hankyoreh

Zhang Lifan

Zhang Lifan, a former researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and independent-leaning historian and political critic, drew analogies to the “Records of the Three Kingdoms,” “Legend of Chu and Han” and China’s national unification to describe Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ascent to power, which culminated in the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress that came to close last week. The 67-year-old historian described the process as a battle among three factions – the so-called Princelings (descendants of prominent Communist Revolution veterans), the Shanghai clique (a Shanghai-based group), and the Communist Youth League of China (CYL) – that ultimately became a one-on-one contest between the Princelings and non-Princelings, which ended up conquered by the “Xi army.” In an Oct. 2 interview the Hankyoreh, Zhang warned that the free hand the Xi army now enjoys is “dangerous.”

Hankyoreh (Hani): Let’s take a look at the process of the collective leadership system becoming a one-man system in the five years Xi has been in power. What is the background of Xi’s success in concentrating authority?

Zhang Lifan (Zhang): If you compare it to a company, then the “red families,” including the Princelings, could be seen as the founders’ majority shareholder group. They view the Shanghai clique and CYL as outside figures along the lines of professional managers. As the Shanghai clique (Jiang Zemin) and CYL (Hu Jintao) continued on in power, the red families wanted their own man to take over at the helm. This kind of battle between the aristocrats who inherited power and those who came to power on the strength of the past is a traditional political dynamic in China.

Hani: Should Xi’s rise to power be seen as a victory for the Princelings?

Zhang: Xi’s father [Xi Zhongxun] was originally a reformist, so there were expectations Xi would be a reformist too. When he came to power at the 18th Party Congress [in 2012], it was a dream come true for the red families. But there’s a widespread sense of disappointment even among the Princelings now that the Xi army has pushed aside the three factions and taken over completely.

It’s also a generational change as the existing factions have become older. The Shanghai clique hasn’t had any successors to speak of since the 18th Party Congress, and there’s a good change there will be no one left in the leadership by the 20th Party Congress five years from now. The CYL has also been on the decline, and most them will be subject to [retirement at the age of 68] in the next five years. This is a full-scale takeover where the Xi army is integrating and acquiring everybody, and the succession framework that Xi wants will also be in place five years from now.

Hani: Couldn’t this “full-scale takeover” provide stability?

Zhang: It’s dangerous. In particular, when the supreme leader’s [Xi’s] name becomes the party’s guiding philosophy, it becomes something that no one else can approach. It also implies infallibility, which could lead us back to the mistakes of the Mao Zedong era. Mistakes by the leader end up becoming the mistakes of the leadership underneath him and the party as a whole.

Hani: What are the chances there was an agreement among the party leadership that this kind of power structure was necessary?

Zhang: Five of seven people are stepping down from the 18th supreme leadership (Standing Committee). Most of the people who are leaving prioritize their own safety and are utterly dependent on the current leader. The leaders scheduled to stay on have gained immense power, and nobody is likely to have raised any objections.

Hani: It seems like a kind of cult of personality trend is emerging.

Zhang: It’s a familiar sight for people who lived through the Mao Zedong era. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) went on to reflect on the Cultural Revolution and effectively repudiate it. The leaders were cautious too. But the one there now [Xi] went through a turbulent time experiencing the Cultural Revolution during his youth when his worldview was being shaped and not receiving a formal education. There’s probably some influence from that.

Hani: Could the current leadership model be the best one for China?

Zhang: There’s a shared direction to human civilization, and China can’t continue forever driving on the wrong side of the civilization highway. But Western-style democracy has also brought its share of problems. The CCP is trying to export the Chinese model to the rest of the world.

Hani: Its diplomatic approach has been characterized as much more aggressive.

Zhang: The CCP has been stressing what it calls “home ground diplomacy,” talking about how it has staged several successful meetings already. It’s very similar to the way “barbarians” from other countries came to have an audience with the Emperor during the days of the various dynasties.

At the same time, the One Belt One Road Initiative is another driving force. If “Red Empire 1.0” came in the 1960s when Maoism was exported to support revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, then the One Belt One Road Initiative is “Red Empire 2.0”: expanding influence by leveraging an economic strength [China] didn’t have back then to buy up political authority, businesses, infrastructure, media, and resources. I’ve even heard some of the Princelings referring to certain African countries as “our colonies.” Chinese diplomacy is set to follow an approach of expanding Chinese interests as part of the “Red Empire” dream.

Hani: There have been concerns about China’s rise among South Korea and other neighbors.

Zhang: When you have this strong of a neighbor, you have to worry. Everyone wants coexistence, but we don’t know what form that coexistence will take. In terms of the Taiwan issue, the impulse to unify by force could intensify if a leader strongly committed to “leaving a legacy” commits himself to achieving that goal. But the timing for that is also tied to China’s development situation.

By Kim Oi-hyun, Beijing correspondent

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]