hankyoreh

Lee Won-deog

The intense frictions between South Korea and Japan over historical issues have escalated into a trade conflict. After recently adopting control measures on three types of semiconductor and display materials amid its objections to a South Korean Supreme Court ruling ordering compensation for forced labor mobilization, Japan declared last weekend that it plans to cut South Korea from its “white list” of countries receiving favorable treatment for the exportation of strategic goods.

What is the backdrop for this race toward a head-on collision in South Korea-Japan relations, and how is it poised to play out? What solution can be found? The Hankyoreh posed these questions in a meeting with Lee Won-deog, 57, a professor of Japanese studies at Kookmin University and expert on South Korea-Japan relations. Lee, who returned to South Korea on July 17 after a two-week visit to Japan, said Tokyo’s announcement of economic retaliation measures was “carried out like an ambush operation by associates of Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe in the Prime Minister’s office and elsewhere and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry,” while other agencies “were apparently unaware.” Describing the mood in Japan, Lee said the “prevailing view among the Japanese media and intellectuals is critical.” In terms of a solution, he suggested the “best way would be to resolve things through diplomatic negotiations between South Korea and Japan.”

“If that isn’t possible, we may have to consider taking the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an alternative,” he said. The interview took place at the Hankyoreh’s offices in Seoul’s Gongdeok neighborhood on July 15 and lasted for over an hour and 30 minutes.

professor of Japanese studies at Kookmin University

Hankyoreh (Hani): Japan’s trade retaliation measures are unexpected. What do you see as the context for this trade retaliation?

Lee Won-deog (Lee): One of the surface reasons the Japanese government has given is damage to the relationship of trust, and another is that there were inappropriate measures in terms of security issues. Internally, however, the primary thing is likely to be unhappiness over the South Korean government disbanding the foundation established according to the 2015 South Korea-Japan comfort women agreement, and I think a second is displeasure over the South Korean government not taking any measures in response to the South Korean Supreme Court ruling ordering compensation for forced labor mobilization. It seems like that unhappiness built up before finally exploding.

Hani: The timing of Japan’s retaliation measures was a bit of a surprise. Some had predicted Japan might attempt some concrete response around early next year when measures were taken to liquidate assets seized from Japanese companies in accordance with the South Korean Supreme Court ruling, but it came far earlier than people were expecting.

Lee: I was also a bit skeptical about how ahead of schedule it was. Japan had announced that it would take “resistance measures” if the South Korean government didn’t offer a satisfying resolution on the forced labor trial result. It looks like the Japanese Prime Minister’s office carefully compiled a list of resistance measures suggested by different agencies and chose its priorities with a retaliation list of around 100 items. The G20 Summit was held in Osaka in late June. They couldn’t really retaliate before that because Abe had named “free and fair trade” as an agenda item for the event. There’s also a House of Councillors election on July 21. While it’s a minor variable, Japan most likely did not slap its retaliation measures together because of the domestic political timetable. You have to assume this came out of some very careful preparations and fine-tuning. Yet if you really look at the details, it’s not a case of going ahead with embargo measures right away – it’s a matter of the administration reserving the right and opening the path toward an embargo. That aspect also seems to have been a consideration in the timetable being moved up.

Hani: You returned to South Korea last weekend after being in Japan until recently. What was the mood like there as you perceived it?

Lee: Speaking in general terms, the matter is a big issue in South Korea, where it’s perceived as a national crisis, but that isn’t the mood in Japan. It isn’t an important issue in the House of Councillors election either. The main issues are domestic things like pension reform and Abe-nomics. The major media in Japan take a rather dim view of Abe’s retaliation measures. The Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei, and Tokyo Shimbun have all published critical editorials. If you meet with policy experts, former government officials, and newspaper editorial board members, most of them will say they “don’t know what Abe is thinking” with these measures. I’ve heard people asking, “Can he keep this up when it’s only going to hurt Japanese industries?” What we should be paying attention to is the fact that there seems to be some resentment built up with the Japanese public over South Korea’s forced labor conscription trials and measures on the comfort women issue. So it seems like there was a mood that there needed to be some resistance measures. Over 70% of the Japanese public believes the South Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on forced labor was unfair. I think the level of support is right because of the perception that the government can’t just sit by and do nothing when a Japanese company’s assets have been seized. So there’s a bit of a gap in views between intellectuals and the public.

Also, if you listen to what they’re saying internally in the Abe administration, it looks as though the retaliation measures were a kind of “ambush operation” by Abe’s associates, including aides in the Prime Minister’s office and officials in the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry. There’s been some bafflement expressed by the other agencies. According to media reports, even Foreign Minister Taro Kono was apparently unaware. I met personally with senior officials in the Foreign Ministry, and I got that sense from them too.

Hani: Do you anticipate another critical moment early next year when the seized assets are scheduled for liquidation?

Lee: I always expected the deadline for liquidation would be the moment when the time bomb went off. That’s still true now. The current measures from Japan are like a signal. They’re not blocking exports right now – they’re announcing, “We’re applying sanctions.” They’re saying, “This is what we could do.” But if the liquidation goes ahead, if compensation for labor is provided through the sale of Japanese companies’ assets, then public opinion will sour, and the Japanese government will be obliged to take action. I suspect the liquidation measures will respect a kind of “crossing the Rubicon.”

during his interview with the Hankyoreh

Hani: How do you expect the situation to be resolved?

Lee: There’s a chance the retaliation will be softened or withdrawn if a solution is suggested and negotiations take place depending on how the results of the forced labor trial are handled. Japan will need a pretext for backtracking on the “cards” it has played here. It could provide a justification for withdrawing the measures if a reasonable method for addressing the trial result is suggested and there’s a growing sense that things can be resolved through negotiations with Japan.

