hankyoreh

in San Francisco in June 1990. 　

Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean are becoming a vast chess board for international politics. Great powers such as the US, China, Japan, and Russia are making strategic diplomatic moves on that board as part of their long-term plans, which look decades into the future. At stake in this game are each country’s hegemony and national interest.

Despite claims that South Korea has been upgraded from a shrimp surrounded by whales to a dolphin-like medium power, there is little evidence that South Korea has its own game plan. There are concerns that, if things continue on their present course, geopolitical decision-making in Northeast Asia will become the exclusive domain of the whales.

More than relying on improvisation, the South Korean dolphin is in dire need of a bold but brilliant survival strategy.

The US and China are using national offensive and defensive strategies in the battle over hegemony over Northeast Asia. At the launch of the government of President Xi Jinping, resurgent China announced that its national vision was the “Chinese dream,” the goal of which is the rise of the Chinese people.

In the words of Park Byeong-gwang, analyst with the Institute for National Security Strategy, this means that “China has set the strategic goal of establishing itself as the regional power in East Asia” by 2020, the deadline for ushering in a xiaokang shehui (moderately prosperous society).

Beyond this, China has the long-term goal of establishing the “datong shehui” (great community) and achieving the rise of China by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.

Meanwhile, the administration of US President Barack Obama has set the “rebalancing Asia” as its key strategy for East Asia. The object of this strategy is to check the rise of China. And since Japan shares the American goal of checking China, it continues to work on its long-term national strategy of becoming a “normal country” that can wage war.

Russia has also announced its “new eastern policy,” hinting at its ambition of becoming a major player in East Asia.

While South Korea’s neighbors are crafting long-term diplomatic plans that thread together mutual rivalry and cooperation, South Korea’s own grand diplomatic strategy is losing more and more of its clarity.

One after another, the administration of Park Geun-hye has published diplomatic strategies including the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, and the Eurasia Initiative. But none of these strategies seem to be making a clear mark.

“South Korea’s obsession with the May 24 Measures has kept it from improving relations with North Korea, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative is stalled because of chilly relations with North Korea and Japan, and the Eurasia Initiative has given way to China’s plans for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its progress on the Belt and Road Initiative,” said Yang Gi-ho, professor at Sungkonghoe University.

Analysts say the problem stems fundamentally from failures in inter-Korean relations, a unilateral dependence on the alliance with the US, and an attitude emphasizing “principle” above pragmatism.

“You can’t build a two-story house without a first floor,” said former Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun. “The Eurasia Initiative is never going to get off the ground with North Korea’s consent and participation.”

The argument is that the initiative, which centers on linking a trans-peninsula railroad with the Trans-Siberian Railway to form a single sea and land route, is dead in the water unless Pyongyang is brought on board. The idea of advancing a vision of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia while weighing attendance at China’s Sept. 3 anniversary parade for the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II against Washington’s disapproval has been likened by some to “fishing up a tree.”

According to some observers, Seoul‘s only real choice is glean wisdom from the Park administration’s failures and attempt something new in which dependence on surrounding powers in diplomacy is seen as something to be overcome - to broaden inter-Korean cooperation into something involving the rest of Northeast Asia and Eurasia while developing a framework of coexistence that extends beyond the clashing major powers.

Relations with Pyongyang form a bedrock for Seoul‘s diplomatic strategy, and some observers are suggesting that as the side with greater capacities and resources, South Korea should be working on a bold strategy aimed at assuaging the North’s fears and building trust.

“We need to start by stopping the leaflet launches, and from there we should work to take advantage of areas of common ground in inter-Korean economic cooperation by ending the May 24 measures and resuming tourism at Mt. Keumgang,” advised University of North Korean Studies professor Yang Moo-jin.

If such efforts paid off in a successful railway and sea route linkage, this in turn could lead to greater cooperation within Eurasia, including countries such as Russia, China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.

Resuming the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program would be an especially key step, since it would allow for a linkage between a resolution on that issue and a vision for collective security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The September 19 Joint Statement from the six-party talks ten years ago in 2005 stated that the six countries had “agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.”

In a keynote speech for the Jeju Peace Forum on June 22, 2007, then-President Roh Moo-hyun said the six-party talks “should be developed into a body for multilateral discussions toward Northeast Asian peace and security cooperation even after the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved.”

“That body would function as a permanent institution for multilateral security cooperation to control armaments and mediate disputes in Northeast Asia,” he said at the time.

Major changes in the denuclearization situation since then mean that reaching a resolution on the nuclear issue will require more arduous negotiations. But South Korea’s experience in guiding the six-party talks to develop a denuclearization framework and steering toward an agreement to develop them into a multilateral regional security institution encompassing powers such as the US, China, Japan, and Russia warrants close consideration.

According to some, it’s an experience that should be extended beyond Northeast Asia into other parts of East Asia. To avoid being painted in a diplomatic corner where it has to pick sides in the complex structure of antagonists among the US, China, and Japan, the argument holds, it would be in Seoul’s interest to take the lead in developing and promoting different forms of multilateral institutions. Others argue that South Korea should work to resume trilateral summits with China and Japan, which have been halted over territorial and historical conflicts with those countries. The situation could be one where Seoul may play the role of a proactive mediator in the clashing between Beijing and Tokyo.

“If the US, Japan, and China can find common interests to replace their antagonisms through various frameworks for multilateral cooperation, then there won’t be clashing of powers that forces South Korea to make a choice,” said Seoul National University professor Chun Chae-sung.

A multilateral cooperation framework would also reduce the likelihood of any one power dominating bilateral relations with its influence. Not only would smaller countries have more chance of casting the decisive vote between competing powers, but they would also gain the opportunity for greater control through alliances. In other words, multilateral frameworks would increase the chance of Northeast Asia becoming a slightly more level playing field. As a “dolphin among whales,” Seoul would also be able to increase its standing and leadership diplomatically.

“South Korea is caught in between powers that are working according to long-term strategies, and it shows no signs of having a response strategy of its own,” said Korea National Strategy Institute director Kim Chang-soo.

“We need a clear vision of what kind of country we are going to be by the time the hundredth anniversary of liberation comes in 2045, and we need to prepare a strategy for achieving it,” Kim advised.

By Son Won-je, staff reporter

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