS FTA means that renegotiating the agreement is no longer an option.

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