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The Monju fast-breeder reactor

Japan‘s decision on Sep. 21 to shut down its Monju fast-breeder reactor, which had served as a pretext for holding plutonium, is expected to create more controversy in East Asia, which is already embroiled with conflict because of North Korea’s nuclear program. Another question is how Japan will manage to retain its supply of plutonium after closing the Monju reactor.

According to a document that was made public by the Japanese Cabinet Office in July, Japan held 47.8 tons of plutonium as of the end of 2015. Since 8 kg of plutonium is needed to manufacture a single nuclear warhead, that’s enough plutonium to make 6,000 warheads. Considering that the whole world was horrified to learn that North Korea is extracting plutonium from its 5 megawatt graphite-moderated reactor in Yongbyon, it is difficult to understand this double standard.

Japan’s justification for this has been its plan for a “nuclear fuel cycle” that it has pursued for several decades. Japan’s argument has been that, while it does possess a huge amount of plutonium, its purpose is to peacefully burn it in fast-breeder reactors, not to create nuclear weapons as North Korea is doing.

Responding to criticism from the international community about its plutonium stockpile, Japan has maintained that it will not store plutonium that it does not intend to use. In apparent recognition of the awkwardness of this situation, the Japanese government reconfirmed its plans to continue executing its nuclear fuel cycle plan, even after it shuts down the Monju reactor.

While Japan is not one of the nuclear power states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is regarded as being capable of making nuclear weapons at any time. Evidence for this argument includes Japan’s huge stockpile of plutonium and its advanced rocket launch capability, including the H-IIA, which boasts a stable launch ratio of more than 95%. Japan has indirectly indicated that it does not intend to give up the plutonium that it has gone to such efforts to make and to store as a safety precaution against the rise of China, the threat of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons and the reckless calls for nuclear armament from the South Korean right wing.

Indeed, discussion inside the Japanese government aimed at finding an alternative to Monju has reached some degree of progress. During a meeting of cabinet members connected with nuclear power that was convened at the Prime Minister’s residence on Sep. 21, the Japanese government decided to create a “fast reactor development committee” led by Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Hiroshige Seko and to confirm plans to develop new fast reactors.

The Yomiuri Shimbun and other Japanese newspapers reported that Japan would deal with this issue by participating in the development of the ASTRID fast reactor, which France hopes to begin operating in 2030. Separately from this, Japan has a “plu-thermal” plan in the works that would involve burning MOX fuel (made from a mixture of plutonium and uranium) in regular nuclear reactors.

The biggest pending question is whether the US will extend its nuclear agreement with Japan when it expires in July 2018. After six years of heated negotiations in the 1980s, Japan was able to secure sweeping prior approval from the US for nuclear activity including the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

Japanese newspaper the Mainichi Shimbun voiced concerns that, unless there is progress on the fast reactor development plan or the “plu-thermal” plan, the US will put the brakes on automatic extension of the agreement (which is valid for 30 years). After North Korea‘s third nuclear test in Feb. 2013, the South Korean government also asked the US for the kind of reprocessing authority that Japan has, but this request was ultimately denied. Japan is the only non-nuclear power state to which the US has granted reprocessing authority.

The final variable is the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, on which construction is supposed to conclude in the first half of 2019. When operations begin at this facility, it will enable Japan to acquire 8 additional tons of plutonium each year. This would mean the mass production of even more “useless” plutonium in a situation where Japan is already being viewed askance by the international community.

By Gil Yun-hyung, Tokyo correspondent

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