[Analysis] The changing order of Northeast Asia

Posted on : 2014-07-07 16:55 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
S. Korea caught in two emerging alliances, based either on values, led by the US, or history, led by China
 at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. Starting on June 26
at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. Starting on June 26

By Yi Yong-in and Choi Hyun-june, staff reporters

A rapid diplomatic competition is underway in Northeast Asia. The old order pitting South Korea, the US, and Japan against North Korea and China is crumbling, and each country is beginning to fight on its own to ensure its own survival. It is a sign of the grim reality of the world order, in which there are neither lasting friends nor lasting enemies.

At the moment, the countries of Northeast Asia are mobilizing a variety of strategies in the struggle for power. One example is the concerted efforts of North Korea and Japan to change the status quo, motivated by dissatisfaction with the current order and anxiety about an uncertain future. Another is China’s strategy of creating a strategy of solidarity based on common historical understanding, which challenges the American alliance of values targeting China.

On July 3, the leaders of South Korea and China held a summit at the same time as North Korea and Japan came to an agreement, symbolizing the battle of nerves being fought by each country as the rules of the game are being rewritten in Northeast Asia. To explain the survival strategies of each country - which bring to mind the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in Chinese history - we have chosen two keywords.

■Changing the status quo (NK and Japan) vs. maintaining the status quo (SK, US and China)

The keyword for understanding the negotiations between North Korea and Japan is “changing the status quo.” The vast scope and authority of the special committee for investigating Japanese kidnapped by North Korea that was set up by Japan and North Korea on July 4, and the fact that this was announced suddenly (unlike during the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in the early 2000s), show just how much the two countries are seeking to change the status quo. The Japanese cabinet’s decision on July 1 to endorse the right to collective self-defense can also be understood as another such attempt.

Japan‘s sense of crisis derives from concerns that, with China’s military spending exceeding Japan’s by more than three times, the country could ultimately engulf the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in China) and extend toward the Pacific Ocean. The perception that, if the US cedes its position as the dominant power in Asia to China, it will ultimately abandon Japan is giving impetus to Japan’s efforts to change the status quo. Japan cites the Nixon shock - when US President Richard Nixon took steps in 1972 to restore diplomatic relations with China without giving Japan any prior notification - as an example of such abandonment.

In this context, it appears that Japan wants to show China it is no easy prey by using negotiations with North Korea to bolster its diplomatic prowess. Japan’s exercise of the right to collective self-defense, which is serving to increase uncertainty in Northeast Asian affairs, is also aimed at China.

“One aspect of Japan’s declaration of the right to collective self-defense is strengthening the Japan-US alliance. But in the long term, it is also aimed at increasing Japan’s ability to defend itself in the worst-case scenario of being abandoned by the US,” said Kim Joon-hyung, professor at Handong Global University. Since Japan is not an independent factor like the US and China, it has adopted the strategy of hurrying to change the status quo on its own, Kim said.

North Korea is greatly interested in changing the status quo, as well. It believes that, to overcome its fears about the security of the regime, it must move beyond military hostility with the US, a relic of the Cold War and virtually the oldest hostile relationship extant today. Since aggressive actions such as nuclear tests have made it difficult to improve its ties with the US, North Korea regards a partnership with Japan as an opportunity to gain a transfusion of outside funds and to escape its isolation.

In contrast with this, South Korea and the US are focused on maintaining the status quo. Despite South Korea’s rhetoric about unification being a jackpot, South Koreans tend to see themselves as being in conflict with North Korea. And the US still feels it necessary to use North Korea as a pretext for putting pressure on China.

■ Historical coalition vs. values alliance

 

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to South Korea, he expended considerable effort to bring South Korea into the framework of the historical coalition. During a lecture at Seoul National University on July 4, President Xi referred to the Imjin War as a time in the past when Korea and China joined forces to overcome difficulty, noting that the people of the two countries went into battle with Japan with “animosity in their hearts,” a rather strong expression.

This could also be compared with how China attempts to maintain emotional ties with North Koreans by referring to the way it helped North Korea and fought against the US and South Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War as “helping Koreans fight the US.” In these terms, the late 16th century Imjin War becomes China “helping Koreans fight Japan.” China has also kept pace with South Korea in responding to the Japanese government’s attempts to undermine the Kono Statement and in agreeing to conduct joint research on the comfort women issue.

China’s historical coalition can largely be understood as being opposed to the US’s alliance of values. The diplomacy of values advocated by the Obama administration - based on freedom, human rights, and democracy - can be seen as a strategy of excluding China, putting the spotlight on China’s political and social weaknesses.

In concert with this American strategy, Kim Seong-hwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade during the administration of former president Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), declared in May 2012 that “the US-Korea alliance is not merely an alliance based on security or economic concerns; we are now entering the age of an alliance of values.” This thought was echoed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during an administrative policy speech before the Japanese Diet immediately after his inauguration in Jan. 2013. “As we craft strategies for our foreign policy, we must look at the wider world and take into account basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights,” Abe said.

“The US is restructuring East Asia through its alliance of values, and China is striving to keep Korea from getting caught up in the American policy for East Asia,” said one expert on US-China relations on condition of anonymity. Effectively, South Korea’s position is astride the very point where the two strategies collide.

However, experts point out the necessity of understanding that Japan’s actions are not motivated by the alliance of values with the US per se, but are rather strategic preparation for its survival, as can be seen by the haste with which the Japanese government entered negotiations with North Korea.

While the administration of President Park Geun-hye is emphasizing a popular coalition with China, in the bigger picture, this contrasts with the fact that South Korea remains closely tied to the alliance of values with the US.

 

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

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