[Column] My answers to N. Korean officials’ question on US pressure and denuclearization

Posted on : 2018-12-17 17:14 KST Modified on : 2018-12-17 17:14 KST
As unfair as it may seem, the North needs to do more to convince Washington to budge

As the situation opened up this year in terms of the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization, I had several opportunities to visit North Korea, for the first time in 11 years, to attend inter-Korean events this fall. I met with North Korean officials there, some of them quite familiar faces. In the past, they had focused on adopting a high-pressure stance and propagandized their regime in an attempt to cow the other side; now they appeared far more flexible and pragmatic.

It may have had to do with my record as a former Minister of Unification and expert on Korean Peninsula issues, but the North Koreans attending the events sought me out at times to hear my views on the current situation. As a result, I got to have quite a few conversations with them. As we talked, the fervency of their desire to have UN economic sanctions lifted was evident.

Economic cooperation with the outside world seemed to have become all the more urgent since North Korea had changed course this April from focusing on simultaneous nuclear and economic development to channeling its full capacities into building the economy. In light of that, their interest and questions were naturally focused on denuclearization dialogue with Washington, which is seen as the key to the sanctions’ removal.

At root, their questions came to down to whether the US would actually “spare” them if Pyongyang did move first to denuclearize. It echoed the first question I was asked by a North Korean official when I visited Pyongyang in October: “What guarantee is there that we won’t end up like Libya?” The question concerned the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, which was bombed by US-led NATO forces during a Civil War with militia forces after abandoning nuclear weapons on a US pledge to guarantee its security.

The cautionary tale of Gaddafi’s fall

The US’ involvement in Gaddafi’s fall was, to Pyongyang at least, a warning of the risks of abandoning its nuclear program based on an agreement. Indeed, North Korea moved to state its possession of nuclear capabilities in its Constitution in Apr. 2012 – not longer after Gaddafi was killed in Oct. 2011. I tried to reassure them that their situation was fundamentally different from Libya’s: South Korea would do everything in its power to stop the US from attacking the North if it did denuclearization, and China would not stand idly by and let anything happen. But I couldn’t be sure how far they would take my word for it.

In that context, it is reasonable that North Korea would demand that its denuclearization move in tandem with trust-building between Pyongyang and Washington. In other words, Pyongyang’s position insisting on establishing trust through a step-by-step process of simultaneous give-and-take is more persuasive than Washington’s insistence on complete denuclearization as a prerequisite for lifting sanctions. In that sense, it would not be out of the ordinary for the US to offer some immediate corresponding measures for North Korea, which has already halted its nuclear and long-range missile testing and launches and dismantled its underground nuclear test site.

But when the North Koreans asked me to propose a solution to escape the denuclearization impasse, I told them that as unfair as it might be, they would need to produce still another advanced measure on their own to get the US to show more flexibility. Given the US’ status as the world’s sole superpower and dominant force, there was no other way of approaching its rejection of simultaneous action, I told them; the only path to advancing North Korea’s national interest was through preemptive compromise.

As the matter of breaking out of the North Korea-US deadlock has become even more urgent, I feel obliged to tweak my response. US President Donald Trump is aware that Chairman Kim Jong-un want to abandon nuclear weapons so that he can choose a future for North Korea as a “wealthy economy.” Accordingly, he hopes to lift sanctions if possible, if only to encourage Kim to make the right choice. But the mood among the US politicians and public is not conducive to that, given the widespread distrust of the North. Trump himself is unlikely to gain any traction for a resolution without offering some new justification.

N. Korea needs to give Trump a good reason for lifting sanctions

So what should be done? North Korea needs to give Trump the rationale he needs to proceed with lifting sanctions. As it happens, the US recently made the decision to postpone the Foal Eagle joint military exercise originally scheduled with South Korea for next spring. It was the right decision to make in terms of showing a commitment to dialogue with the North. White House National Security Advisor John Bolton went on to say the US may consider lifting its economic sanctions against the North if there is progress with denuclearization.

This message – very different from his past position clearly stating that sanctions would only be possible after complete denuclearization had been achieved – echoed the one shared by Trump soon after the North Korea-US summit in June when he hinted at a standard for lifting sanctions, arguing that 20% denuclearization would be “irreversible.” This is significant in terms of Washington moving first to show its flexibility as a way of getting North Korea to make an additional denuclearization decision.

Lee Jong-seok
Lee Jong-seok

Now it’s time for North Korea to move. It needs to provide Trump with some grounds for overcoming the pessimism in the US and loosening sanctions, allowing him to argue that Kim’s commitment to denuclearization is clear and the process is moving ahead irreversibly. This will entail some additional, creative form of denuclearization measure. The North will also need to join forces with Seoul, which has been acting as a mediator, and work together on finding an answer.

By Lee Jong-seok, former Unification Minister and senior researcher at the Sejong Institute

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]

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