Hani: Does that mean we need to provide Japan with a rationale for backing down?

Lee: I think so. In a case like the current one where one side’s principles are clashing with the others, it becomes difficult for either side to make concessions or compromise. But when the two sides are clashing from a position of equal strength, the reality of the current economic structure between South Korea and Japan is such that the losses to us will inevitably be greater.

Hani: The South Korean government has suggested a solution with the so-called “1+1 approach,” where compensation is provided to the forced labor conscription survivors from a fund with voluntary payments from South Korean and Japanese businesses, but Japan rejected the idea. What are their demands?

Lee: It appears they see the 1+1 approach is being less than fully thought through. I think they believe it should be a “2+1 approach” with the South Korean government also participating, rather than a “1+1 approach” with just South Korean and Japanese companies. With the South Korean government involved, the matter would have to be discussed between the companies and the survivors, and they’re skeptical about whether the problem can be dealt with that way. There are also different interests that need to be coordinated in terms of the size of the fund and the amount of compensation, and they question whether that’s possibility without the government playing a role. Additionally, some see it as unclear whether the survivors will agree enough to that kind of solution. After all, the comfort women agreement ended up on the road to ruin because the victims declared it to be unacceptable.

I don’t think the Japanese government will have any cause to reject a solution the South Korean government comes out with if they believe it can fully resolve the issue. As a rule, though, I would say that from Japan’s perspective, the issue was put to rest with the Claims Settlement Agreement in 1965, and they couldn’t pursue it as a matter of Japanese companies implementing measures as a legal obligation. I don’t think it’s out of the question for them to fund it voluntarily as a gesture of moral obligation.

Hani: Japanese conscription survivors lost their case in Japanese court, but Japanese businesses compensated them from a fund in accordance with a Supreme Court reconciliation recommendation. The Japanese government didn’t intervene at the time, declaring it to be a “private matter.” Couldn’t the same precedent be applied with the South Korean conscription survivors?

Lee: It could be a model for a resolution. But I think Japan views it differently because of the different frameworks for handling colonial issues with South Korea and for the postwar resolution with China. After the war, China forfeited its claims to compensation from Japan. I think that was a consideration for the Chinese survivors – whereas Japan’s argument is that the legal resolution came to an end in 1965 with the South Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement.

Hani: So the difference here is that South Korea received a payment in the past, whereas China did not?

Lee: I think that’s how Japan sees things. If the Japanese government took a tolerant view of [the case of the Chinese forced laborers], it could probably serve as a good model for a solution, but practically speaking, I think there’s hardly any chance that they’ll take that position.

Hani: You’ve also argued that South Korea needs to take this case to the International Court of Justice.

Lee: Our priority should be on resolving this through negotiations between South Korea and Japan. That’s the best approach. But I’m saying that, if that approach doesn’t work out, taking the fight to the International Court of Justice would be a decent plan B. Koreans tend to associate the International Court of Justice with [Japan’s demand to have the court try the territorial status of] Dokdo, but this has nothing to do with Dokdo. The court would only be dealing with the issue of forced labor. Since South Korea’s and Japan’s highest courts have issued conflicting rulings, we could ask a third party to decide the issue. The central question here is how to provide relief to the victims of forced labor. If the case is tried by the International Court of Justice, I don’t think we’d suffer a complete defeat. Under the currently established principles of international law, the rights of the individual cannot be completely annulled through an agreement between states. Even the Japanese Supreme Court has acknowledged that individuals maintain their right to make claims. It only found that those claims can’t be made through lawsuits. So it’s worth a shot debating this before an international court. I’m not suggesting that South Korea and Japan litigate all their historical debates. I’m saying we should get a third party to make a decision about the question of providing relief to the victims of forced labor.

If the case is taken to the International Court of Justice, it takes about four years to reach a decision, which could cause the two countries’ dispute to be deferred until then. And according to many scholars of international law, reconciliation is more likely when the court seems set to split its decision between the two sides. That is, a trial at the International Court of Justice could be an opportunity to further negotiations between South Korea and Japan.

Hani: But there’s the question of whether the losing side would submit to the court’s ruling. Furthermore, losing would carry a considerable political cost.

Lee: Since a joint petition by South Korea and Japan would be predicated on accepting the ruling, that shouldn’t be an issue. We’d have to view this as winning or losing on the narrow question of relief for the victims. If South Korea loses, the government could simply step in to provide its own remedy.

Hani: There are calls for the South Korean government to be held accountable for sitting on its hands and not tackling the issue for so long. How would you grade the government’s action?

Lee: It’s a problem that the government dragged this out for so long without coming up with an appropriate response. It’s really too bad that the government didn’t consider earlier on the questions of who should be in charge, who should come up with the strategy, and what the plan should be. It wasn’t until last month, eight months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in October 2018, that the government came up with its “one plus one” plan for joint funding by South Korean and Japanese companies. Some say the issue had previously been handled by the office of Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon, but it’s unclear exactly what options were considered there.

Hani: What should we do moving forward?

Lee: First of all, we need to open up channels of dialogue between South Korea and Japan. Since the retaliatory measures are ultimately focused on the issue of forced labor, our best option is to come up with a reasonable solution for that issue. Japan also needs to take a flexible approach. Economic retaliation is very inappropriate. It’s a dirty trick that flatly contradicts the principles of free and fair trade, principles that Japan itself has long advocated. The two countries’ historical dispute derives from the Japanese empire’s colonial occupation of Korea. Nothing can change the fact of who was the aggressor and who was the victim. As the aggressor, Japan needs to act with humility. But right now, the rules of aggressor and victim seem to have been switched in some unfair reversal. It’s very disappointing for Japan to be trying to push South Korea into the corner, as if Japan itself were the victim.

By Park Byong-su, editorial writer

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]