hankyoreh

used for detecting Chinese ICBM (hypothetical)

If the US deploys the radar for THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) on the Korean Peninsula, it would be able to detect and track intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) being launched from China toward the continental US at ranges of up to 3,000 km or more as they pass over or north of South Korea, , two prominent US experts say.

Data collected in this manner could be communicated in real time to the early warning radar network at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska, which would allow the US to launch intercept missiles earlier.

This means that THAAD is not only intended to defend against missiles from North Korea as the Pentagon and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense claim, but that it would also be actively integrated, and used for interception, in a US missile defense system that is designed to counter China.

With THAAD - which China regards as a serious threat to its security - becoming a new cause of conflict between the US and China, South Korea is expected to be squeezed between the two countries, leading to serious difficulties in the areas of foreign policy, security, and the economy.

These were the results of a joint study conducted by Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology, and security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and George Lewis, senior research associate at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. The Hankyoreh became the first media outlet to receive the research findings on May 31.

Postol and Lewis, who have been studying missile defense systems for years, are regarded as the preeminent experts in the area. While there has been a great deal of controversy about the capabilities of THAAD radar, this is the first time that experts have published a technical analysis of the specific consequences of deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. The analysis is likely to carry major implications for ongoing debate about THAAD.

The two scholars argue that it is a problem that a THAAD base includes the AN/TPY-2 radar, which includes cutting-edge American military technology that enables long-distance detection. This means that, if this radar were deployed on the Korean Peninsula, it would become a component of the missile defense system intended to defend the continental US.

In their analysis, the two scholars conclude that, if this radar were deployed in South Korea, it would have enough time to detect the upper booster stage of a Chinese ballistic missile heading for the West Coast or East Coast of the US from the side or rear, which are easier to detect. Their analysis suggests that this missile could be detected while passing above the Korean Peninsula at a distance or 3,000 or 4,000km.

While this radar would probably not be able to track the warhead of a Chinese ballistic missile, it could detect the movement when the upper booster separates from the warhead. This data could be used by the early warning radar at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska to acquire and track the warhead from a greater distance than is currently possible.

“Data about a Chinese ballistic missile heading for the West Coast of the US would be particularly useful for the US. This could enable ballistic missile interceptors in Alaska to be launched more quickly,” Postol said.

Some have argued that if the US deploys “terminal mode” radar (with a detection distance of 600-900 km) rather than “forward-based mode” radar (1,800-2,000km), it would not affect China, but Postol dismisses this as “nonsense” inspired by ignorance of the radar’s capability.

He said, “The radar is not constrained to function only in the TM mode. The transition between TM mode and Forward-Based Mode is not difficult.”

Analysts in the US defense industry regard the radar’s maximum detection range as being greater than 4,500 kilometers, but the actual detection range varies considerably depending on the strength of the reflected signal of the radar waves that bounce back from the target.

The two scholars said that the missile defense system is fundamentally constrained by its inability to distinguish between real and fake warheads, making it inappropriate for meaningful missile defense.

“The radar is likely to be seen by Chinese military planners as potentially significant threats to China‘s survival should a situation evolve where a nuclear attack against the U.S. is actually being considered,” Postol said.

He advised, “The South Korean government and its people need to be fully aware that the Chinese might develop plans to attack this radar as part of an attack on the U.S.”

During a meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo at the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore on May 31, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff department for the Chinese military, expressed his concern about the deployment of THAAD with US military forces in South Korea.

By Park Hyun, Washington correspondent and Park Byong-su, senior staff writer in Singapore

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