hankyoreh

It was disclosed that the South Korean government under President Park Geun-hye asked the US for the transfer of wartime operational control to be delayed again. This transfer was already delayed once under former president Lee Myung-bak.

In 2009, the Lee administration used North Korea’s second nuclear weapons test as an excuse to delay the transfer of control to Dec. 2015. Now, the Park administration seems to be insisting that it be delayed once more because of North Korea’s third nuclear test, which took place in February.

The core of a nation’s sovereignty and its last line of defense is its armed forces. But Korea keeps asking the US to look after the wartime operational control of its military. This is a shameful state of affairs for a sovereign nation.

Clause 2 of Article 66 of the South Korean constitution (which deals with the position, duties, and administrative authority of the president), says that the president is responsible for preserving the independence of the nation, maintaining its territory, preserving its continuity, and defending its constitution. The armed forces are the last resource that the president can call upon in carrying out these duties.

To be unable to exercise operational control over a country’s armed forces during wartime is no different from putting the power of life and death of one’s country and one’s people into the hands of a stranger. This is why it is hard to find any other country in the world that is unable to direct and control its own military.

Looking back at the history of Korea is enough to show just how vital it is for a country to exercise control over its own military. During the Imjin War (1592-98), the Ming dynasty army of China came to Korea to help it against the Japanese invaders. But once the Chinese forces seized control of Joseon’s military, they plundered their ostensible allies as they pleased.

On July 14, 1950, with South Korea reeling from invasion by North Korea and fighting for its survival, then president Rhee Syngman surrendered operational control to the UN military command.

But since that time, Korea has made efforts to win back operational control in the interest of restoring the nation’s sovereignty.

In 1994, during the presidency of Roh Tae-woo, Korea was given back its peacetime operational control, and during Roh Moo-hyun’s term in office, it was agreed that the operational control would be returned to Korea by April 2012.

But once the more conservative Lee Myung-bak government took power, this trend began to be reversed. Time and again, the conservative establishment suggested that the timing of the transfer be delayed because of the North Korean nuclear threat.

By this logic, South Korea would have to surrender its military sovereignty indefinitely, or at least until the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved.

But in reality, the South Korean army is 40 times stronger than the North Korean army, and the US is not averse to transferring wartime operational control to South Korea. Considering this, there is no way to explain the deep-rooted dependence on the US.

It is just as difficult to ignore the obsession with secrecy and the lack of transparency surrounding the second delay of the transfer of operational control.

Until the issue was brought to light by a US official, not a single diplomat or security official in the Park administration had ever indicated that the transfer, which was scheduled for Dec. 2015, might be delayed.

Park even included the handover of control in her campaign pledges and then confirmed that it would happen during her summit with US President Barack Obama.

For her to be furtively working behind the scenes to delay the transfer is an act of fraud against the Korean people. This behavior constitutes an admission that she has no integrity.

There are also some observers who believe that the hierarchical culture of rank in the diplomatic and security establishment, which consists of National Intelligence Service Director Nam Jae-joon (25th class of the Korea Military Academy), National Security Chief Kim Jang-soo (27th class), and Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin (28th class), played a part in the change of direction in Park’s administration.

The national interest ought to take the priority in issues of diplomacy and security. For these issues to be dominated by questions of which year you graduated from the Korea Military Academy is a really serious problem.

In any transaction with a foreign power, there is always a price that must be paid.

Already, it is a prevailing view that the US will take advantage of the Korean request for a delay of the transfer by asking for Korea to make major concessions on various matters, including negotiations for the cost of defense, wrangling over nuclear power, the next-generation jet fighter project, and participation in missile defense.

Next year, Laos will be receiving twice as much public development aid from South Korea as it did this year. Laos is the country, of course, that recently sent young North Korean defectors back to the land they had fled.

This effectively illustrates the grim reality that nothing is free in the international community.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]