hankyoreh

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul on Dec. 4. (Yonhap News)

Quite a few American diplomats descended upon Seoul before the scheduled termination of South Korea’s information-sharing agreement with Japan last month. Those diplomats were quite open in their attack on China. If the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was terminated, they said, the only countries that would be pleased are China, North Korea, and Russia. They also accused China of assuming that “might makes right.”

As soon as South Korea bowed to American pressure and agreed to extend GSOMIA on a conditional basis, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited South Korea. During a courtesy call to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a meeting with South Korea’s foreign minister, and a conference with figures friendly to China, Wang repeatedly lashed out at the US’ “unilateralism” and “hegemony.” He also blamed the US for the Terminal High-Altitude Defense (THAAD) issue, which he said the US had instigated with China as its target. Wang’s behavior on this trip differed considerably from the head-on assault he launched against then Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2016, shortly after Seoul approved the THAAD deployment. During that forum, Wang said that “South Korea had damaged the foundation of trust between the two countries.”

Throughout his trip to South Korea, Wang reserved his sharpest attacks for the US and sent more amiable signals to Seoul, which he described as a “trustworthy long-term cooperative partner” and part of a “community of interest, with US$300 billion in bilateral trade.” He also emphasized how much he likes Korean-style jajangmyeon (a black-sauce noodle dish inspired by Chinese cuisine) and mentioned the links between South Korea’s March 1 Movement and China’s May 4 Movement. Wang had refrained from visiting South Korea for five years after the THAAD incident; on his return visit, he deftly employed diplomacy in an attempt to draw South Korea closer to China or at least convince Seoul to maintain its neutrality amid the increasingly heated hegemony rivalry between Beijing and Washington.

While reporting on the visits by American and Chinese diplomats to South Korea last month, I got a clear sense of how South Korea has become a battlefield in the two countries’ hegemonic rivalry. The two powers are both asking South Korea — which leans on the US for security and on China in economic matters — to take their side. South Korea is facing a multifaceted threat: its security may be endangered if it ignores the American demands and its economy may be jeopardized if it doesn’t listen to China.

After caving to American pressure by conditionally extending GSOMIA, South Korea now faces a demand for a massive increase in its contribution to the cost of stationing American troops in its territory, as well as the threat of a potential withdrawal of the American garrison. Given these circumstances, China appears to be concerned that South Korea will make an even bigger concession to the US vis-à-vis its security strategy. Wang’s visit to South Korea, therefore, was an attempt to forestall the possibility of South Korea fully participating in the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy or moving toward accepting an American request for hosting intermediate-range missiles.

At this point, the debate about whether South Korea should be pro-US or pro-China is pointless. The only way South Korea can avoid the trap of vacillating between the two powers is to set clear strategic principles for foreign policy and to stick to those principles, regardless of the consequences. Superpowers won’t stop trying to intimidate South Korea into changing its position until South Korea lets it be known that its position is fixed, no matter what pressure it faces.

In its defense cost-sharing negotiations with the US, South Korea must firmly reject the US’ demand for an unreasonable increase in financial contributions, ignoring idle threats about a US troop reduction. The US is obliged to counter China, but with the US’ global influence in decline, it hopes to strengthen its alliance with Japan by rearming its rich ally. Inside that framework, the US is pushing South Korea to get over its historical grievances with Japan; to join a trilateral alliance with the US, subordinate to Japan; and to take on a greater share of the cost of containing China. The US$5 billion that the US wants South Korea to cough up includes costs connected with its Indo-Pacific Strategy, costs that are unrelated to US Forces Korea (USFK).

Furthermore, South Korea needs to let the US know in unmistakable terms that it will never permit the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in its territory. Just as the Soviet attempt to deploy missiles to Cuba, on the doorstep of the US, in 1962, brought the two superpowers to the brink of World War III, the American attempt to deploy intermediate-range missiles in South Korea, on the doorstep of China, is a self-serving move that would spell disaster for South Korea and Northeast Asia.

In regard to China, South Korea should communicate its concerns about the high-handed foreign policy toward China’s neighbors that has become evident during its rapid rise. South Korea should also let China know that its “Big Brother” style of social control and its violations of human rights in places such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang are narrowing South Korea’s choices, even as it seeks to increase cooperation with China. Wang Yi’s remarks about opposing big countries that exploit their power to bully smaller and weaker countries is a universal truth that applies not only to the US but to China as well.

By Park Min-hee, head of the Unification Diplomacy Team

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]