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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversees flight drills of combat pilots of Unit 1017 of the Air and Anti-aircraft Force of the Korean People‘s Army on Apr. 16

One after another, the inter-Korean exchange efforts that were agreed upon last year are coming to a standstill. South and North Korea agreed to embark on a joint exhumation of Korean War POW/MIA remains in the DMZ in April, but the North’s failure to go along has left the South undertaking the exhumation on its own. The two sides had agreed to begin a test run on joint usage of the Han River estuary by private vessels this month following a joint waterway survey – but no word has yet come from Pyongyang. Last month, the North declared the sudden withdrawal of its staff from the joint inter-Korean liaison office. While it did quietly return some of its workers to their posts three days later, it is still a far cry from a full-scale return to normal operations.

There doesn’t seem to be any doubt that the reason behind North Korea’s newfound reluctance – in contrast with last year, when it moved readily to implement agreements on the establishment of a buffer zone around the armistice line and withdraw its guard posts – has to do with the failure of its summit with the US in late February. It may have needed some time to recover from the internal shock and get its new strategy organized after that summit unexpectedly failed to produce an agreement. In that regard, it’s understandable that it would have difficulty deciding straight away whether to move ahead with these projects as pledged.

At the same time, the attitude that North Korea has shown is dismaying. Anyone may find themselves in a situation where they have to renege on their promises. Circumstances may be such that promises have to be postponed or altered. But the proper approach in cases like that is to first offer an explanation and ask for understanding – a bit of common wisdom that North Korea seems to lack. When asked why it isn’t keeping its promises or what should be done instead, Pyongyang remains quiet, offering only that there are “no orders from higher up.” While this could simply be seen as an illustration of the North Korean regime’s rigidity, I would also note that this sort of attitude, whatever its intentions, only serves in the end to reinforce North Korea’s image as a “country that can’t be trusted.”

In a democratic state, it is reasonable enough for policy decisions to be influenced by public opinion. It is difficult to proceed properly with policies when they don’t enjoy the public’s trust and support. The same goes for policies in North Korea. It’s hard to expect the public to maintain a favorable attitude toward the North when it discards its agreements with the South like tossing out on old shoe, without so much as an explanation or a word of regret. For South Korea, this is quite likely to narrow the scope for policies concerning inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. Every time something like this happens, we routinely hear the same criticism: “Why is it that the South Korean government can’t even lodge a proper protest when North Korea backs out of its promises?” It may be asking too much for South Korean authorities to pursue conciliatory North Korea policies with any kind of vigor when they are left unable to reply to this critique. It may seem like a minor issue when a party unilaterally fails to honor its promises, but even a drizzle will get your clothes wet.

We’ve seen cases in the past where North Korea threw the brakes on inter-Korean relations after trouble arose in its relations with the US. An inter-Korean summit didn’t happen until the end of the Roh Moo-hyun administration in October 2007, when the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) situation was finally resolved after two years, thereby clearing a major obstacle in North Korea-US relations. (The US placed sanctions against the Macao-based bank handling North Korea’s financial transactions.) But Pyongyang’s policy approach of prioritizing its relationship with Washington ended up thwarted. However, when the BDA situation was resolved and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation efforts were allowed to begin during Roh’s term, a new conservative administration was elected and it was back to square one. Does North Korea have any cause to follow down the same path again?

The current moment seems to calls for the opposite approach: creating momentum to improve North Korea-US relations by actively moving to improve inter-Korean relations. To be sure, the current situation in terms of sanctions more or less rules out a full-scale improvement in relations. It’s no secret that Pyongyang would like to see the resumption of tourism Mt. Kumgang and operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex – but even those go beyond what is allowed by the UN’s framework of North Korea sanctions. There certainly are areas where South Korea could be more proactive, but it’s not a matter that can be resolved through commitment alone without progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. The rational approach for now appears to lie in broadening the scope of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation by starting systematically with things that can be done within the sanctions framework. In this way, we need to set a virtuous cycle in motion where inter-Korean relations and North Korea-US relations stimulate and drive each other.

In that sense, it was heartening to see North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stating in his policy speech last week that he “earnestly hopes that North-South relations will be constantly improved [. . .] through thorough implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration and September Pyongyang Declaration from last year.” What we need now is not rhetoric, but practical action.

By Park Byong-su, editorial writer

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