[Reporter’s notebook] The facts about THAAD missile defense system

Posted on : 2016-03-24 17:30 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
The South Korean government is pushing deployment of the system while understating its flaws
A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched from a battery during a flight operational test.
A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched from a battery during a flight operational test.

In spring 2015, I met with a missile defense expert at a Washington think tank. While we were discussing the possible deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula, he told me he didn’t really know if it would be helpful. Then he showed me a memo. It had been circulated quietly among experts, he said, and the US Defense Department and defense companies were in an uproar over it. It had been drafted by the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff for then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. It was called the “eight-star memo,” since it bore the signatures of two four-star generals.

The gist of it was this: based on assessments from front-line commanders, the generals had concluded that the ballistic missile threat from potential enemies was growing by the day and exceeded the US’s missile defense capabilities. It called the current US missile defense strategy “unsustainable” under current financial conditions and said the present moment was an opportunity for developing a long-term approach to missile defense priorities in the continental US and other regions, such as East Asia and Europe. It amounted to a frank admission: the commanders actually in charge of operating missile defense were saying it could only do so much to stop an enemy attack.

In the past, the two main limitations of missile defense cited by the Defense Department and others were performance issues and cost. The technical difficulties are severe - likened to trying to shoot down an oncoming bullet with another bullet. Perhaps the best example was the issue of decoy detection. Decoys here refer to dummy warheads that are made similar to actual ones and used to confuse missile defense radar and sensors. It’s a long-cited problem, and one the US has yet to solve.

At the same time, the Pentagon has also been forced to cut its defense budget, which means can’t afford to supply unlimited funds for astronomically expensive missile defense development and production. The Achilles heel there is that enemy countries are now able to produce ballistic missiles at lower costs than the US pays. Taking note of this issue for the US, Russia has opted for a response strategy of overwhelming missile defense by producing more ballistic missiles.

The big question in Washington now is how the Pentagon and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will respond to the issues cited by commanders. In January, MDA director Vice Adm. James Syring was invited to give a seminar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. While there, he made two noteworthy statements. First, he described the issue of detecting decoys and other enemy confusion tactics as “an integrated problem across the ballistic missile defense network” and “a challenge on the regional bases with Aegis and THAAD.” The message was that no really effective solution had been found yet. He also mentioned the financial concerns surrounding the missile defense project. “Those interceptors need to be procured by somebody,” he noted. In other words, he was suggesting that under current budget constraints, THAAD would have to be sold to procure resources to carry on with missile defense development and production.

In this regard, two claims about THAAD by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense at a Feb. 12 meeting with reporters are of particular note. One was that decoy detection was a basic radar feature and would definitely be possible. The other was that THAAD would not be especially costly for South Korea because it would be deployed with US Forces Korea, and that there was no plan to purchase it in the future.

Given the current climate in Washington, the South Korean ministry’s responses seem intended to mislead the South Korean public. In essence, the ministry is claiming that the decoy detection problem is not a problem, even as the US’s own MDA acknowledges it as a “challenge.” Moreover, the claim that the US - the dominant side in the alliance - will deploy and operate THAAD in South Korea purely at its own expense makes little sense in light of the budget difficulties it currently faces.

By Park Hyun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

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