hankyoreh

May 5. 　

The sinking of the Cheonan on March 26 and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s visit to China on Monday have come together such that the political situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to unfold in a complex way. At the heart of the complexities are the Cheonan’s sinking and the establishment of relationships in the six-party talks, but the related authorities have shown subtle differences in their positions.

The recent positions of the Chinese and Russian governments on the Korean Peninsula situation have been clear: the sooner the six-party talks can resume the better, for the sake of peace and stability on the peninsula. Both governments have avoided making open references to the relationship between the Cheonan’s sinking and the six-party talks. At a press conference held at the Russian Embassy in Seoul’s Jeong-dong neighborhood on Tuesday to mark the 65th anniversary of victory in the Second World War, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Konstantin Vnukov stressed that Russia would like the six-party talks to resume as soon as possible. When asked to confirm Kim Jong-il’s visit to China, Vnukov replied, “We are looking forward to China making efforts to guarantee the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and successfully resolve the basic issue of resuming the six-party talks,” hinting at Russia’s intentions.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a briefing Monday, “Related countries are in agreement that making headway with the six-party talks and practicing the principles agreed upon in the September 19 Joint Statement conform to the interests of the nations involved.” Jiang also said, “It is our hope that all nations will work together to achieve this.” Regarding the sinking of the Cheonan, the Chinese government has consistently stated that it “hopes for a scientific, objective investigation.” While the statement itself is basic, it also emphasizes the burden of proof on the South Korean government.

“Dilemma.” This word from a U.S. government official sums up the disconcerting position Washington finds itself in, caught in the “alliance trap.” As Seoul goes “all in” the Cheonan, the policy keynote of the Obama administration, which emphasizes alliance diplomacy, conflicts with the global strategy of denuclearization through the six-party talks. Since the sinking, senior figures such as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell have refrained from making references to the six-party talks and advised waiting to see the results of the South Korean government’s investigation.

However, there have recently been signs of a shift in emphasis. During a briefing Tuesday (local time), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley repeatedly expressed hope that North Korea would return to the six-party talks. He even went so far as to ask to take more questions about North Korea when a question about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill came up during the briefing, and only moved on to other matters after confirming there were no more North Korea questions. This attitude stood in stark contrast to the ordinary approach. Also noteworthy is the fact that this came after both a long telephone discussion on April 29 between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Kim Jong-il’s arrival for his visit to China. Sungkyunkwan University Professor Lee Hee-ok said, “To the governments of the U.S. and China, the strategic importance of the six-party talks is greater than that of the Cheonan.” Lee added that the U.S. and China “will adopt a two-track approach, responding separately to the Cheonan and six-party talks issues.”

Unlike the U.S., Chinese and Russian governments, Seoul has been clear in its approach. A representative case is a public remark on April 20 by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, who said that the six-party talks “have to come after the Cheonan in the list of priorities.” In other words, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s formal policy is that determining the cause of the Cheonan’s sinking comes first, and discussions on resuming the six-party talks come later.

Facing such divergent diplomatic strategies from the nations involved, what will become of the situation in Northeast Asia? The most crucial factors are the summit between Kim Jong-il and Chinese President Hu Jintao, and the U.S.-China strategic and economic dialogue scheduled to take place in China on May 24 and 25. The general view among experts is that there is a strong chance these two high-level diplomatic meetings will result in speeding up diplomatic efforts towards the resumption of the six-party talks.

The result of the investigation into the cause of the Cheonan’s sinking, which the South Korean government is set to announce in the near future, is also likely to be a major variable. If the government announces formally that the sinking resulted from a North Korean attack, this will have an inevitable impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Even in that case, however, Seoul has the burden of presenting enough conclusive evidence and clear causality that all nations involved can agree upon. If it cannot provide such scientific proof, the South Korean government risks diplomatic isolation if it maintains its “all-in on the Cheonan” approach.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]