Conditions for OPCON transfer are excessive, S. Korean analyst says

Posted on : 2020-08-21 18:46 KST Modified on : 2020-08-21 18:54 KST
Sejong Institute’s Kim Jung-sup argues for reevaluating transfer standards
Robert Abrams (center), commander of US Forces Korea, Choi Byung-hyuk (right), deputy commander of Combined Forces Command, and Nam Young-shin (left), commander of Ground Operations Command, observe a firing exercise by the Republic of Korea Army 5th Artillery Brigade in October 2019. (USFK’s Facebook account)
Robert Abrams (center), commander of US Forces Korea, Choi Byung-hyuk (right), deputy commander of Combined Forces Command, and Nam Young-shin (left), commander of Ground Operations Command, observe a firing exercise by the Republic of Korea Army 5th Artillery Brigade in October 2019. (USFK’s Facebook account)

As the US and South Korea move toward transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) of the South Korean military from Washington to Seoul, an expert has argued that the conditions for that transfer, and the process by which those conditions are verified, are excessive.

This objection was raised by Kim Jung-sup, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, in an Aug. 20 report titled “Issues and Challenges in the OPCON Transfer.”

“The tasks required for each condition [for the OPCON transfer] and the method of verifying them are excessive in light of the current plan, which would maintain the CFC [Combined Forces Command] system even after the OPCON transfer. Therefore, those tasks and that method should be reassessed and [new] standards adopted,” Kim said.

South Korea and the US originally agreed to three conditions for the OPCON transfer: the South Korean military’s acquisition of key capabilities, development of the ability to counter the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, and the security environment around the Korean Peninsula. They further agreed that, after the OPCON transfer, the future Combined Forces Command (CFC) would be led by a four-star general from the South Korean military, rather than the US military.

Maintenance of CFC makes S. Korean military capability less relevant

Kim raised questions about that arrangement in his report. “If the CFC system is to remain unchanged even after the OPCON transfer, it’s doubtful whether strengthening the capabilities of the South Korean military really ought to be a strict condition for the OPCON transfer,” he wrote.

“If the only thing that changes after the OPCON transfer is the nationality of the CFC commander, the key condition for the transfer should be an assessment of leadership ability — namely, whether the South Korean four-star general is capable of leading joint operations. It’s excessive to focus the assessment on the South Korean military’s physical capabilities, including the acquisition of armaments and enhancement of surveillance assets.”

Kim also addressed the method of assessing and verifying the operational capabilities of the future CFC, which consists of three stages: initial operational capability (IOC), full operational capability (FOC), and full mission capability (FMC). “[These standards] are significant when carrying out a preliminary assessment and verification of the operational capabilities of a newly established unit. We need to rethink applying [such] strict verification standards to the CFC, which already exists,” Kim said.

South Korea and the US completed their verification of the initial phase (IOC) last year and were planning to do the same for the second phase (FOC) this year, but that was delayed until next year because of the continuing transmission of COVID-19.

Plan has been altered, but verification method remains the same

“The three-phase verification [of the future CFC] was adopted in line with the Park Geun-hye administration’s concept of dismantling the current CFC and setting up a future CFC. The problem is that the verification method has been retained even though the plan has been altered to maintain the current CFC system,” Kim said.

In addition, Kim drew attention to recent reports in the press indicating that the delay of this year’s FOC verification has basically made it impossible to complete the OPCON transfer before President Moon Jae-in leaves office. “Strict conditions and verification for the OPCON transfer make the schedule vulnerable to continuing interruptions connected with efforts to enhance South Korea’s military power, situational variables including the COVID-19 pandemic, and the position of the US government and its interpretation [of the agreement],” Kim said.

“The South Korean military should acquire key military capabilities through the Defense Reform 2.0 initiative, but the method of assessing and verifying the conditions for the OPCON transfer needs to be revised and made more reasonable,” the analyst added.

“All the way back in 2006, the George W. Bush administration wanted to carry out the transfer as early as 2009, believing that the South Korean military had adequate capabilities. Opponents of the OPCON transfer continue to argue that it’s ‘too soon,’ but in the end, our decision about the timing of the transfer has less to do with capability and circumstances and more to do with resolution and judgment,” Kim said.

Since South Korea began preparing in earnest for the OPCON transfer in 2007, Kim reported, it has invested more than 153 trillion won (US$129 billion) into building up military strength. “The South Korean military’s ability has increased by leaps and bounds,” he said.

Kim said that South Korea and the US should aim for a parallel system of command led by the South Korean military and supported by the US military in order to satisfy the purpose of the OPCON transfer. If that’s not feasible, he added, the CFC should be reorganized to give the South Korean military a bigger role.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

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