hankyoreh

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun held a luncheon meeting on Aug. 13 with editorial staff in charge of foreign affairs, security, and unification at several newspapers, including The Hankyoreh. The presidential office asked participants not to publish President Roh’s remarks made during the meeting. At that time, The Hankyoreh respected the presidential office’s request. However, as a local newspaper reported the president’s remarks on Aug. 18, The Hankyoreh has decided to report the proceedings of the meeting as related to public interest. Below are excerpts from President Roh’s remarks.

The president, regarding South Korea regaining wartime military control: The problem was burgeoning after conservative media began to argue with different logic [than they had 10 years ago]. When we talk with the U.S., official discussions are important. In general, it is a rare thing for the U.S. government to express its position on an alliance. That’s because such an expression of position could be the subject of argument. However, the [U.S.] Defense and State Departments expressed their support for returning wartime control [to South Korea]. It’s not the kind of thing on which to delay discussion.

While [the conservative media] raised questions about our military power, our military buildup for now is aimed at coping with future Northeast Asia geopolitics. There would be no problem if we retain wartime military control. The basic characteristic of military sovereignty is to be able to carry out military power independently. Regaining wartime military control would be possible now. Of course, some things need to be coordinated [with the U.S.], such as the air defense system. During inter-Korean military talks - for example, to address the issue of reduction of military power - we need to cope with the situation when North Korea raises questions about wartime military control.

Additional explanation from an official from the presidential office: When we began discussions in 2003, we had planned to regain wartime military control in 2010. But, the timing was delayed to 2012, as our defense ministry is [currently] focused on military buildup. While the U.S. side talks about the timing of 2009, that’s because they are worried about a possible further delay.

Participant question: But wasn’t there not enough explanation given to the public?

Presidential office official: We still have things we [currently] need to be confidential about, but we plan to step up our explanations to the public in September, when the roadmap for regaining wartime military control is confirmed. So far, we have publicized all necessary parts. We didn’t know that [the conservative movement against the handover of military control] would become a problem belatedly.

The president on operational plan 5029: Operational plan 5029 against North Korea must be revised. Basically, the 5029 plan allows the U.S. to order military forces to enter North Korea. If so, there will be no simple problems. China doesn’t want the U.S. military to reach its border. In addition, when North Korea collapses, there is a concern that the U.S. and China may deal with the North Korean matter without South Korea. Just in case, we must have the capability to peacefully deal with the problems that would arise if North Korea collapses. Of course, it’s important [for us] to make efforts to prevent this situation.

The president, regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and resumption of the six-party talks: I don’t know what we can do about it. Sometimes, I think that the best thing to do is to transfer the matter to the next government after we manage things so they do not worsen further. I feel a sense of frustration. Although there is much I have to do on the matter, that is my mind on the subject.

With regards to the North Korean regime, we have some problems in talking with the U.S., and North Korea is also obstinate. South Korea has the difficulty of being sandwiched. We have insufficient information about North Korea and sometimes our decisions have not been rational. Also, the National Intelligence Service doesn’t have full knowledge of everything. An official channel with North Korea is most accurate. So far, we had tried with unofficial channels, but no tangible result was made. It’s difficult to confirm that the channels were connected with...Kim Jong-il. A [formal-level meeting] with Chairman Kim Jong-il, as former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young did in Pyongyang last year, would do. The reason why I keep Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok is that he is the most trusted channel with North Korea. If a new person comes along, North Korea has also the difficulty of making a decision [whether to trust that person or not].

About North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, China is seen to be not so worried. A threat is a matter of relations rather than a matter of technology. Why does the U.S. allow India to have nuclear weapons? While the U.S. has nuclear weapons, South Koreans have no concerns. While India and Iran have their willingness to possess nuclear weapons, North Korea has a will to bargain with its nuclear program. We should try to manage relations well.

Historically, as nations that boasted themselves as civilized ones forced primitive nations to obey their rules, the U.S. treats North Korea in a similar way. So to speak, it’s a way [to have a] primitive nation to obey the rules of democracy and the market economy. However, the more important thing is fairness. We need to think about whether the U.S. treats North Korea in a fair manner.

Participant question: How about South Korea directly talking with North Korea, partly commissioned by the U.S. and China?

President Roh: Could the U.S. commission [such an effort]? If there is any possibility, we will directly talk [with North Korea].

The president, on his administration’s relationship with the Bush administration: It’s a fact that we haven’t talked well with the Bush administration. Once, there was a honeymoon period between Christopher Hill and our government. But the situation changed after Hill returned home. The situation had been good from spring 2005, when Chung Dong-young met Kim Jong-il on September 19, but it became tangled after the U.S. raised issue about Banco Delta Asia.

Personally, President Bush likes me because I have a clear direction. I can say that’s my asset.

The president, regarding the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement currently being negotiated: I feel less burdened regarding the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, compared with the issue of regaining wartime military control. The South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement is a choice that we could win. We can cope with damages from the agricultural industry. One-third [of South Korean agriculture] is currently competitive, one-third could be competitive with supports, and one-third is not competitive.

A South Korea-China free trade agreement would be more burdensome. But with the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, after we become stronger, we should move forward with the South Korea-China free trade agreement.

It’s also important how the U.S. has treated us. Though 25 countries proposed free trade accords with the U.S., the U.S. chose South Korea. When I talk about this, some people might call me ’pro-American.’