[Column] For N. Korean denuclearization, China must play a tougher diplomatic game

Posted on : 2016-08-08 18:35 KST Modified on : 2016-08-08 18:35 KST
A Chinese flag at the Chinese Embassy seen through a window in a nearby building in Seoul on Aug. 4. (Yonhap News)
A Chinese flag at the Chinese Embassy seen through a window in a nearby building in Seoul on Aug. 4. (Yonhap News)

North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile tests brought on Seoul and Washington’s decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system with US Forces Korea, which China has objected to in turn. All the potential is there to exacerbate the Northeast Asian political situation. At root, this is about Pyongyang’s desire to develop nuclear capabilities out of a fixation on the survival of its administration and system. Another factor is China’s lack of will to use every means at its disposal to deter North Korea’s behavior. 

Goal is a security order where THAAD isn’t needed

Yet the THAAD debate currently taking place between South Korea and China not only blurs the essence of the issue, but makes a solution even harder to come by. Seoul’s goal isn’t a THAAD deployment per se - it’s a security environment where THAAD is not needed. South Korea has been calling on China to upgrade its North Korea policy to check the nuclear activities that are serving as the main cause behind the Northeast Asian arms race.

THAAD is part of the US missile defense network. Washington’s efforts to build forward missile defense bases in Asia and Europe date back to the 1980s. After the Cold War‘s end took away the rationale of defending against the Soviet Union threat, US conservatives offered new reasons: averting the threats of North Korean missiles in Asia and Iranian ones in Europe. Released in July 1998, the Rumsfeld Commission Report epitomized the arguments of missile defense proponents.

The report didn’t draw much attention at first; it was seen as representing the interests of the US military-industrial complex. A month later, however, North Korea launched its Taepodong rocket, calling it a “satellite launch.” The move lent new authority to the report. Seoul communicated its concerns to Beijing about a potential chain reaction from an arms race in Northeast Asia and asked it to work toward deterring Pyongyang from nuclear and missile activities. But Beijing’s focus was more on opposing Seoul’s involvement, claiming Washington and Tokyo were trying to use the North Korean missile program as an excuse for missile defense deployments that would leave China itself under siege.

Perceptions of Iran as a missile threat faded somewhat after a nuclear deal was signed in 2015. But by 2014 it was Russia that was being played up as a threat due to events in Ukraine. The US and Europe began full-scale efforts to set up a missile defense network in eastern Europe targeting Russia, which was deemed a potential threat. In Asia, the now increasingly visible North Korean nuclear and missile threat was deemed reason enough to position a missile defense system in South Korea. 

China insists that THAAD is about more than North Korea

China claims the US’s aims in the THAAD deployment go beyond North Korea. But South Korea has no cause to set up a radar network targeting China. If China were to fall into the detection range of a radar system in South Korea, that would amount to being hit by a “stray bullet” from North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. More precisely, North Korea’s fixation on nuclear weapons has left itself the biggest victim, South Korea the second biggest, and China a victim of the collateral damage. The animosity Seoul and Beijing are showing conflicts with their inherent good will.

If North Korea’s nuclear capabilities can be checked, the need for THAAD is slashed - regardless of missile range, Taepodong or Musudan. Since 2008, basically nothing has been done about Pyongyang’s nuclear development. We are ignoring a danger that we cannot afford to leave at the heart of Northeast Asia, where South Korea, China, and Japan make up the core population. In 1962, the US invested all of its diplomatic assets in the issue of Soviet missiles positioned in Cuba, which it saw as a life-or-death matter. It ended up withdrawing its own missiles from Italy and Turkey, allowing both it and the Soviet Union to save face and preserve their interests.

China may think that the Korean Peninsula and the rest of Northeast Asia are to it as the Caribbean is to the US. How China sees the geography of Northeast Asia is nothing more than its viewpoint, of course, but it cannot be a key player in the neighborhood if it ignores a threat in its own backyard. Even if THAAD is not deployed, this threat will not disappear.

China needs to play a tougher diplomatic game than it has so far. I’m talking about China making use of capabilities that only it possesses. There is no country on the planet that has a greater influence over North Korea than China does. China is only hesitant to exert the kind of influence that could undermine North Korea because of the geopolitical importance of the Korean Peninsula.

Policymakers in the US and China are divided on the North Korean nuclear issue by opposing undercurrents.

China wants the US to use the carrot by playing cards such as lifting sanctions on North Korea, cutting back on its military exercises and normalizing relations with North Korea. But the US wants China to use the stick by shutting down North Korea’s connection with the outside world, including energy assistance and financial transactions.

The reasonable thing to do is to try the carrot first and, if that doesn’t work, to resort to the stick. Since several agreements with North Korea have not been implemented, the US wants China to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, since North Korea is on China’s doorstep.

Regardless of who is right and wrong, both sides have delayed dealing with this issue in the hope that the other side will decide they cannot wait any longer.

More than a quarter of a century has passed since the North Korean nuclear program has become an issue, but the US and China have put off this decision while only investing enough diplomatic resources to get half way to their goal.

Neither of the two countries have treated the North Korean nuclear issue as a matter of life or death and exhausted their options in search of a solution. But since President Xi Jinping took office in 2012, China has been focusing on “getting things done” (you suo zuo wei, 有所作?) and emphasizing that Asia’s security should be left to Asians.

In order for China to take on the responsibility and to play the role commensurate to its national standing, Northeast Asia needs to see productive change on the Korean Peninsula instead of the current stalemate. Yet Northeast Asia is moving toward a confrontation between South Korea, the US and Japan on the one hand and North Korea, China and Russia on the other because of the issues of North Korean nuclear weapons and THAAD.

South Korean society as a whole is opposed to this confrontation, and China probably does not want it either. Therefore, China needs to make the first move.

For more than a decade, China has officially maintained that North Korea will take a positive stance toward giving up its nuclear weapons if the US accepts North Korea’s “reasonable security concerns.”

No one can deny that the primary target of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles is South Korea. China needs to take into consideration the “reasonable security concerns” not only of North Korea but also of South Korea.

The greatest threat is faced by South Korea, and until a solution is found that can assuage South Korea‘s concerns, China should not be opposing South Korea’s attempts to defend itself. The controversy about the military efficacy of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula is a separate matter.

 Need wisdom of linking denuclearization to lifting of US sanctions

Song Min-soon
Song Min-soon

Our immediate objective should be getting the ball rolling on denuclearization by linking the suspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities and lifting US sanctions. The next objective should be building momentum so that we can move on to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. The critical element here is convincing North Korea to sit down at the negotiating table in good faith.

The key of the art of diplomacy is playing the right cards at the appropriate time. China knows better than anyone else how it must play its North Korean cards if it is to persuade the US to also play the cards in its hand. South Korea, needless to say, will have to cooperate fully in these efforts. 

China needs forward thinking for regional community

At the moment, an overwhelming majority of the South Korean public not only is critical of North Korea but also feels pent-up frustration toward China.

In recent years, China has been advocating the creation of a regional community that seeks mutual development and prosperity, based on the principles of qin cheng hui rong (??惠容), or in other words amity, sincerity, benefits, and inclusiveness. South Korea and the rest of China’s neighbors welcome a diplomatic course that is consistent with the mutually inclusive modern concept of qin cheng hui rong as opposed to the historical system of Sinocentrism.

But before our very eyes we are seeing China trapping South Korea between it and the US and then turning the screw. Such behavior conforms neither to the principle of “getting things done” nor to the idea of “Asians handling Asian security.” China ought to take measures that fit the diplomatic program it has itself espoused.

By Song Min-soon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

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