hankyoreh

Citizens chant for then-President Park Geun-hye to resign at Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul on Feb. 25, 2017. (by Park Jong-shik, staff photographer)

Back Ki-chul

By Back Ki-chul, executive editor

I recently read an interesting book called “The Era of Overtaking,” which was recommended to me a while back by a Facebook friend. Written by six authors born in the 1980s, it’s an ambitious work that touches upon a range of topics such as generations, history and politics. It examines past generations from a holistic point of view that transcends the ideological divide.

The main argument of these 30-something pundits is that the generations who achieved Korea’s industrialization and democratization (let’s call them the industrializers and the democratizers) have focused on slamming each other while refusing to acknowledge each other’s unprecedented achievements, trapping Korea in a political civil war.

According to the book, people born in the 1980s, who enjoyed the benefits of both democratization and industrialization, will embark upon an era of overtaking, rather than chasing — an era in which they acknowledge the successes, and compensate for the failures, of the preceding two generations.

Simply put, the authors describe a generation of overcomers, a generation that adopts a politics of positivity. The book can also be read as a meaningful rebuttal of older Koreans’ lament that people in their 20s and 30s are growing more conservative because of their ignorance of the history and essence of democratization.

Importantly, those of us who lived through the unrelenting pace of industrialization and democratization over the past 60 years can view those events more dispassionately through the eyes of these younger writers.

Few countries that have achieved a per capita GDP of US$30,000 (considered the threshold for the club of advanced economies) have put out so many top global products as South Korea. And since the candlelit revolution united the Korean public over issues of livelihood and safety (crystallized in the tragic sinking of the Sewol ferry), perhaps it can be described as “the moment when South Korean democracy overtook Japanese democracy.”

Nevertheless, the crux of the problem is that the industrializers and democratizers still regard themselves as being the hero of their own separate narratives: “For the industrializers, the villains are North Korea and its sympathizers; for the democratizers, the villains are South Korea’s dictators and their collaborators.”

Ultimately, the authors say, “Neither side can leave the stage until the other does. [Both sides] view hypocritical behavior as being due not to selfishness, but to the belief that their hero’s minor flaws are no reason to bow out so long as the villain remains on the stage.”

The authors describe this as “the tragedy of the hero who can’t leave the stage” and propose that the two generations “historicize” their issues and “let each other go home.” In terms of the text, historicization means acknowledging each other’s relative accomplishments.

In other words, the book argues that the two generations, after recognizing each other’s great success, should gracefully allow each other to retire, rather than artificially trying to tear each other down.

The book offers a sharp analysis that spans the accomplishments, limitations, and survival strategies of the industrializers and the democratizers. But it’s not clear whether its solutions are realistic.

The two older generations — and especially the democratizers — may be miffed that the younger generation isn’t taking their side. But every generation must eventually give way to the next. Having completed the task assigned to them, perhaps the democratizers should step aside while they can do so with their dignity intact.

The movement to overcome preceding generations may have begun with the candlelit rallies in 2016. The 20- and 30-somethings who raised the candles may have been motivated by more than the mere desire to bring a new political party to power. Perhaps they also represented a larger struggle to supersede the generations that had gone before them.

These authors in the “1980s generation” offer a fascinating perspective on history. What are the origins and driving forces of South Korea’s development? How should South Koreans view the US and Japan? What does North Korea mean to South Korea? These are all contentious questions whose answers depend upon historical and generational viewpoints.

The authors generally reject the view that the US and the Japanese empire were the crucial drivers of industrialization. Various countries received aid from the US, but South Korea and Taiwan were the only ones that succeeded at industrialization.

The authors also dismiss the thesis of colonial modernity — namely, the idea that South Korea and Taiwan owed their industrialization to the legacy of Japanese colonization — by underlining that China and Vietnam’s growth over the past 30 years is tied to East Asian characteristics rather than Japanese exceptionalism.

The autonomy of small farmers during the Joseon Dynasty, land reform following Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule, former president Park Chung-hee’s investment in heavy and chemical industry and Koreans’ passion for educating their children — these are all endogenous factors that are distinct to Korea.

Regarding the US and Japan as being the fundamental causes of Korea’s industrialization is quite different from believing that industrialization couldn’t have happened without Koreans’ efforts amid the given circumstances. Looking at these two aspects simultaneously provides a holistic view of Korean history following liberalization.

The fact that the authors take stock of the achievements and limitations of Japan, which had already industrialized and set up a parliament by the late 19th century, speaks to the emergence of a generation that has begun to regard Japan with greater objectivity.

As for North Korea, the authors advocate a two-state peace regime. Viewing North Korea through the lens of South Korea is typical of people born in the 1980s but carries limitations.

Writ large, their argument can be regarded as falling within the scope of a “third way.” Their arguments are fairly persuasive from the generic perspective of a generational study, but the “third way” has mostly been ineffective in terms of political empowerment. Furthermore, the concepts of the “1980s generation” and “politics for the 1980s generation” are not clearly articulated.

This book seems to serve as a prologue for a fuller definition of the 1980s generation and a decision about what policies and narratives can be used to surpass older generations. I look forward to seeing these questions being further contemplated and debated in the future.

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]