hankyoreh

Patrick McEachern

Washington analysts have been preoccupied with the meaning of “denuclearization.” What exactly will Kim Jong Un be ready to give when he meets with President Trump? It is a fair question, but one where this is ample precedent for concrete pathways to denuclearization. In 2007, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia agreed to the Denuclearization Action Plan to implement the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. While the agreement failed in implementation, its parameters are mostly still relevant. The pathway to denuclearization is not a mystery, but all parties must walk the path.

The more challenging question for the United States and its allies is what it will give in return for North Korea's denuclearization. South Korea has suggested it would raise at the inter-Korean summit the issue of a peace regime to officially conclude the Korean War, which is a long-held North Korean demand that the United States has traditionally avoided. South Korean President Moon Jae-in sought and received President Trump’s “blessing” to proceed.

The United States has traditionally considered peace treaty negotiations a distraction or worse. When North Korea insisted that peace regime issues make up one of the five working groups of the Six Party Talks, Washington reluctantly agreed and participated in a handful of Six Party working group meeting in Moscow. However, analysts commonly argued the peace regime negotiations were a North Korean effort to distract international attention from core denuclearization matters and drag out negotiations while secretly advancing their nuclear program.

Beyond delay tactics, a peace treaty threatened peace. North Korea would demand a dillution or termination of U.S. forces in South Korea as terms of peace, which could invite a future North Korean attack. The United States would not be able to honor its treaty commitments to defend South Korea in the event of attack in the same way if not stationed on the peninsula. A nuclear-armed North Korea could deter a massive amphibious landing from U.S. troops stationed in Japan as General MacArthur lead in the Korean War by threatening the vulnerable landing armada with the world's most lethal weapons.

Further, a peace regime could end the UN Command. After North Korea's invasion in 1950, a nascent UN Security Council, which did not yet include China as a veto-wielding member, condemned the action and authorized UN member states to repulse North Korea's aggression. Besides South Korea and the United States, sixteen UN member states sent troops to fight North Korea's aggression, and they retain a token military presence in South Korea today. More importantly, UN member states retain the legal authority and legitimacy to protect South Korea in case of renewed hostilities. China would likely veto any effort to pass another UN Security Council Resolution like this today, so a peace treaty that nullifies the 1950 Security Council Resolution and ends the UN Command poses an irreversible blow to military and diplomatic efforts to garner global resources to thwart any future North Korean advance.

Some American analysts dispute these concerns, noting North Korean comments in Track 2 conversations, its media, or remarks by past North Korean leaders suggest Pyongyang does not genuinely harbor these intentions. However, given lack of trust in the U.S.-DPRK relationship and past agreements gone awry, North Korea skeptics will always have the upper hand in Washington's debates, especially during a conservative presidential administration.

If Kim's peace regime demands are maximalist and unbending, then the United States and its allies may want to discuss alternative quid-pro-quos that do not undermine strategic stability. If Kim's demands are less expansive than the traditional peace regime concerns dictate, the allies can discuss what trade-offs may be acceptable for specific and concrete North Korean action on denuclearization. Any sustainable U.S.-DPRK denuclearization agreement must begin with solidarity among the allies and well-informed negotiations. There was no more important preparation for the U.S.-DPRK summit than the inter-Korean one, and further narrowing this uncertainty about North Korean peace regime intentions will go a long way in ensuring the U.S.-DPRK summit is not a missed opportunity.

By Patrick McEachern

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