hankyoreh

Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo (right) and Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Yasumasa Nagamine sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) on Nov. 23. The Ministry refused to allow news photographer to photograph the signing ceremony

“What is ‘confidential information’? Say Kim Jong-un is wearing a Prada outfit - is that kind of thing confidential information?”

This question came up when I was talking to Kwon Eun-jung, the person in charge of the “Friendly Reporters” piece in the Hankyoreh’s Saturday edition, about South Korea and Japan’s General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). What do you think?

In my case, I answered, “Probably not.” According to the GSOMIA text, military secrets are defined as intelligence that “could result in a clear danger to national security if leaked.” It’s a Class I secret if the risk is “fatal,” Class II if it’s “conspicuous,” and Class III if it’s “substantial.” What Kim Jong-un is wearing wouldn’t seem to have anything to do with military secrecy.

Let’s consider another. Some of you may recall the story about Kim Jong-il brushing his teeth. After he was felled by a stroke in Aug. 2008, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) director reported to the National Assembly that Kim was “not capable of more than brushing his teeth.” So what about that? It’s about the health of North Korea’s supreme leader, so it would seem to be a bit different. And given claims that the North Korea human intelligence network suffered greatly as a result of the NIS’s conjecture based on leaked information, it does seem to constitute a secret.

I asked a senior military intelligence officer about it, and was told that the question of what and how numerous Class I, Class II, and Class III secrets are is itself a matter of security. To indulge me, he let me know that as of June 30, there were fewer than ten Class I secrets and about 47,000 Class II and III secrets together. Sources around the military have said Combined Forces Command operational plans like OPLAN 5027 or OPLAN 5015 and code books fall into Class II, while unit formations and organizations are managed as Class III secrets. Passwords aren’t even considered secrets; they are said to be “confidential,” which is a level below that. GSOMIA applies to Class II and III secrets, but not Class I. Since Class I secrets represent just 0.00002% of secrets at most, that basically means just about everything.

The Ministry of National Defense has cited Japan’s outstanding intelligence gathering capabilities as one of the reasons this agreement is needed. Japan has five spy satellites that South Korea lacks and long experience with tracking Russian submarines, which is expected to be helpful in monitoring North Korean subs. But it’s questionable whether there was a proper review or assessment of whether Japan’s military intelligence will really be all that useful. The Ministry of National Defense has scarcely been able to really look at Japanese intelligence on North Korea. Not only that, but the South Korean military already receives military intelligence from US forces. Are Japanese satellites superior to the US’s? Did this agreement really have to be passed over overwhelming public objections, and in the middle of the Choi Sun-sil scandal to boot? The questions just keep coming, and none of them have answers.

The content of GSOMIA is nothing big in itself. It just says each side should use its domestic law to protect the intelligence they provide each other with so it can be exchanged without concerns. It doesn’t obligate anyone to provide intelligence; all exchanges are based on each side’s determinations and needs.

But in the context of Northeast Asia’s roiling security environment, the story changes somewhat. The US’s strategy for Northeast Asian hegemony is focused on hemming in a rising China. Japan’s expansion of the scope of its Self-Defense Forces’ activities is based on China being viewed as a de facto threat. Clearly, the US and Japan want to drag South Korea into this front against China as part of a trilateral system. That would entail having the US alliances with South Korea and Japan as the main axis, with stronger military cooperation between South Korea and Japan to fill the gap of the triangle’s third leg.

Intelligence cooperation is the foundation and starting point for all military cooperation. It won’t stop there. Pressure to step up military cooperation with Japan will only intensify. But this also means South Korea being pulled step by step into a framework pitting the US and Japan on one side against China on the other. Would that be a good thing for us? Aren’t we already hearing stories about Korean popular culture being rejected in China over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system deployment plans?

On Nov. 24, the day after the agreement was signed, the Japanese media was filled with articles about how Japan would potentially request information about deployment of South Korean forces and airport and seaport information to evacuate its own citizens in the case of an emergency. That would certainly give the lie to the Ministry of National Defense’s previous claims that the agreement was intended as a measure against the North Korean nuclear and missile threats. The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper even said Japan’s Defense Ministry was “hoping for South Korea-US operational plans” and predicted the agreement would “allow for more realistic training and cooperation by South Korea, the US, and Japan.” How far is this bilateral military cooperation with Japan going to go? What kind of vision or outline does the South Korean military have for it? Does it have one at all?

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]