hankyoreh

Moon Chung-in

Hankyoreh (Hani): Can you describe in broad strokes how the Trump administration will affect the Korean Peninsula?

Moon Chung-in (Moon): The Korean Peninsula policy won‘t be taking shape until April or May, when all the assistant secretaries have been appointed and confirmed. There are a lot of variables. But the main question is whether the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” policy will be retained, since that is linked to the global strategy the Trump administration comes up with. One has to bear in mind that Trump will reconsider the alliances according to his “America first” policy and that he’s more interested in geoeconomics [than geopolitics]. It’s also important to remember that Trump has a tendency to acknowledge what is called the Chinese and Russian sphere of influence, so he‘s not on the same page as the geopolitical strategy of checking and blockading China.

Hani: What kind of changes do you expect for the South Korea-US alliance?

Moon: Trump is blunt about the alliances. He has called out South Korea, Japan, NATO, Germany and Saudi Arabia for getting a “free ride.” He has a strong sense that the US is the benefactor and that its allies are the beneficiaries. The primary issue is adjusting how much of the joint cost of the South Korea-US alliance is covered by the two sides. First is defense burden sharing. South Korea spends 2.4% of its GDP on defense, and Trump could ask it to increase this to the US level of 4.3%. Second is defense cost sharing related to US Forces in Korea. South Korea is covering around 50%, and Trump could ask it to cover as much as 100% of this. These adjustments could be complicated by resistance inside South Korea. If a progressive government comes to power in South Korea, the question of pushing forward the transfer of wartime operational control [of South Korean troops to South Korea] would be sure to come up. Trump is likely to say that South Korea can have it right now if it wants it. He tends to act on instinct and impulse.

Hani: What about the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons?

Moon: This is the fundamental problem. If Trump takes the “anything but Obama” approach, he’ll try to change the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience.” There are two ways to do that. One is reaching a breakthrough through dialogue and negotiations, which is the desirable direction for South Korea. The alternative is military action, which could lead to some quite difficult developments. The nominee for Defense Secretary has not ruled out a preemptive strike on North Korea.

Hani: Trump hasn’t been sending any messages to North Korea since winning the election.

Moon: The primary area of interest for the Trump administration’s foreign policy is the war on terror. China and Russia are important, too. North Korea’s nuclear program is unlikely to be his number one priority.

Hani: What are the implications of that?

Moon: For that very reason, we need to take the initiative on responding to the North Korean nuclear issue no matter what the next government‘s ideological leaning may be. The cast here should have South Korea in the leading role and the US and China in supporting roles. Many people mistakenly see the US as an independent variable and South Korea as a dependent variable, but I think it’s the other way around. There‘s a dire need for an imaginative foreign policy in which we take the initiative in inter-Korean relations and use the resulting influence over North Korea as leverage with the US.

Hani: THAAD is another pressing issue.

Moon: That one’s actually easy. Trump has been skeptical about the technological effectiveness of missile defense systems. If the South Korean government asks for the deployment to be delayed given the current circumstances, Trump could be accommodating. To Trump, deploying THAAD with US Forces in Korea could come across as the US giving something without getting anything in return.

By Kim Ji-eun and Lee Je-hun, staff reporters

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