hankyoreh

By Jin Jingyi, professor at Peking University

Once again, the argument is being made that China should take a bigger role in addressing the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.

During her trip to the US, South Korean President Park Geun-hye argued that China must get more involved in bringing about change in North Korea. US President Barack Obama referred to changes in China’s North Korea policy as “encouraging,” urging the country to take an even more active role.

The argument that China should take on a more significant role in the issue is nothing new. While the idea is rarely proposed when progress is being made in relations between South and North and between North Korea and the US, it is often trotted out when these relations stumble and lurch instead toward confrontation.

In the past, the case was made that China should take action to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and to push Pyongyang toward reform and liberalization.

But that is not the argument being heard today. The role that China is being asked to play is instead to force North Korea to change by threatening to shut down the lifeline to North Korea that it currently maintains. Briefly, South Korea and the US are asking China to change its North Korea policy.

China’s North Korea policy is made up of a spectrum of complex elements that span history, ideology, geopolitics, culture, time, and factors inside North Korea. The goal that ties together these elements is China’s national interest. The importance given to each of these is also determined by how much each contributes to that national interest.

During the Cold War, the relationship between North Korea and China functioned as an alliance because of historical, ideological, and geopolitical factors. The Western world understood this as an alliance in the Western sense of the world.

This is similar to how the West viewed the relationship between Qing Dynasty-controlled China and Joseon in early modern times as that of suzerain and tributary state. This explains why the US asked China to exert its influence on Joseon as a “suzerain” during the naval expedition to Ganghwa Island in 1871. China declined, emphasizing the fact that Joseon was an autonomous state.

The relationship between North Korea and China has never been consistent with the concept of an alliance as it is understood in the West. But if it is not an alliance, it is also not the normal diplomatic relations that generally exist between two states.

This is why there are some who view the current state of North Korea-China relations as being too ambiguous. These critics think that the two countries should define the relationship either as a definite alliance or as normal diplomatic relations between two states.

So what then is the key factor that defines China’s relationship with North Korea? While this analysis may sound somewhat vague, it can be said that the key overall factor is national interest, and that the factor underlying national interest is culture.

In terms of the cultural aspect of the relations between China and North Korea, it is necessary to understand the term sujeong, which refers to a governing strategy that seeks to preserve the peace of a country and its people. In China, sujeong has traditionally involved pursuing peaceful relations with neighboring countries and expressing concern for the people living there.

The main principle of sujeong is moderation, one of the key values of Confucianism. Moderation is often misunderstood to be compromise without principles, but what moderation actually means is achieving tolerance and concord without going to any extremes or transgressing boundaries.

China’s three fundamental principles in its approach to North Korea are peace and stability, denuclearization, and dialogue-based problem solving are linked to this key element in Chinese culture. This can be distinguished from more aggressive cultures, in which a clear line is drawn between black and white.

The fact that China is stressing the cultural aspect of its North Korea policy is intended to emphasize that this element cannot easily be changed. The implication here is that China should not be expected to adopt extreme measures against North Korea.

How far will China go to satisfy South Korea and the US’s expectation that it will take advantage of its influence over North Korea?

In the final analysis, China does not believe that it holds the key to solving the issue of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. In China’s view, the only way that a fundamental solution can be found for the North Korea nuclear weapons issue is, in the words of the Chinese proverb, “The person who tied the knot on the bell must untie it.”

One of the parties that tied the knot on the bell is North Korea. North Korea has defied the warnings of China and the resolutions of the UN by pushing ahead with its nuclear weapons tests, sending shock waves throughout Northeast Asia. In China, even members of the old guard who had been sympathetic to North Korea believe that North Korea has gone too far. They are now turning their backs on North Korea. The recent measures that China has taken have also been caused by the situation inside North Korea.

The other party that tied the knot on the bell is the US. Is the US truly a champion of justice, as it likes to believe? During the four years of President Barack Obama’s first term in office, the US did nothing to find a solution to the North Korean situation and today, it is still doing virtually nothing.

In fact, the US is now taking a step even further back, pushing South Korea to the front and urging China to take a bigger role. Rather it is enough to make one think that South Korea and China are the ones who should step forward and urge the US to take action to resolve the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons.

The issue of North Korean nuclear weapons can only be solved by getting at the heart of the problem. US appeals for China to intervene in the situation are not a fundamental solution. The US and South Korea must not expect much to be accomplished by using China’s influence over North Korea.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]