hankyoreh

Chang Won-sam (right)

Following Seoul’s decision to terminate its intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan, the US has repeatedly expressed its “regret” and “disappointment” over that decision. The only way to mollify the US, many figures say, is to permit a major increase in South Korea’s contribution to the cost of stationing American troops on the Korean Peninsula.

After patching over their historical disputes with the comfort women agreement in 2015, South Korea and Japan concluded the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2016, with enthusiastic persuasion, and arm-twisting, by the US. GSOMIA was an edifice that the US built to achieve trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan, with the purpose of countering China. According to this argument, Seoul has essentially aroused the US’ wrath with its GSOMIA decision, which undermines the US’ strategy for Northeast Asia. In order to appease the US, therefore, Seoul may have to accede to a major hike in its share of the joint defense cost, a major goal of the Trump administration.

The countdown has begun on negotiations for South Korea and the US’ 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), as the cost-sharing agreement is known, with the negotiations slated to begin in mid-September. South Korean government officials are worried that these negotiations will be tougher than ever before. The primary reason for US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s visit to South Korea at the end of July was to hand over the “bill” for a big hike in South Korea’s defense contribution. The message reportedly sent by the US is that the annual cost of the American troop presence and operations in South Korea is US$5 billion, and that South Korea needs to foot as much of that bill as possible.

South Korea’s contribution according to the 10th SMA, which went into effect this year, was 1.04 trillion won (US$857.99 million): in short, the US is effectively asking for a fivefold increase. It’s not even clear what grounds there are for Washington’s claim that US Forces Korea (USFK) costs US$5 billion a year. Presumably the standard about “defending South Korea” found in the two countries’ mutual defense pact and the USFK’s Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has been replaced with a new standard that puts South Korea on the hook for the cost of American military activities in the South China Sea and elsewhere that are part of the US’ global strategy.

According to Article 5 of SOFA, which lays the legal foundation for USFK, South Korea is supposed to provide the land and facilities, while the US is supposed to cover the entire cost of stationing and maintaining the USFK. South Korea paying that latter cost would, by definition, be a violation of SOFA. Because of that, South Korea has been paying part of the cost of stationing American troops through the separate SMA agreement since 1991.

That began with South Korea covering part of the personnel cost for South Korean workers, but today that has expanded to include nearly the entire personnel cost, along with the cost of military construction projects and support for military supplies. In addition to its cost-sharing contribution, South Korea also spends about 4 trillion won (US$3.3 billion) each year on arranging lots for facilities, waiving rent on land, and supporting the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army program, abbreviated as KATUSA. And on top of that, a substantial portion of the 50.15 trillion won (US$41.37 billion) that South Korea has allocated for next year’s defense budget will be used to purchase high-tech weapons from the US.

Given these circumstances, it’s impossible for South Korea to agree to a massive increase in its defense contribution, as the US is requesting. Seoul will have no choice but to say no. Considering that Trump has often boasted to his supporters about how he’s forced South Korea to increase its share of the defense cost, these negotiations will probably turn into wheeling and dealing with Trump himself. It’s not hard to picture Trump going on Twitter to complain that “USFK costs too much” and to threaten to “bring the troops home if the rich South Koreans don’t pay more.” If an anonymous American official leaked information to the press about scaling back the American troop presence, that by itself would have massive repercussions in South Korea.

In relation to this, we should take note of the argument made by right-wing conservatives in South Korea and Japan that the recent conflict between those two countries is leading to South Korea’s abandonment. The September issue of Japanese right-wing magazine Bungei Shunju featured an article titled “The day the Moon administration becomes an enemy state.” This article contends that the South Korean left wing is trying to draw the 38th parallel across the East Sea and to side with North Korea and China against Japan. According to this article, Japan needs to prepare for cutting off diplomatic relations with South Korea and establishing a “maritime bloc” with Taiwan and the US to counter a “continental bloc” consisting of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia.

This Japanese argument dovetails with concerns raised by South Korean conservatives and some American experts about what they see as a “new Acheson line.” Now that South Korea has decided to pull out of GSOMIA, they say, the US will drop South Korea from its East Asian strategy and draw up a “new Acheson line” encircling the US, Japan, and Taiwan. The threat here is that South Korea will be discarded if it refuses to serve the US as its junior partner and forward outpost against China. These conservatives are evidently willing to grovel before Japan, extend GSOMIA after all, and massively increase South Korea’s share of funding USFK. By this logic, if South Korea tries to speak up for itself, and for its national interests, against American and Japanese demands for its incorporation into trilateral military cooperation, it will be branded as an enemy state that has sided with China.

On Aug. 29, the US relaunched its Space Command, which had been originally established by the Reagan administration in 1985 — at the height of the Cold War — in order to handle missile defense and monitoring. The old Space Command was at the heart of the “Star Wars” initiative designed to combat the Soviet Union, and the subsequent arms race was a major factor in the Soviet Union’s downfall.

In 2019, Trump is toying with his own version of Star Wars: the US’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty marks the first chapter in a rivalry for military hegemony with China, in which another military arms race is being ignited with the hope of bringing China down.

Even if South Korea doesn’t renew GSOMIA or increase its defense contribution as much as the US wants, would the US really pull troops out of its numerous bases in South Korea, which are located in close proximity to China and are crucial to the American containment of China?

By Park Min-hee, senior staff writer

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]