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Amid a fierce confrontation between the US and China over Hong Kong and the South China Sea, diplomats from the two countries traded angry words for the first time during the foreign ministers’ meeting in the East Asia Summit, which was held remotely on Sept. 9. The intensifying conflict between the US and China has prompted the US to elaborate its Indo-Pacific Strategy of containing China in the form of its Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia, and India, known as the Quad. This is a situation that must be astutely handled by the government of South Korea, which seeks to maintain a diplomatic balance between the two powerful countries.

On Sept. 9, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha attended meetings of ASEAN Plus Three (South Korea, China, and Japan), South Korea-ASEAN, and East Asia Summit foreign ministers in turn via teleconference. The high point came with the East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ meeting, which was attended by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Pompeo did not attend the event last year, but signaled plans on Sept. 2 to attend this year.

In a press conference that day, Pompeo explained, “We’ll have discussions that will be wide-ranging, including on COVID, North Korea, South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Burma’s Rakhine State. I’ll also raise how the Trump administration is restoring reciprocity to the US-China relationship.” His remarks sent the clear message that he planned to use the meeting as a setting for reining in China and demonstrating unity with allies and partners that share the US’ views.

In connection with this, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said at the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum on Aug. 31 that the Indo-Pacific region is “actually lacking in strong multilateral structures” and does not have “anything of the fortitude of NATO or the European Union.”

“Starting with the Quad, starting with just the four might be a very important start,” he continued. Biegun’s remarks have drawn so much attention because the Quad’s collective security regime for containing China is much more concrete than the abstract concepts of the “rebalancing strategy” and “Indo-Pacific strategy” that have characterized the US’ efforts to check China since the 2010s.

The Barack Obama administration, which advocated a “rebalancing strategy” to contain China, upgraded its relationship with Japan to a “global alliance” through an April 2015 amendment of the two sides’ Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The Trump administration also regarded Japan as a key partner, deciding on a joint strategy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in November 2017. In an “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” published in June 2019, the US Defense Department clearly signaled its plans to counter the Chinese challenge and retain dominance in the region by collaborating with Indo-Pacific allies and partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. As if to underscore its resolve, the US changed the name of its “Asia-Pacific Command” to “Indo-Pacific Command” around the same time.

Since then, the US and Japan have continued laying the groundwork for the Quad by conducting various joint military exercises in the Pacific and Indian Oceans with Australia and India. In September of last year, they held an inaugural meeting of the four countries’ foreign ministers in New York, where they reached an agreement on plans to cooperate toward achieving the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” While there haven’t been any concrete movements regarding South Korea, the strategic importance of the South Korea-US alliance -- which the US has called a “linchpin” for the Indo-Pacific’s prosperity and development -- suggests that Seoul will eventually be asked to take part in some form of an expanded “Quad-plus” framework.

To date, whenever Washington has made references at summits and other settings to its Indo-Pacific strategy -- which has a strongly “anti-China” aspect -- Seoul has responded by underscoring its own New Southern Policy, a strategy that involves boosting economic cooperation with the members of ASEAN. After a summit in South Korea with Trump on June 30 of last year, President Moon Jae-in announced plans to “pursue cooperation harmonizing South Korea’s New Southern Policy and the US Indo-Pacific policy based on the regional cooperation principles of openness, inclusiveness, and transparency.” Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Se-young sounded a similar note in a strategic foreign ministers’ dialogue with Biegun on July 9.

Full-scale efforts to bring the Quad vision to fruition appear likely to get under way once the next administration is launched in the US in late January 2021. In a possible nod to the US presidential election schedule in November, Biegun said the framework was “something that I think in the second term of the Trump administration or, were the president not to win, the first term of the next president [. . .] would be very much worthwhile to be explored.” With both Trump and rival Democratic Party candidate Joseph Biden sharing the same message in pursuit of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad concept appears likely to go forward regardless of who is elected.

It obviously remains to be seen how smoothly the plan goes forward amid pushback from South Korea, India, and ASEAN -- which aim to preserve a balance between the US and China -- and vehement objections from Beijing. With Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Yang Jiechi sharing a message on Aug. 22 calling for “ushering the strategic cooperation partnership between China and South Korea to a new plateau,” a rash decision on Seoul’s part is expected to trigger a major outcry from Beijing.

By Gil Yun-hyung, staff reporter

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