hankyoreh

John Feffer

In the early 1960s, the United States was very worried about the potential nuclear threat of China. It was bad enough that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, but China under Mao Zedong seemed even more diametrically opposed to the United States.

In 1964, China tested its first nuclear weapons. Then, two years later, it descended into the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The political and economic situation inside China became so dangerous that thousands of Chinese fled to the safe haven of, believe it or not, North Korea. Even more ominously, the leadership in Beijing was worried that Revolutionary Guards might seize control of the nuclear complex and try to use the weapons.

Finally, to make matters even worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong began to sink even further into paranoia and then dementia.

Some hardliners in the United States thought that this was a good time to confront China – when it was in political crisis, hobbled by economic turmoil, and had relatively few nuclear weapons.

And yet, even while the Cultural Revolution was underway, the U.S. government decided to do the opposite. The administration of Richard Nixon began secret negotiations with the Chinese leadership on what would eventually become a historic détente.

Richard Nixon was an unlikely leader to choose such an option. He had cultivated a strong reputation as an anti-Communist who was willing to take his country deeper into war in Vietnam to prevent Communism from spreading further in Asia. He had even developed a “madman theory” by which he wanted countries around the world to think that he was crazy enough to use nuclear weapons to advance U.S. national interests.

But Nixon was also playing a more sophisticated game of geopolitics. He wanted to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China to weaken the Communist bloc. It was a version of the old divide-and-conquer strategy.

The result was the extraordinary U.S. opening to China of 1971-2. It would lead eventually to expanded cultural contacts, diplomatic recognition, and a powerful trade relationship. It also meant that China would continue to maintain a relatively small nuclear arsenal for deterrence purposes. But the United States ceased to worry that China would launch a nuclear attack on Washington.

Today, the United States is in a similar bind. It worries about the nuclear capability of another Asian state led by a dictator. It is concerned about the internal situation within that state, including its human rights situation. Some hardliners in the United States advocate attacking North Korea now, when its nuclear program is still relatively weak, rather than wait for it to develop more sophisticated weapons that can definitively strike the United States.

At the same time, many people around the world think that a “mad man” again occupies the White House. Donald Trump’s comments at the UN about destroying North Korea suggest that he is willing to use all weapons at the U.S. disposal, including nuclear weapons, to annihilate an adversary.

Yet, in some ways, the situation today between Washington and Pyongyang is more conducive to some kind of negotiated solution than it was between Washington and Beijing in the late 1960s.

First of all, the North Korean leadership is considerably more pragmatic than the ideologically driven cadre around Mao Zedong. North Korea will work with anyone – churches, multinational corporations – to achieve a win-win deal. Moreover, there is considerably less political turmoil in Pyongyang today than during the Cultural Revolution in China.

Second, North Korea has no pretensions to being a superpower. It wants a nuclear weapon to deter any possible attacks from outside and to balance the overwhelming conventional military edge maintained by the United States and South Korea. It would be satisfied with an even smaller nuclear arsenal than China – as long as it is offered a place at the table internationally and access to the global economy.

Third, Donald Trump has some good reasons to want to negotiate with Pyongyang. He wants to prove that he can achieve a solution that eluded President Obama. A diplomatic settlement with North Korea would help widen the breach between Beijing and Pyongyang. And Trump would love to pave the way for U.S. business – including his own businesses – to enter the North Korean market.

True, Donald Trump has used some very explosive rhetoric when talking about North Korea, But Trump is an unpredictable leader capable of switching his positions completely from one day to the next. It’s not inconceivable that he could do so with North Korea as well.

In the 1960s, war with China would have been catastrophic for all concerned. Today, virtually everyone on all sides knows that war on the Korean peninsula would be apocalyptic. Even leading members of Trump’s cabinet – Pentagon chief James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster – have acknowledged how devastating war would be for both the United States and its allies in the region.

As the Trump administration casts around for options for dealing with North Korea today, it should think back to how a Republican Party leader handled a similar situation half a century ago. It’s not too late for a win-win solution. If a mad man in Washington and a senile man in Beijing were able to get to yes in the 1970s, Trump and Kim can do the same today.

By John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy In Focus

The views presented in this column are the writer’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of The Hankyoreh.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]