hankyoreh

Robert E. McCoy

Two issues cloud the political landscape shared by Seoul and Tokyo. Both are unresolved artifacts of Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 until the conclusion of World War II in 1945. One is the matter of Korean comfort women forced to serve Imperial soldiers while the other is Koreans who were forced to labor for Japanese industry in slave-like conditions.

The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was thought to have resolved the issue of forced labor, but as with many things in Asia, that resolution was fraught with complexities initially kept from the public eye. The other issue, comfort women or sex slaves, was completely swept under the table.

Japan has been obdurate in dealing with the comfort women issue which emerged from the shadows after former comfort women began coming forward to make their voices heard in the early 1990s. However, adding a new complication to already strained relations between the two countries, South Korea has recently authorized its citizens to file lawsuits against Japanese companies for the forced labor of Koreans during Japan’s occupation of the Peninsula.

During the Japanese occupation, Koreans were conscripted to serve their Japanese colonial masters in various ways. More than one million were subjected to forced labor in dangerous occupations such as mining and manufacturing. Additionally, perhaps as many as 200,000 young women were coerced into providing sex for Japanese soldiers as so-called “comfort women.”

While the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco brought a formal end to the war between Japan and the Allies, neither the Democratic People’s Republic of (North) Korea nor the Republic of (South) Korea were parties to the agreement. Subsequently and only after fourteen years of difficult negotiations, the 1965 treaty normalizing relations between Japan and South Korea was concluded. Its signing appeared to mark a successful closure of an undesirable chapter in the often contentious relationship between the two sides.

However, for reasons unknown – perhaps due to a common desire to keep a heinous crime buried in the past – the comfort women issue was not covered by the 1965 treaty, despite being well known by all parties, including the Allies. That omission eventually became the source of renewed animosity between Seoul and Tokyo.

At the time however, the treaty did specify reparations from Japan, though the pact specifically avoided using that term. Everything appeared settled as the government of Eisaku Soto (who would later be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize) provided the equivalent of US$500 million in soft loans and US$300 million in grants to the South Korean government headed by Park Chung-hee.

The Park administration subsequently put the funds to good use, repairing infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the Japanese occupation (as well as during the 1950 – 1953 Korean War) and building a foundation for the country’s modernization. There is little doubt that the nation as a whole benefitted from the way in which these monies were spent.

However, in response to increasing clamor from South Korean citizens in 2002, the government of Kim Dae-jung released five sets of documents– out of 57 known sets – that detailed those fourteen years of negotiations behind the 1965 bilateral treaty. Altogether, 1200 pages of hitherto undisclosed papers were released, though an untold number remain secreted in South Korean government storage.

The released documents triggered an outrage. During negotiations with the Japanese, the Park government had used the forced labor issue as a basis for claiming reparations, citing 77,603 deaths due to forced labor, 25,000 injured in forced labor activities, and 930,081 survivors of forced labor – just over 1.03 million Koreans. South Korea insisted on US$1,650 per death, US$2,000 per injured person, and US$200 for each survivor. The total demanded was just over US$364 million.

Though not mentioned in the treaty itself, the released documents show that the intent was for individual victims or their surviving kin to be compensated. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that South Korea would make no further claims on Tokyo once the US$800 million was in hand. Afterwards, however, only a little more than W2.5 billion was dispersed, paying merely W300,000 to each of the families of 8,552 Koreans that had died.

Those who had survived their forced labor experiences wanted financial redress as well, but by 2002, it was too late – the money was gone. Shortly after the treaty was concluded, the South Korean government decided it was better to use the money in rebuilding the country. What had been originally intended for forced labor victims and survivors had been spent.

In recent years, Japan has faced severe international criticism for refusing to acknowledge legal and moral responsibility over the comfort women issue, despite mounting evidence that clearly establishes its guilt. Sympathies around the globe have been with South Korea on this long-festering issue, and a number of statues symbolizing Korean comfort women have been erected in various countries, often in close proximity to Japanese consulates or embassies for maximum effect.

Now though, the Moon Jae-in administration has cleared the way for forced labor survivors to sue former Imperial Japanese companies for their parts in such activities. This is in clear disregard for how that issue was settled by the 1965 treaty.

