hankyoreh

On Dec. 9, North Korea gave its first confirmation to the outside world that second-in-command Jang Song-thaek had been removed as head of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) administrative department. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un appears to have ousted Jang, his uncle by marriage, in an attempt to place himself more solidly at the center of the regime. The move came ten days before the second anniversary of his father Kim Jong-il’s death.

The announcement of Jang’s ouster was unusual in both form and content. Kim presided over an expanded meeting of the WPK Political Bureau on Dec. 8 where Jang was judged for various misdeeds and a decision was made to relieve him of all duties and titles and expel him from the party. Purges of senior leaders have not been rare in North Korea, but few if any precedents can be found for this particular approach. Already, it is being seen as sending the message that the party is firmly at the center of the regime, while enlisting the support of the public. Jang was accused of a long list of misbehavior at the meeting - everything from “anti-state, anti-revolution factional activities” to “impeding the Cabinet’s economic projects” and “acts of corruption and depravity.” The aim here may have been to further solidify Kim’s grip on the regime by squashing any hopes for a comeback by Jang.

The very fact that Jang, a key figure in establishing the Kim regime for the past two years, was put on “trial” in this way shows the backwardness of the government in Pyongyang. But his removal doesn’t appear likely to have much of an impact on the regime’s stability or course of action. No more challengers to Kim’s “Baekdu bloodline” of hereditary succession from grandfather Kim Il-sung appear to be left, and most of the older officials in the party, government, and military have already been replaced by “newcomers” in their forties and fifties. Meanwhile, the administration has continued to pour its energies into economic reforms (of a kind) ever since officially stating a two-track policy of nuclear weapons and economic development this past spring. Jang did have a role in special economic zone development and relations with China, but his presence had not been strongly felt this year.

The worry right now is that Jang’s fall could result in the military gaining a stronger grip on power. Some analysts have noted that Jang was one of the figures who opposed the military in its plans to carry out a long-range rocket launch and nuclear tests. If he did lose out in a power battle, the military could up with a stronger say in things - especially its General Political Bureau director Choi Ryong-hae, who is now being called the “new second-in-command.” And this could mean that for all the current efforts to maintain the status quo, Pyongyang’s foreign policy may end up drifting toward a hard line, especially if it remains on poor terms with Beijing and Washington and nothing is done to get relations with Seoul improving again. It goes without saying that a restart of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue would be much more difficult.

Inter-Korean relations need to be improved, whatever changes may happen in North Korea. It is the only way to keep stability on the peninsula and increase the possibility of a resolution to the nuclear issue. At the moment, we don’t have any leverage with Pyongyang. Hopefully, nobody is looking at these events with vague hopes that they may lead to an upheaval for the North Korean regime.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]