hankyoreh

It has always been a question of timing, and it has been expected. The experts predicted it would be the next step in Pyongyang’s playbook. In a North Korean foreign ministry statement on July 16, it responded to the United Nations Security Council’s resolution by declaring it would use "all means and methods" to strengthen its "war deterrent," reconfirming its intention to take what it has previously called "stronger physical action" if the U.S. and others attempt to pressure it over its missile tests.

A similar warning of what could come happened on July 5, local time, when the missile test took place.

In its statement on June 1, Pyongyang’s foreign ministry said that it would take "unavoidable, extremely strong measures" if the U.S. intensifies what the North calls hostility and pressure. In that sense, the current activity involving vehicles and large reels of cable at Punggye-ri, Kilchu-gun, North Hamgyong Province, when compared to the first signs Pyongyang would attempt a missile launch, make it seem like the North might eventually follow through with a nuclear test.

Movement in the mountainous area of Kilchu-gun that could be related to a nuclear test is nothing new. In April 2003, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, referring to activity there, said that moves towards a nuclear test are a "serious concern for the international community." It was the first time the U.S. officially suggested the possibility of North Korean nuclear test. Movement suspected of being potentially related to a nuclear test have been spotted in the Kilchu area sporadically since the summer of 2004. According to U.S. intelligence officials, the North was at one point making a deliberate effort to engage in "all activities" related to a test, including the building of an observation platform and the filling in of the entrance to a tunnel. That activity stopped in June 2005, perhaps because of the U.S.-South Korea summit on June 10, the meeting between Kim Jong-il and Chung Dong-young on June 17, and the resumption of the six-party talks.

When the North simultaneously launched a series of missiles last month, the experts made two predictions about the North’s reaction to the U.S.’s policy of "disregarding" Pyongyang and refusing to have bilateral dialogue. The first prediction was that it would attempt another launch of its Taepodong 2 missile. The other was that it would perform a nuclear test. Another Taepodong launch would require a lot of time, because the last test was a failure and improvements would involve technical issues. A nuclear test, on the other hand, is something the North has been preparing for a long time.

The big question is how destructive such a test would be. If it goes ahead with a nuclear test, North Korea will hurt relations with the South and with China and give Japan an excuse to go nuclear, as well. The domino effect on regional proliferation would be hard to predict. A test would be crossing that so-called "red line" even for China and South Korea. The resulting crisis would be more serious than any resulting from missile tests.

In its statement on July 16, Pyongyang’s foreign ministry said that "no one can protect us, not even the U.N." Its relations with China are not good, because of the passage of the U.N. Security Council resolution. The situation is such that even China may not be able to function as a means of controlling what transpires. Pyongyang might come to believe that it does not have much to lose in the context of inter-Korean relations, either.

The North is taking its brinkmanship to the brink of all brinks over the potential for a nuclear test. But they will likely avoid going through with it ahead of the U.S.-South Korea summit scheduled for September 14. South Korea, the U.S., and China need to come up with a "negotiable answer" to this most dangerous trouble initiated by North Korea.