hankyoreh

By Kim Ji-suk, editorial writer

President Park Geun-hye keeps trying to extend the positive image of German unification to her own concept of jackpot unification, but this is about as unlikely as trying to put on a stranger’s clothes. The plan for peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula that Park presented at Dresden in former East Germany shows just how far those contradictions can go.

The unification of Germany was led by the people of East Germany. In May 1989, East Germans who wanted to go to West Germany started crowding into the West German embassies in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and the West German mission in East Berlin. Later, the demands for reform in East Germany took the regular form of Monday demonstrations, and by October the demonstrators numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

At the time, the people of East Germany wanted a reform of the system. Their principle slogan was “we are the people.” But after the Berlin Wall, which separated East and West Germany, came down on Nov. 9, the slogan “we are one German nation” began to gain strength. When calls for reform failed to lead to results, there was a rapid increase in demands for unification. The events that ensued - the first democratic elections in East Germany (Mar. 18, 1990), the unification of the currency in East and West Germany (Jul. 1), the referendum in which East Germans decided to join West Germany (Aug. 23), and the declaration of unification (Oct. 3) - can be viewed as a process of institutionalizing the demands of the East German people.

The Dresden Doctrine, in contrast, offers a laundry list of economic and social projects - including aid for North Korean mothers and babies, an agricultural complex in the North, cooperative projects in Rajin-Hasan and Sinuiju, and an office for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation - without providing an overarching framework. It is certainly not a plan for unification. It also has two fatal flaws.

First of all, the plan assumes that unification of the Korean peninsula is imminent. Just before announcing the Dresden Doctrine, Park remarked that “the day will come when the armistice line torn down in the same way that the Berlin Wall collapsed.” This implies that the armistice line could crumble shortly after the people of North Korea start to vocalize their demands for reform of the system just as the people of East Germany did.

This is why Park‘s plan does not really deal with how to reorient the current relationship between North and South Korea toward unification. It takes for granted that unification is going to happen, and it presumes that the North Korea people are waiting for support from South Korea.

The specific content of the plan is also lacking. The proposals she offers are neither what the North Korean people need or the North Korean government wants. The idea seems to be that North Korea should just follow along since all of the proposals would be helpful. The example of Germany teaches us that these are all things that ought to happen during the integration phase, after unification has been announced. Nor did Park make any mention of urgent aid for North Korea, including fertilizer and food.

How exactly could a plan like this have been made? First of all, it is possible that Park is mistaken about the current situation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, there are some people in the ruling party who think that the North Korean people are alienated from their government and that the regime will collapse before long. While Park is different from these at least insofar as she supports expanding inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, it is possible that she shares their fundamental understanding of the situation.

Another possibility is that Park is exploiting jackpot unification for strategic reasons, even though she is fully aware it does not reflect reality. The steady public support for jackpot unification is acting as poison.

The Park administration continues to push forward in unification drive mode even though this is not a situation where anyone should be talking about unification. This is not just a provocation; it distorts the entire relationship between North and South Korea. It results in us not doing what we should and doing what we shouldn’t. The rising tensions on the peninsula caused by the US-ROK joint military exercises and the stalemate in talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue are the flipside of jackpot unification.

At several times in the past, the South Korean government has talked about genuine preparations for unification. There have been various efforts toward this end, which have been taken part in by many people. Most of these people say that preparations for unification and expanding exchange and cooperation are one and the same thing. That is to say, it is by improving inter-Korean relations and diligently advancing exchange and cooperation that we prepare for unification.

If Park is to talk about unification, she ought to first show some respect for the Oct. 4, 2000 Summit Declaration and the June 15, 2007 Joint Declaration. The Oct. 4 Summit Declaration offers a much better framework than the Dresden Declaration and it is more detailed. Plus, of course, it was agreed to by the leaders of North and South Korea.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]