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South Korean President Moon Jae-in presides over a GSOMIA-related meeting of the National Security Council’s standing committee at the Blue House on the afternoon of Aug. 22.

After previously being viewed as a fixed framework within the Northeast Asia, trilateral security cooperation by South Korea, the US, and Japan broke down on Aug. 22 with the South Korean government’s decision not to extend its General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. Consequently, trilateral security cooperation returns to its level before GOSMIA was signed in November 2016 – but now burdened by the fallout from the recent frictions between Seoul and Tokyo. Observers are predicting the situation could deteriorate further depending on how Japan responds going ward.

The effects of Seoul’s decision appear poised to extend beyond its relations with Japan to unsettle ties with the US and the Northeast Asian order in general. To begin with, it is strongly significant to Japan in terms of questioning the bleeding over of historical attitudes into the realm of security. For the US, it may read as a warning calling for responsibility and respect toward the alliance – a message from the Moon Jae-in administration in response to Trump administration remaining on the sidelines amid South Korea’s efforts to resolve its conflicts with Japan, while at the same time pressuring Seoul with demands for a larger share of defense costs and the deployment of intermediate-range missiles. While Washington relayed the message that it wanted Seoul to keep GSOMIA in place during recent South Korea visits by White House National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, it also made it clear that it sees the South Korea-Japan dust-up as a matter for the two parties to resolve on their own.

“Japan would like to make its relationship with South Korea into a vertical framework as it pushes forward with its Indo-Pacific strategy with the US, while the US has been focused entirely on bringing South Korea on board with its Indo-Pacific strategy,” said Cho Sung-ryul, a senior researcher for the Institute for National Security Strategy.

The South Korean government’s decision is also significant as a move to push on the brakes as the situation around the Korean Peninsula is redrawn in line with the US- and Japan-led Indo-Pacific strategy. Washington’s past Northeast Asia strategy followed a structure with the US as a central axis, where both South Korea and Japan formed relationships on an equal footing as its “spokes.” But the new trend has been one where South Korea joins the ASEAN countries as a subordinate partner under an Indo-Pacific strategy pursued by the US and Japan as a way of checking China’s rise.

Seoul’s decision further deals a blow to the US’ Northeast Asia strategy of using the sharing of military information between South Korea and Japan as a basis for establishing trilateral missile defense, and ultimately developing this into a regional alliance. Amid the frictions between Seoul and Tokyo, it spells a major crossroads for the strategic direction of the trilateral security cooperation that the US has been spearheading to date.

“The signing of a South Korea-Japan acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), which had been mentioned as the next stage following GSOMIA, is out of the question now,” said one military expert in Seoul.

“The future of trilateral security cooperation is going to be unavoidably constrained,” the expert predicted.

Some analysts suggest the nature of the recently emerging South Korea-US row was never compatible with the vision for trilateral security cooperation in the first place – owing to the inevitable clash between South Korea-Japan cooperation and Japan’s growing militarism with its basis in distorted historical views.

“Trilateral security cooperation is rooted in the US’ vision of using South Korea and Japan to keep China and Russia in line and opposing the North Korean threat,” explained a professor at Korea National Defense University, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“There’s also an internal contradiction, where the backlash from South Korea only intensifies as Japan’s push to establish itself as a military power and amend its Peace Constitution gains force,” the professor said.

South Korea’s decision now raises addressing the cracks in trilateral security cooperation as a matter to be resolved. Other powers that are troubled by that cooperation – including China, Russia, and North Korea – are already digging at the fissures.

“As soon as the South Korea-US row was exposed, China and Russia were staging military exercises in the East Sea, and the intrusion of a Russian military aircraft on [South Korean] airspace could be seen as a case of picking at those holes,” a military official said.

South Korea-Japan relations now appear to have plunged into a tunnel of long-term confrontation or conflict. The end of GSOMIA sends a stern message that South Korea does not intend to flinch before Japan’s unreasonable demands.

“When Japan is treating South Korea as an ‘untrustworthy country in security terms,’ taking it off its white list [of countries receiving expedited export reviews for strategic materials], and refusing to view South Korea as a friendly power when it comes to security, South Korea cannot share sensitive information with such a country,” the Blue House said.

Experts saw Seoul as adopting an all-or-nothing approach after Japan’s continued refusal to engage in dialogue, ignoring the signals sent by President Moon Jae-in in his celebratory address for National Liberation Day on Aug. 15. The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is spearheading the export controls, has rejected Seoul’s demands for discussions; in a bilateral foreign ministers’ meeting on Aug. 21, Japan merely reiterated its previous stance.

“By ending GSOMIA, the South Korean government hit back with a stronger-than-anticipated move in response to the total lack of any sign of room for compromise on Japan’s part,” said Nam Ki-jeong, a professor at Seoul National University.

“If Japan’s removal [of South Korea] from its white list signaled that it was entering a long-term process of re-establishing bilateral relations in terms of historical issues, then the end of GSOMIA may be a signal that relations are entering a long-term process of geopolitical reconstruction,” Nam suggested.

Yang Kee-ho, a professor at Sungkonghoe University, noted, “While Japanese companies have been willing to reconcile with the victims of forced labor mobilization, the Japanese government has exacerbated things by moving to block them from offering compensation.”

“The situation is one where it’s going to be tough to restore trust for the time being,” he said.

Now that South Korea is putting an end to GSOMIA, observers are watching to see if Japan escalates things further. One possibility is a hardline response as Japan increases the number of items requiring individual export permits when it issues its enforcement degree on Aug. 28 removing South Korea from its white list.

“Japan could use its technology dominance to step up its ‘Korea onslaught,’ claiming that South Korea ‘can’t be trusted,’” predicted Yang Kee-ho.

“That could end up leading to a blow-for-blow response where South Korea makes an even more forceful case over the discharge of radiation-contaminated water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean and turns radiation safety into an international issue for the Tokyo Olympics,” he added.

By Yoo Kang-moon and Park Min-hee, senior staff writers

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