hankyoreh

Masao Okonogi, professor emeritus at Keio University (Hankyoreh archives)

“Strategy sharing will enable the sharing of attitudes.”

Masao Okonogi, professor emeritus at Keio University and one of Japan’s foremost Korean Peninsula experts, said in an email interview with the Hankyoreh on Aug. 11 that a solution to the conflict between Seoul and Tokyo over a South Korean supreme court ruling on compensation for forced labor needs to start with the sharing of a diplomatic strategy rather than fighting over differences in fundamental perspectives. Okonogi, who has dedicated himself to Korean Peninsula research since studying in South Korea during the 1970s, said that South Korean President Moon Jae-in showed the right approach to the issue with his remarks at a South Korea-Japan summit in Chengdu on Dec. 24 of last year, where he declared that “arguing over the essence of the matter only makes things more difficult.”

Hankyoreh (Hani): Many people are concerned about South Korea-Japan relations being at their worst since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1965. How do you view the two sides’ current relationship?

Masao Okonogi (Okonogi): It’s serious enough that calling it the “worst ever” may not be an exaggeration. There was also a rapid souring of relations at the time of [then opposition party leader and future President Kim Dae-jung’s abduction in 1973, but nobody was taking issue with the 1965 South Korea-Japan Treaty system itself. Things have also gotten more serious with the Japanese military comfort women issue, but that always fell outside the framework of the Claims Settlement Agreement [a supplementary agreement to the Treaty on Basic Relations]. For the Shinzo Abe administration, it was traumatic to see the invalidation of the South Korea-Japan comfort women agreement that it reached with the Park Geun-hye administration on Dec. 28, 2015. That appears to be why it responded with such an unusually stern approach with the increased strictness [of controls on] exports to South Korea.

Hani: How much of an effect do you think it will have on South Korea-Japan relations if the liquidation [of assets seized from Japanese companies to compensate forced labor survivors] goes ahead?

Okonogi: The South Korean government has been citing the separation of powers to justify the administration’s non-intervention, while the Japanese government has been voicing concerns about the South Korean judiciary and executive working together to reduce the Claims Settlement Agreement to a skeleton. This means the collapse of the very heart of the “1965 system,” so [Tokyo] is weighing various options in response, including recalling the [Japanese] ambassador [in South Korea]. South Korea will respond with its own measures, creating a worst-case scenario for relations between the two sides.

Hani: Do you think it’s possible to solve the export control and forced labor issues at the same time?

Okonogi: The two issues are politically linked, so it would be difficult to find any other way. Japan could loosen up on its management of exports to South Korea if South Korea resolves the conscripted labor issue in a way that doesn’t negatively impact Japanese businesses. In a summit with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Chengdu last December, President Moon Jae-in said, “The important thing is to find a solution. Arguing over the essence of the matter only makes things more difficult.” That’s the right approach. I’d like to see the two of them fleshing that out, either at the G7 summit in the US or at a trilateral summit with China. Now is the time to be marshaling wisdom.

Hani: Some have suggested that a resolution to the forced labor issue will require establishing a joint foundation between South Korea and Japan to provide comprehensive restitution to the survivors. Of course, there are also those who see such an agreement as unrealistic.

Okonogi: Both South Korea and Japan have to resolve their own issues. The Japanese government cannot accept a situation where a Japanese company is legally compelled to provide funds. And the Japanese government can’t stop the South Korean government and companies from organizing a foundation or Japanese companies and people from cooperating voluntarily in the interest of a humanitarian restitution. That may represent the most realistic solution.

Hani: Some have suggested that the fundamental differences between South Korea and Japan’s policies on North Korea and China are so deep that they can’t regain the same level of cooperation that was seen in 1998 when President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced their “joint statement on a new South Korea-Japan partnership for the 21st century.”

Okonogi: There’s no need to view things in such rigid terms. The Kim-Obuchi declaration reflected a current of international cooperation and historical reconciliation following the end of the Cold War. The Japan diplomacy of the Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in administration has been a reflection of structural changes in East Asia with China’s emergence as a major power. But that situation is undergoing rapid changes again.

The growing competition between the US and China is expanding into a new cold war. If the US were to clearly acknowledge the failure of its past policies of intervention with China and increase its US-China “decoupling” policies in terms of technology and markets -- as we’ve seen in the semiconductor and information industries -- then Japan and South Korea would be left with no choice but to cooperate. They would be obliged to share strategic interests as “middle powers.”

Hani: Do you have any suggestions you want to make to the South Korean and Japanese governments?

Okonogi: Japan and South Korea currently share a lot of the same basic diplomatic objectives and interests. Yet their diplomatic relationship remains divided by the strange and unpleasant history of the early 20th century, with one country annexing its neighbor. My Korean friends claim that we can’t share diplomatic strategies unless we share the same attitudes on history. It’s actually the reverse: it’s the building of mutual trust through long-term strategy sharing between South Korea and Japan that will enable the sharing of attitudes. That’s why the two sides’ governments cannot afford to neglect efforts toward strategy sharing for the same of the next generation.

By Cho Ki-weon, staff reporter

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