hankyoreh

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gives his annual policy address during the first day of the regular session of the Japanese Diet on Jan. 28.

In his annual policy speech, delivered on Jan. 28, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took the unusual step of omitting a reference to South Korea-Japan relations. This deliberate snub – which comes amid a souring in the two countries’ relations over a South Korean judicial decision about compensation for victims of forced labor and a controversy about a “threatening flyby” by a Japan Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft – is presumed to be a an attempt to counter South Korea.

When Abe made the address containing his policy plans for the year on Monday, the first day of the regular session of the Japanese Diet, he made no direction reference to South Korea-Japan relations. Over the past few years, Abe had made a specific reference to South Korea, using a range of expressions, even though the two countries’ relations were rocky because their dispute over historical issues. In this address, however, Abe omitted that reference altogether.

In regard to North Korea, Abe promised to “break the shell of mutual distrust and move toward a solution on North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile program and on the most important issue of the abductions.”

“Next, I will take bold action and won’t miss out on any opportunity to sit down personally with Chairman Kim Jong-un,” Abe said.

The only reference to South Korea came in this context, when Abe said that he would be “closely coordinating with the international community, in particular Washington and Seoul.” One inference is that Japan’s relationship with South Korea has been downgraded to a necessary means of dealing with North Korea.

After Abe’s speech, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono delivered a foreign policy speech in which he pressured South Korea by underlining Japan’s typical hardline stance on territorial and historical disputes.

“[South Korea] is strongly urged to keep its international promises, including its agreements with Japan about the right to make claims and about the comfort women issue,” Kono said.

“We consistently convey Japan’s position about Takeshima [called Dokdo in Korea], which is Japan’s sovereign territory, and will respond strongly and persistently.”

Since returning to power at the end of 2012, Abe has used his yearly policy addresses to steadily lower the importance of South Korea-Japan relations. In 2013 and 2014, he retained previous administrations’ language about South Korea being “our most important neighbor sharing our fundamental values and interests,” but in 2015, after the dispute over the comfort women issue intensified, Abe only referred to South Korea as “our most important neighbor,” dropping the phrase about “fundamental values.” During a string of nuclear tests and missile launches by North Korea in the following years, Abe emphasized the importance of military cooperation with South Korea in 2016 and 2017 by using the expression “an important neighbor sharing our strategic interests.”

There appear to be three reasons that Abe has played the “strategic disregard” card against South Korea. What was made clear in Abe’s message was his confidence about the Japan-US alliance, which was upgraded to a “global alliance” under former US President Barack Obama, and in Japan’s relations with China, which have greatly improved as of late. In regard to Japan-US relations, Abe said that “the Japan-US alliance has become our strongest alliance ever.” Abe also asserted that China-Japan relations “had been completely brought back to normal track by [my] visit to China last fall.” This reflects Japan’s confidence that it has enough diplomatic clout to disregard its relations with South Korea for the time being.

The second reason can be regarded as the fact Japan has less need for security cooperation with South Korea, since the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles has decreased considerably since early 2018. In its 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan announced that it would work to conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with South Korea. But in last year’s edition of those guidelines, Japan only made an abstract reference to “strengthening trilateral solidarity [with South Korea and the US] for peace and stability in the region.”

Finally, Abe appears to have calculated that the dispute between South Korea and Japan offers an unexpected “political opportunity” to pursue his “life’s work” of revising Japan’s constitution. According to a public opinion poll reported by the Nihon Keizai Shinbun on Jan. 28, 62% of the Japanese public want Tokyo to make a “strong response” to the low-altitude flights by patrol planes with the Japan Self-Defense Force. Thanks to this conflict, the Abe cabinet’s approval rating has climbed six percentage points from last month to 53%.

Japan’s apparent disinclination to make any effort to improve relations with South Korea in the near future places Seoul in an even greater quandary about how to respond.

“Seoul’s approach should be responding with restraint to prevent its relations with Japan from degenerating too far. If the second North Korea-US summit alters the situation in Northeast Asia and increases the need for North Korea-Japan dialogue, [the Japanese government] could pivot toward cooperation with South Korea,” said Yang Gi-ho, a professor of Japanese studies at Sungkonghoe University.

By Cho Ki-weon, Tokyo correspondent, and Park Min-hee, staff reporter

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]