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The US’ THAAD launchers in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province.

Sometimes it feels like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system issue in South Korea forms a tight-knit pair with the matter of South Korea’s participation in or incorporation into US-led missile defense, which comes up almost reflexively alongside it. The same thing happened when the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced plans to improve THAAD’s performance at a budget briefing not long ago. Immediately, people began asking whether the “performance improvements” were being pursued as a way of incorporating South Korea into the US’ missile defense strategy.

A look at the context suggests the concern was not entirely unwarranted. The controversy over South Korea being “incorporated” into US-led missile defense dates back to the early ’00s. At that time, the George W. Bush administration made attempts to set up a missile defense system in its own territory and that of its allies, prompting vehement objections from Russia and others who decried it as a violation of the US-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). A debate unfolded as the conflict among the US, Russia, and China heated up, until the Kim Dae-jung administration finally announced that it will “neither oppose nor participate in US missile defense.”

In addition to the fierce objections from Beijing and Moscow, this decision also took into account the extreme economic difficulties being faced by North Korea -- which left its abilities to wage war at an all-time-low -- and widespread skepticism about the military usefulness of missile defense. Since then, South Korea’s nonparticipation in US missile defense has been the official stance for every administration that has taken office.

But the controversy refuses to die mostly because US officials take every chance they get to either urge South Korea to take part in missile defense or speak as though it were a done deal, while the South Korean government has done little in response except to parrot its previous stance about “not participating in US missile defense.” The THAAD deployment in 2017 only stoked the embers by evoking fierce objections from China. It was alleged at the time that THAAD, a US strategic asset, was being forward-deployed on the Korean Peninsula to intercept ballistic missiles aimed at US territory and overseas US military bases in places like Okinawa and Guam.

In October 2012, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) named three criteria for South Korea’s participation in US missile defense -- the provision of a ground-based interceptor (GBI) base, the presence of X band radar, and the payment of joint missile defense research costs -- and explained that the South Korean military “does not meet any of them.” But THAAD is a ballistic missile interception system equipped with powerful X band radar. The questions about whether the THAAD deployment meant South Korea was being incorporated into the US missile defense framework were the next logical step.

But is it justified to view the issue solely in these terms? Even at the time MND announced the criteria, questions were raised about how objective or appropriate they were. In retrospect, it seems more like the MND contrived its criteria specifically to create a basis for its position about not taking part in US missile defense.\

It is true that South Korean authorities are working on an independent Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system independently of the US. It is difficult to imagine, however, that this system will be “independently operated” from US missile defense if it is completed by the mid-2020s as planned.

Modern warfare is evolving into a form where all available combat components -- including detection assets, strike assets, and decision-making -- are connected into networks and combat capabilities are maximized through the real-time exchange of information. It’s become known as “network-centric warfare.” There is no reason why KAMD and the US military’s missile defense system should be any exception just because of their nomenclature. In the name of “interoperability,” the South Korean and US missile defense system are connected into a mutual network and designed to operate while sharing information in real time.

Is this evidence to conclude that South Korea is being incorporated into the US missile defense framework? It could be viewed that way. But if we consider changes to international security amid developments in information and communications technology, it remains unclear whether the term “incorporation” is suitable to fully capture the core of the issue.

Things are now past the point whether the question of whether South Korea joins the US-led network or not. It is now simply a matter of policy determinations. In an era where networks have assumed a central role in warfare and alliances are compelled to join such networks, the debate surrounding missile defense may need a new, more advanced frame beyond the question of “incorporation.”

By Park Byong-su, editorial writer

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