hankyoreh

Thomas Berger

Thomas Berger is Professor of International Relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies and author of “War, Guilt and World Politics After World War II”. He recently conducted an email interview with the Hankyoreh’s Washington correspondent, discussing the likely foreign policy of the incoming administration of US President Elect Donald Trump.

Hankyoreh (Hani): What do you think will be the essence of Donald Trump’s foreign policy?

Thomas Berger (Berger): It is very hard to tell at this point in time what kind of foreign policy the Trump administration will wind up pursuing. Even if I had direct access to the President-elect and his advisors (which I do not), many Presidents come into office with a set of ideas which they ultimately have to discard entirely. In all likelihood the same may be true of the incoming Trump administration. Moreover, there are clearly deep divisions of opinion between Trump and some of his advisors, most notably the new Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis. How Trump will manage those differences once in office is an interesting question. Will he listen and allow himself to be guided by his advisors, or will he ignore them?

That being said, we can divine some basic tendencies in Trump’s remarks, which give us some idea about how the tack that the new administration will take, at least in the short run. While the President talks about the importance of unpredictability, this is more a matter of tactics than overall strategy. His is a fundamentally transactional approach to foreign policy making. Instead of emphasizing the US as being in a complex network of relationships with other countries, be they traditional friends and allies (like South Korea) or long-time enemies and rivals (like Russia), Trump seems to view the US as having made a number of deals with other countries which can be challenged and renegotiated as the needs of the moment require.

Hani: What impact might this have on the Korean peninsula?

Berger: If my analysis is correct and if I were in South Korea, I would be very, very concerned. South Korea is in the front lines of any conflict involving North Korea and/or China. Trump’s protectionist instincts also could have major negative implications for South Korean economic interests. At the same time, Seoul’s leverage with Washington is limited. This might incline a new leadership to seek a closer relationship with Beijing, but this too will be very problematic. Differences in interest between South Korea and Beijing remain at least as large as between Seoul and Washington, even under Trump. Moreover, it is desperately important to try to find ways to discourage the United States from taking unilateral actions against Pyongyang. Siding openly with Beijing against Washington would destroy whatever influence Seoul has with the US. It will be vital for Seoul to work with some of Trump‘s advisors to create a credible strategy for managing the North Korean nuclear challenge, and find ways of meeting some of Trump’s demand for more alliance burden sharing. At the same time, Seoul would be well advised with Beijing to find some way of creating at least the image of a grand new bargain in East Asia that satisfies Trump‘s psychological need to profile himself as the agent of change without giving in to his dangerous confrontational and protectionist instincts. For better or for worse, South Korea is once again a pivotal actor in East Asia. I hope very much that the next government in Seoul will be up to the challenge.

Hani: Do you agree that Trump’s foreign policy will be characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability, inconsistency?

Berger: From this perspective, unpredictability makes sense. Just as it does not make sense to go into a car dealership and tell the merchant that one wants to buy a car for 30,000 dollars, from Trump’s point of view the United States should try to squeeze as much advantage out of other countries as possible. If South Korea, Japan, the NATO countries can be pushed to do more in terms of supporting international security, the US should get them to do so. It cannot do so, however, if it promises to come to their defense whenever needed. They need to be reminded that the US can - and very well might - choose not to support them if it does not get enough benefits from doing so. Conversely, if a long-time rival like Russia is able to help the United States deal with a serious problem which it is in the interests of both nations to confront, then it would be foolish to pass up the opportunity.

This does not mean, however, that Trump’s actions are likely to be entirely random. He does have his set of ideas of what American interests are and which countries he can work out new deals to better pursue them.

Hani: Do you think that Trump’s foreign policy should be placed within the history of Jacksonian tradition? If yes, why?

Berger: Some have compared President-elect Donald Trump to President Andrew Jackson, who came into office in 1829. Like Trump, Andrew Jackson was an anti-establishment populist who was viewed with suspicion by the political establishment. And like Trump, Jackson had an “America first” view of the world, one that did not seek to remake the world in America’s own image, but rather related to the outside world on the basis of a clear-eyed assessment of American interests. Neither the spread of democracy nor the promotion of a global trading order should be a US priority. This is at least one characteristic of the Jacksonian tradition, and it certainly seems to reflect Trumps basic instincts as revealed in the comments that he has made about foreign policy dating back to the 1980s.