The position of the current South Korean administration seems to be that, since Seoul spent those funds for the good of the country as a whole, individual claims must be settled by the Japanese companies themselves. Never mind it was a prior South Korean government that chose to use the funds intended for victims on other things.

ANOTHER FLAWED SETTLEMENT

In 2015, a self-serving and politically inelegant attempt by the United States to coerce the two historical antagonists to hurriedly settle the comfort women issue exposed the naiveté of the American diplomats. In the rush to conclude a deal, comfort women and the families of those deceased were not consulted, despite their vested interests in such a pact.

Signed by the Park Geun-hye administration with the government of Shinzo Abe in the waning hours of 2015, the agreement contained no admission of guilt by Tokyo. Rather, it merely stipulated that Japan would provide Y1 billion (US$8.9 million) to a foundation administered by Seoul on behalf of surviving comfort women. In return, the South Korean government agreed to refrain from further disparaging Japan on this issue. Both sides then stated that the issue was "finally and irreversibly resolved" – except that almost immediately after it was announced, some comfort women denounced the agreement in no uncertain terms.

In fact, a great many South Koreans soon came to view the settlement as highly flawed. In view of this and because of American strong-arming in forcing a resolution on the two sides, the Moon administration has continued to bring up the matter with Tokyo. For his part, Abe has adamantly insisted that he believes the matter to be closed.

Now, South Korea has indirectly brought up the forced labor issue by allowing private citizens to sue Japanese companies for compensation. Perhaps this was merely a ploy, a political stance taken to force Japan to face its responsibilities regarding comfort women in exchange for dropping the forced labor issue. Regardless of the underlying motivation, by resurrecting a matter thought to have been long settled, South Korea has lost the moral high ground with Japan, and cooperation between the two countries facing the common danger of North Korea has been placed at risk.

The unraveling of the 2015 deal on comfort women proves two important things: (1) haste makes waste, and (2) pressure brought about by the selfish motivations of outside nations isn’t helpful. The sordid history of the early twentieth century between South Korea and Japan is a shared one, and to that point, it is these two countries that must resolve the issues that remain, without external pressure.

Until there is full and satisfactory resolution of those issues, there will be serious consequences of South Korea and Japan not working closely together. This has been most clearly exhibited in less-than-optimal diplomatic exchanges on the security issues before them.

Not long ago, South Korea declined to directly share intelligence on North Korea with Japan. Critical information must first pass through the US, which serves as a middleman. Seoul has also refused to participate in joint naval exercises that would better acquaint it with how Tokyo and Washington intend to operate in the waters around the Korean Peninsula in the event of a military conflict with North Korea.

Now the intent by President Moon to grant US$8 million in humanitarian aid to Pyongyang along with US$6 million to facilitate the North taking its own census is seen as counter-productive by Seoul’s allies, as well as many in his own country. Moreover, since money is completely fungible, funds given in any form to Pyongyang run counter to the purposes of the recently passed UN sanctions. Even goods in kind supplant other resources which can then be used for other purposes, such as the North’s missiles and nuclear programs.

Both Japan and South Korea need to look at their individual histories squarely. Both have to reevaluate their stances with regard to a very unfortunate but shared history. Only in this way can the two countries, so necessary to one another these days, come to some “forward-looking” accommodation regarding their intertwined pasts in order to move forward.

Evidence of that beginning to happen was observed recently when Moon and Abe agreed to work with each other on implementing the latest sanctions imposed by the United Nations in response to the latest North Korean provocations. In addition, South Korean Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon extended an invitation last month to Japanese Emperor Akihito to visit Seoul before he abdicates. In light of the aging emperor’s views regarding the shared history of Japan and South Korea, paying such a call would likely be greatly welcomed and ultimately do much to ease tensions between the two countries.

But there remains the question of whether this warming of relations will become permanent so that the two countries are able to put aside past differences in order to face more pressing challenges. Until there is a sea change in the political thinking by the current administrations in both countries, that is probably wishful thinking. That is a pity, for Northeast Asia needs enduring solidarity now more than ever before.

By Robert E. McCoy

The views presented in this column are the writer’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of The Hankyoreh.