The other part of the Jacksonian tradition is that when the US does use force, it will do so in an unrestricted fashion. Trump, who went to a military academy as a young man and who clearly values tough men with military experience, may share this view. Whether such a policy would in fact be practicable in a world of nuclear states is questionable. If he does in fact pursue such an approach, it should be a matter of some great concern to countries like the Republic of Korea, which may be caught in the crossfire of any conflict that a Trump administration might spark. Advisors like General Mattis and Senator Mike Pompeo (CIA) with greater experience may try to dissuade him from such a course of action.

Hani: Why do you think Trump is trying to get closer with Russia in terms of strategy?

Berger: With regard to Russia, the dominant view among US commentators is that Trump‘s evident respect for Vladimir Putin is a reflection of his overwhelming vanity and ego and the former KGB’s canny ability to take advantage of the President Elect’s character flaws. This may be true, but there may be a more strategic calculation as well. There is the argument that in the long-run the United States has a greater interest in maintaining stability in key areas around the world than promoting democracy.

In the case of the Ukraine, the United States should come to an understanding with Russia that recognizes that the Ukraine falls in Russia’s sphere of interest in return for stabilizing the region. In practice, this means an informal guarantee that the Ukraine will not join NATO, encourage Kiev to give the Donbas region a high degree of autonomy, and dropping or weakening Western economic sanctions. While the West would continue to diplomatically dispute Russia‘s annexation of Crimea, in practice this will remain a largely rhetorical exercise. In return, Russia would force the rebels in the Donbas to come to terms with Kiev, it would promise not to escalate tensions in the Ukraine, much less start a new front in the Baltics, and it would reduce its confrontational stance towards NATO.

In the Middle East, the United States would accept Russia helping the Assad regime reestablish control in Syria, with the support of Iraq, Iran and Turkey and the tacit approval of the Netanyahu government in Israel. A joint fight against the Islamic State and Sunni extremism will be a central legitimating project of such an alliance (even as the Kurds are sold out once again in order to get Turkish cooperation).

Hani: Do you think that the Trump’s hawkish comments on China are just preparation for near-term deals or aimed at competition for hegemony?

Berger: The larger goal of the Trump administration is to confront China, which it sees as a rising power that is challenging US preeminence both militarily and economically. Isolating China by building a better strategic relationship with Russia would make a great deal of sense from this perspective. Trump‘s protectionist economic policies seem largely aimed at China - although philosophically he and other members of his administration - notably Wilbur Ross (Commerce), Peter Navaro (Council of Trade advisors) and Charles Lighthizer (USTR) all seem to be not only anti-China but also opposed to the idea of free trade. Instead they seem to be inclined to pursuing neomercantalist, “managed trade” policies of the sort that we saw expounded by the anti-Japanese lobby in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Trump’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Sea dispute also seem to reflect this tough, anti-Chinese view of the world. How this will translate into concrete policy remains unclear, although we could expect more and more forceful Freedom of Navigation Operations, etc.

The key question is whether Trump really sees China as a long-term threat that requires a protracted campaign of containment and possibly confrontation, or whether the anti-Chinese rhetoric is just part of a bargaining strategy that seeks to extract extensive concessions from Beijing on trade and North Korea. Both are possible, and in all likelihood Trump thinks much will depend on whether the Xi Jinping regime is willing to strike a deal with the US or not.

Hani: What impact could Mr. Trump‘s policy have on the Middle East, Europe, Asia?

Berger: It is impossible to tell whether Trump will be able to implement this strategy or not. He appears to have an exaggerated sense of what US power can accomplish, and he does not appreciate how other countries may react in ways that may surprise him. China and North Korea, but also Saudi Arabia and the European allies all may wind up taking actions that he might think are not in their interests. How Trump holds up in a serious crisis will also be interesting to see.

By Yi Yong-in, Washington correspondent

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]